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ABSTRACT
I explore the relationship between religious affiliation and support for democratic 
values in postcommunist societies. Using the Tocquevillian idea o f the institutional 
learning o f democratic values within civil society, I examine three post-transition 
countries o f Eastern Europe for evidence that the churches preserved and promoted 
democratic values during the years o f Soviet regime control.
Comparative historical examination of the relationship between the institutional 
churches and the state during the years o f communist regime control demonstrate how the 
churches worked to preserve and promote democratic values. In those countries where 
the churches were marginalized and excluded from power by the state (such as Poland 
and East Germany) church elites worked to promote the reemergence o f civil society.
But where the churches were able to maintain a base o f power through cooperation with 
the communist regime (Hungary) church elites were less involved in the democratic 
transformation process.
Survey data on democratic attitudes in Poland, Hungary, and eastern Germany in 
the immediate post-transition period o f 1990-1992 demonstrate that church attenders in 
these societies, similar to church attenders in western Germany, report higher levels o f 
support for democratic values than non-attenders. Church attendance is strongly related 
to democratic values o f confidence and trust in institutions, as well as support for a 
democratic form o f government. Church attenders demonstrate more support for 
democratic values in societies where the church had an instrumental role in the recreation 
o f civil society (Poland and eastern Germany) than they do in Hungary, where the church
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cooperated with the regime and did little to promote democratic values. Some evidence 
of optimism, trust, and efficacy among church attenders in these post-transition societies 
is also attributed to the church’s active participation in the transition.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
After 45 years of totalitarian domination, churches in Eastern Europe are free 
again to operate as they did before the communist takeover following World War II. 
Although the churches had not been abolished outright, they were strictly constrained by 
the Soviet-controlled governments and often severely repressed. Marxist teaching does 
not proscribe religion, but rather considers religion to be primitive and superstitious, and 
predicts that religion will tend to disappear in an enlightened communist society (Marx 
1974). The official policy of the communist governments was to tolerate the churches for 
the social services they provided, while their normal practice was to do as much as 
possible to discourage people from active participation.
Nevertheless, the churches managed to jy isist in the harsh environment of Soviet 
totalitarianism. They not only provided social and spiritual services for the masses, they 
also played an important part in the prodemocracy movement which culminated in the 
democratic transformations of 1989. The churches in several of the countries of Eastern 
Europe were influential in providing structural support for those groups and organizations 
who sought to overthrow the Soviet regime. The churches also provided support for the 
expression and preservation of democratic values which were likewise suppressed by the 
regime.
Now that the democratic transformations have taken place in most of these 
formerly communist lands, it is possible for the first time to see just how much decline
I
2the churches behind the Iron Curtain have experienced, and evaluate what remains of 
them. It is enlightening, surely, to examine the numbers and see what the figures for 
church membership and church attendance actually are in post-communist eastern 
Europe. However, church membership and attendance rates have been falling steadily 
(and in some places, such as the Netherlands, even dramatically) since World War II. We 
would expect church membership and attendance rates to have been significantly affected 
by the years of repression.
More important to an understanding of the persistence of influence of the 
churches behind the Iron Curtain, then, is an examination of the attitudes of those who 
remain affiliated with a church in eastern Europe. How much influence have the 
churches been able to retain over the moral and political values of their members? Are 
Eastern European church members' values significantly different than those of their 
western brothers and sisters? In addressing these questions I will be able to explore what 
remains of the churches in Eastern Europe today after two generations of communism.
In this paper I examine the moral and political values expressed by individuals 
living today in formerly communist countries. Using survey data collected in several 
countries of eastern and western Europe in 1990 and 1991,1 examine the moral and 
political values of church attenders to see how much influence over those values the 
churches have been able to retain. For comparison with church members in western 
European democracies who have not had to contend with state repression of churches, I 
contrast several eastern European countries to the case of the western part of Germany, 
which has been a successful democratic state since 1945.
3There exists a gap in the literature regarding the moral and political values of 
contemporary church attenders in Eastern Europe. I propose to address this gap by 
investigating the values of Eastern European church attenders in eastern Germany, Poland 
and Hungary. I chose these three specific countries of Eastern Europe because I believe 
they are roughly comparable to one another in several important ways, and at the same 
time share some interesting differences.
East Germany, Poland and Hungary were the first of the former Soviet bloc 
countries to achieve a democratic transformation, followed closely by Czechoslovakia. 
Free elections took place March 18, 1990 in East Germany and Hungary, May 27, 1990 
in Poland and June 8,1990 in Czechoslovakia. All three countries have historical ties to 
the West, consider themselves to be Europeans, and share a primarily Judeo-Christian 
religious heritage. Although East Germany was the most advanced in terms of industrial 
and economic development of all the nations in the former Soviet Bloc, Poland and 
Hungary were also relatively well industrialized and economically developed. For 
example, percent o f GNP in industry for 1975 was 49% for East Germany, 48% for 
Poland and 39% for Hungary (East European Economies. Joint Economic Committee, 
U.S. Congress, 1977).
All three countries share a somewhat western orientation. Even during the years 
of Soviet domination, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary preferred to 
refer to themselves as "Central Europe" to distinguish themselves from the more eastern 
orientation of the remainder of the Soviet Union. Historically, the distinction refers back 
to the split of the Catholic church into eastern (Orthodox) and western (Roman) spheres
4of influence. The countries of "Central Europe" were under the influence of the Roman 
Catholic Church, as was the rest of Western Europe. The rest of the Soviet Union was 
territory that had been under the influence of the Eastern Orthodox Church. As for 
exposure to western culture, East Germany had the advantage of access to West German 
TV and radio. But Poland and Hungary had Radio Free Europe and the BBC. They also 
had the Roman Catholic Church. The western orientation of Catholicism and its 
historical significance in both Poland and Hungary helped shape both countries' national 
identification in terms of western culture. And the global organization of Catholicism 
provided links with the Western world, particularly through ties with international 
organizations (Johnston 1992).
Despite the similarities of their ancient religious histories, the particular religious 
cultures of these three countries are quite different. Eastern Germany is predominantly 
secular, with about 65% claiming no religious affiliation, but its primary religious 
affiliation is Protestant (about 30% of the population). Poland remains predominantly 
Catholic, with very few non-believers. Hungary is about 70% Catholic, about 20% 
Protestant, and about 5% non-believers. Each country also experienced a continuum of 
religious participation in the prodemocracy movement. Poland had very active church 
participation in the prodemocracy movement, East Germans were active participants in a 
few church-organized protests toward the end of the movement and during the transition, 
but Hungary had practically no participation by churches in the prodemocracy movement. 
These three countries have enough in common, then, to allow me to formulate a 
conceptual model about church/state relationships in the totalitarian societies of Central
5Europe, although the effect of this relationship was unique within each country and will 
be analyzed separately.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The problem of interest in this analysis is what has remained of the churches in 
eastern Europe after 45 years of communism. Are church members' attitudes different 
from those of non-affiliates? What are the moral and political values of church attenders 
in eastern Europe? Are they significantly different from those who do not attend? How 
much influence has the church been able to maintain in these post-transition societies?
Very little research has been done on the political attitudes of church members in 
post-communist societies. There has been some historical documentation of the 
persistence of churches behind the iron curtain, but in all areas under Soviet domination 
the social sciences were severely repressed and compelled to reflect Marxist teaching. 
Empirical social research was carefully controlled by the Soviet regime, and the few 
opinion surveys that were fielded since 1945 have not been made available to the general 
public. Even if such data were made available, the representativeness of the results 
would be suspect.
In contrast, the richness of data available since the fall of communism in Eastern 
Europe allows me to conduct empirical research on the political and religious values of 
individuals immediately following the democratic transformations. These data are from 
1990-91 and they provide a baseline measure of the extent of democratic values in 
postcommunist societies at the point of their democratic transitions. Likewise, baseline 
measures of church attendance and religious beliefs allow me to examine the extent and
6depth of secularization in Eastern Europe. In these analyses, I measure how much 
influence the churches have been able to maintain in Eastern Europe and how much 
influence political repression of the churches has had on the political values of church 
attenders.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Values in Society
There is an extensive literature on the relationship between institutions and 
values. Research from the 1950s and 1960s generally asserted that it was the preexisting 
political values which influenced the development of the subsequent political institutions 
(see, for example, Stouffer 1955, Lipset 1960, Almond and Verba 1963, and Easton 
1965). A reaction to this admittedly functionalist view was provided by the literature of 
the 1970s and 1980s, which tended to assert the opposite -  that it is the political 
institutions which influence the political values of citizens (see Barnes and Kaase 1979, 
Almond and Verba 1980, and Alford and Friedland 1985). These structuralist 
interpretations are now being challenged by theories which suggest a synthesis between 
the two poles -- an interaction between political institutions and political values (see Weil 
and Gautier, eds., 1994, especially the articles by Weil, Kaase, and Steinmetz; see also 
Casanova 1994).
I agree that the relationship is a complex one, with values and institutions 
interacting together to produce the political culture. Another important aspect of this 
relationship, though, is the realization that the various institutions of society also interact 
to influence the political culture. In particular, I point out the influence of the church, as
an institution of civil society, on the political culture. And 1 assert that the church affects 
political culture in two ways — as an institution itself and through the actions of 
individual church members.
Civil Society and Political Culture
Civil society is understood here as that sphere of social interaction existing 
independently from the State.1 In a totalitarian state, such as the Soviet Union, civil 
society is officially nonexistent, as the state ostensibly controls all aspects of public life. 
However, even in a totalitarian state, structures exist which are self-organized outside the 
institution of the state. In particular, churches are an example o f an institution which is 
organized outside the realm of the state, which retain an autonomous, if circumscribed, 
existence even while under the domination of the state.
Civil society is important to the state, for it is the arena in which political 
socialization takes place. Political socialization is a very important factor in regime 
support. Every state tries to socialize its citizens to assimilate its dominant political 
values. Every institution of society has a role in that political socialization. And of all 
the institutions of society, such as families, schools, and other government bodies, the 
churches have probably the greatest possibility of autonomous existence in civil society, 
outside the realm of direct influence by the state. Whether in a democratic or a 
totalitarian society, the separation of church and state implies the autonomous existence
1 For a more thorough development of the concept of civil society see Seligman, 
1992; Casanova, 1994; Cohen and Arato 1992; and Frentzel-Zagorska, 1990.
8of the church as a power in society apart from the power of the state. Therefore, the 
churches can exert a powerful influence on political values.
The Church as It Influences Values 
The church has long been recognized as an important institution of civil society, 
significant to the regime for its support and promotion of the values important for the 
political culture (see for example, Lipset 1960; Tocqueville 1969). Together with 
schools, families, and a variety of political and other voluntary interest organizations, 
church involvement influences political attitudes. Max Weber's (1962) comparative 
study of the relationship between religion and the economy also demonstrated that 
religious values and ideas can be important agents for change in society.
Tocqueville, in his classic work Democracy in America, was particularly 
interested in the interplay between religion and politics. He observed that in his native 
France the oppositional relationship between the Catholic church and the newly 
established French liberal democracy seemed to be detrimental to both parties. But in 
America there appeared to be relative harmony between Christianity and democracy. He 
tried to understand and explain first the need for religion in a democratic community and 
second the effect of religion on a democratic society.
Churches influence political values in two ways. First, as an institution of civil 
society the church has a direct influence through the generalized support of the regime by 
the religious elite -  the clergy. The church has a direct interest in maintaining the 
stability of the political order, so that the power it possesses will not be diminished or 
threatened. Therefore the church, through its elites, will promote and support the
9political values which will assure the maintenance of the political order as it is. This 
perception of the common good can serve to defend a traditional social order from radical 
social change.
Second, the church influences the political order indirectly through the religious 
values shared and promoted by individual religious believers acting in society. 
Tocqueville understood this to be the most significant way that the church influences the 
state. He used the word “mores” to mean the “whole moral and intellectual state of a 
people” and described in detail how the church, as an institution in civil society, 
“contributes to the maintenance of a democratic republic among the Americans” 
(Tocqueville 1969, p. 287). He noted a shared moral consensus among believers in 
America, whatever the denomination, which he attributed to a widespread Christian 
culture. This common culture creates a moral climate which promotes domestic 
tranquility, tolerance and civility. He described how religion, as it regulates domestic life, 
also helps to promote order in the state by creating a moral community (Tocqueville 
1969, p. 291). Finally, he argued that the influence of religion extends even to the 
intellect, by setting ground rules which confine intellectual debate within parameters of 
moderation and reason. This indirect influence of religion on the state is, for Tocqueville, 
indispensable for liberal democracy: “Religion, which never intervenes directly in the 
government of American society, should therefore be considered as the first of their 
political institutions, for although it did not give them the taste for liberty, it singularly 
facilitates their use thereof’ (Tocqueville 1969, p. 292).
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The Priestly and Prophetic Influences of the Church
The Church has not always been seen as supportive of democracy. In fact, 
Tocqueville lamented the unhealthy oppositional relationship between the formerly 
established Catholic church and the newly formed liberal democracy in his native France. 
However, churches appear to have learned over time an appreciation for democracy.
Share (1987) reports in his study of the democratic transition in Spain how the loss of the 
Church as a major ally of the authoritarian government helped bring about Spain's 
transition to democracy. Stephens (1989) also argued that the Catholic church was 
instrumental in helping organize the working class as a political force in Western Europe. 
More recently, Casanova (1993) discussed how the Catholic church in both Spain and 
Poland played a positive role in the processes of democratization
With the exception of Tocqueville, though, prior studies focused primarily on the 
role of elites in bringing about social change. I argue, with Tocqueville, that the effect of 
the church on political values is more subtle than the actions of its elites. In other words, 
the church operates at two levels simultaneously to affect society -  at an institutional 
level, where the influence of church leaders is most clearly observed, and at the level of 
the individual. And at each level there are two countervailing traditions in the church, 
both influencing support for the regime. These two traditions -- the priestly and the 
prophetic as they are known in political theology — have their origin in the earliest Judeo- 
Christian tradition.
The priestly tradition was most clearly enunciated by Saint Augustine in his work 
The Citv of God (Paolucci 1962). The primary function of the state, according to
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Augustine, is the maintenance and enforcement of peace and order. Augustine says that 
earthly authority descends from God, as a condition of original sin. If man were not a 
sinful creature there would be no disorder, and no need for earthly authority. But the 
nature o f humanity has been tainted by original sin and this sin has brought disorder into 
the world. Therefore, obedience to authority is necessary to the preservation of order, no 
matter what form that earthly authority takes. The priestly tradition stipulates that it is 
better to be a servant to an earthly authority than to disobey that authority which comes 
from God. The legitimacy of the ruler derives from his position as one chosen by God, 
and his power is imposed on the people from above (see also Turner 1991, p. 179 on the 
descending and ascending principles of kingship).
The prophetic tradition, in contrast, also has a long history, originating in the 
writings of the Hebrew Scriptures. This tradition calls upon the individual to speak out 
against any earthly authority whenever that authority is being misused and is causing 
injustice. Obedience to authority is not the highest mandate here; rather, it is the call of 
the individual to speak out for righteousness and against injustice. According to the 
prophetic tradition, the individual prophetic voice is called from within the community to 
speak out against the existing power structure and to call for a return to justice. This call 
derives from God and has a higher level of authority than any earthly authority. Because 
the prophet comes usually from within the community, rather than from the hierarchy, the 
prophet receives his (or her) legitimacy from within the community, and the power of the 
prophet moves upward from within the community toward the existing power structure.
At both the institutional level and the individual level churches in Eastern Europe 
experienced repression from the totalitarian state. And at both levels the competing 
influences of the priestly tradition and the prophetic tradition operated to define the 
church's relationship to the state. Church support for democratic values emerged where 
the separation between church and state was sufficiently defined to allow for the gradual 
recreation of civil society by the church -  at both the institutional as well as the 
individual level.
At the institutional level the churches were officially repressed. Marxist teaching 
considers religion primitive and nonprogressive. Churches were handicapped by formal 
sanctions and church affiliation and participation were both subtly and directly 
discouraged. But at the institutional level the priestly tradition of obedience to authority 
was expressed most strongly. As an institutional body the churches had perhaps their 
greatest power, but at the same time they lacked a prophetic voice to speak out against 
injustice. On the institutional level the churches of Eastern Europe for the most part 
observed the priestly tradition of obedience to the state and managed in that way to 
coexist with the state as the only semi-autonomous institution of civil society. As long as 
they were left in relative peace by the state so that they could pursue their primary 
purpose of promoting traditional moral values, preserving ritual and providing for the 
salvation of souls, the churches were resigned to accommodate to the status quo. 
Institutional opposition to the communist regime varied by country, but may be 
characterized overall as sporadic and essentially conciliatory. The only exceptions to
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this situation were the prophetic voices of a few outspoken church leaders, whose 
leadership had only a moderate influence against the communist regime.
At the individual level, church attenders were also repressed and sanctioned. 
Church affiliation was ridiculed as primitive and naive, and official substitutes for 
traditional church functions (such as state marriage ceremonies and confirmation 
ceremonies for youth) marginalized the role of religion in individual's lives. It was at this 
level that the prophetic tradition was most clearly expressed. Individual church attenders 
continued to believe and to practice their faith, despite official and unofficial pressures 
not to do so, and in so doing proclaimed their opposition to the regime. In some 
countries, in gradually increasing numbers, individual church attenders joined ranks to 
speak out and march in protest against the regime (Oberschall 1993). The influence of 
the priestly tradition continued at this level in the desire for, and support of, order and 
peace and a regime which would accomplish these desired goals. But the prophetic 
tradition was also expressed in the protest demonstrations, in the candlelight marches in 
Leipzig, and in the individuals who deliberately refused to acquiesce to the regime and its 
demands.
The Church and Democratic Values
As I stated before, the church has not always been known as a staunch supporter 
of democracy. In fact, the Roman Catholic church is still very hierarchic in its 
organization and has been reluctant to adopt many democratic reforms as an institution. 
The Protestant churches, in contrast, have been much more democratic in their 
organization and leadership. Churches in general, though, have been supportive overall
14
of democratic reforms and democratic movements, particularly since the end of World 
War II.
Some democratic values, such as individual and collective human rights, 
individual liberty, safeguarding of the collective common good and the dignity and worth 
of the individual are intrinsic to church teaching, whatever the denomination. These are 
cherished values to those who would affiliate with a church, regardless of the official 
regime form of their government. Therefore, even in communist countries, those who 
chose to affiliate with a church, despite official and unofficial sanctions against it, have 
continued to support those democratic values. In the face of increasing corruption, 
oppression and disregard for the common good in favor of individual privilege, 
committed church attenders interpreted the movement toward democracy as the 
appropriate regime change necessary to support and promote the humanitarian values in 
which they believed.
In a modem democratic society, the church will support and promote many 
democratic values. These values promote regime stability as well as the maintenance of 
the right of autonomous existence of the church. In a communist society, though, the 
church is faced with a dilemma. In order to promote the stability of society it must come 
to some sort of a compromise with a hostile state. Each of the churches of East 
Germany, Poland and Hungary addressed the problem of existence in an officially 
atheistic state in a different manner, which I will address in detail in the next chapter.
Democratic values promoted by the church include support for the democratic 
regime itself and confidence in the institutions of the regime. Other values promoted by
15
the church which are not directly related to the promotion of democracy yet at the same 
time are not contrary to democratic ideals include orientations toward authority, certain 
family values and values relating to the relationship between the church and the state. 
Church members will tend to value and respect authority; they will value traditional 
family arrangements; and they will support cooperation between church and state.
Certain other democratic values which may be conducive to the promotion of the 
democratic regime are not promoted by the church, usually because they are seen as 
promoting individual rights, and therefore contrary to the common good. These values 
include political tolerance, civil liberties, freedom of speech, and support for protests and 
demonstrations. Such democratic values are seen by the church as promoting the rights 
of the individual to the detriment of the common good. When it must choose between 
the two, the church always promotes the good of the community over the right of the 
individual.
Finally there are certain democratic values having to do with the orientation of the 
individual as an actor in a democratic society, particularly values of personal and political 
efficacy, which are sometimes promoted by the church because they relate to issues of the 
value and dignity of the individual within society. These values are not usually an issue 
for the church; as I stated above, the church teaches that the value of the community has 
precedence over the individual. But when the individual is being severely repressed by 
an oppressive society, such as was the case of religious believers in communist regimes, 
the church promotes individual rights in a prophetic call to overthrow injustice.
16
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL:
HOW CIVIL SOCIETY AFFECTS SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN
POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES
The Church, in opposing the communist regime which actively sought its demise, 
worked to (re)establish autonomous civil society. This happened first in Poland, where 
the Church had a long and strong history of opposition to externally imposed State 
controls. The Polish resistance movement, which became known as Solidarity, originated 
from an organization of liberal intellectuals and church leaders called KOR (Ost 1990; 
Laba 1991; Michnik 1993). Poland is probably the best example of active involvement 
by the church in the revival of civil society.
In contrast, the church in Hungary had very little involvement in the revival of 
civil society, for three main reasons. First, the church was much weaker there. National 
identity was not tied to church affiliation in Hungary the way it was in Poland. And since 
participation was split between two major denominations -- Catholics and Protestants -- 
none of the churches could speak with authority as the unified voice of the people.
Second, Hungarian political reformers began in 1968 to implement a series of political 
and economic reforms from above, so there was less pressure for alternative forms of 
opposition. Finally, the Church had never been as completely in opposition to the regime 
as it was in Poland — church leaders served as party members and government officials 
all along in Hungary. They could seek reform politically.
In East Germany the church only very late and somewhat reluctantly joined the 
movement to reestablish civil society, pushed mainly by the activist peace groups which
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co-existed within the protective spaces allotted to the churches. At the end, though, the
church was quite influential in the democratic reform movement.
Therefore, I propose the following conceptual model of the relationship between
civil society and democratic values. In communist societies in which the churches were
excluded from participation in the state (Poland and East Germany), the church became
drawn into the formation of civil society in opposition to the regime and actively
promoted and supported democratic values. In communist societies which allowed for a
measure of church participation in the state (Hungary) the church saw little value in
opposing the regime and did little to promote or support democratic values.
Consequently, church members in Poland and East Germany will be more supportive of
democratic values than will church members in Hungary (who are less likely to recognize
a connection between religious affiliation and democratic values).
CHURCH EXCLUDED ------> CHURCH OPPOSITION ------> SUPPORT FOR
FROM THE STATE TO THE REGIME DEM. VALUES
OR
CHURCH INCLUDED -> NO CHURCH OPPOSITION ------> LESS SUPPORT
IN THE STATE TO THE REGIME FOR DEM. VALUES
The model is intended to reflect the relationship between civil society and support
for democratic values, as it is filtered through the church. Civil society is a contextual
variable here; it is the context within which the church operates to support democratic
values. As I stated above, the church operates at two levels to support democratic values.
At one level, the church as an institution, primarily through the words and actions of its
elites, influences society in its support for democratic values. On another level, though,
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individual church members also express support for democratic values, stemming from 
their attempts to live out their faith in society. The data that I have for this analysis are 
individual level data. Therefore, I can explicitly model and test church influence on 
democratic values at the individual level. Church influence on democratic values at the 
society level could also be formally modeled and tested, but the model would be overly 
complex. Adding this contextual variable would require a model which tests for 
interaction between a variable indicating the nature of civil society and individual 
attitudes of democratic support.
Instead of adding another level of complexity I have chosen to test this model at 
the individual level separately for each country. I then explain these individual results 
separately, within the context of the particular civil society/state context of each country. 
Since I do not have a direct measure of this contextual variable it is possible that between 
country differences in effect could also be due to other variables not captured in these 
models. Therefore, this relationship remains implicit and suggestive in this analysis, and 
I do not explicitly test alternative country-specific explanations of difference. But my 
results do point in the direction of context-specific differences in the effect of church 
attendance on support for democratic values.
From this context, then, I have proposed a conceptual model of the effect of civil 
society on church support for democratic values in these countries of central and eastern 
Europe. In countries where civil society has been severely repressed, where the church 
was excluded from any possibility of meaningful participation in the state, such as eastern 
Germany and Poland, the church has responded on both levels with strong support for
democratic values. In countries where the state/church relationship was less defined, 
such as Hungary, where the church had a legitimate voice in society and consequently felt 
that it had a role in the state, the church has not felt so strongly the need to preserve and 
express support for democratic values.
In the next chapter I provide a brief comparative-historical account of the 
relationship between church and state in each of these three countries, up to the point of 
their democratic transformations in 1989. I state formal hypotheses of the relationships 
between church attendance and particular democratic values for each of these countries.
In chapter three I discuss the data and methods I use for my analysis of church support of 
democratic values.
In chapter four I provide a descriptive analysis of the present demographic 
characteristics and religious beliefs of church attenders in eastern Germany, Poland and 
Hungary, as of 1990 and 1991. I compare these characteristics and beliefs with the case 
of western Germany, as a comparable western democracy. In chapter five I examine the 
effect of church attendance on a variety of democratic values, separately for each of the 
countries. I focus in particular on the priestly vs. the prophetic influences, to see which 
influence predominates in support of democratic values in each of the countries. Finally, 
chapter six will summarize my findings and discuss directions for further research.
CHAPTER II
OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE CHURCHES DURING COMMUNISM
Each of the countries under Soviet control had their own state-level government 
organizations, and each State had some level of autonomy in determining policy toward 
their churches. Therefore, church-state relations in each of the countries under Soviet 
control varied, depending on the nature of state-level government policy toward the 
churches and the level of active participation or resistance of the churches in each 
country. In this chapter I will evaluate that relationship separately for each of the Eastern 
European countries in this study, to see how the churches reacted to communist 
domination in each country.
East Germany
In Germany, the Protestant church is more closely identified with the social 
structure and power of the State (Gauly 1991), whereas the Catholic church remains more 
closely identified with the power of the Vatican in Rome. For this reason, plus the fact 
that the former East Germany has traditionally been nearly entirely Protestant, it is more 
important for our purposes to focus on how the Protestant church developed as opposition 
leader of the democratization movement in eastern Germany.
The role of the Protestant church in Germany has been that of "State Church" — 
the officially recognized and designated religious institution of the state (Herms 1989). 
Since the Peace of Augsburg (1SS5) and the rise of the modem state, Protestant church 
boundaries in Germany have been equated with state boundaries (Goeckel 1990). Each
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state had its own Landeskirche -  State Church. The various Landeskirchen were united 
on a national level into the Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchenbund (1922) which evolved 
into the Evangelical Churches in Germany, or EKD in 1948. There was little competition 
from other denominations or sects, and in return for its loyalty the church received semi- 
autonomous status within the state. It was supported financially by a Kirchensteuer, a 
federally collected tax on individuals, and granted freedom of assembly and a limited free 
press (Gellner 1991). Although church leaders could provide advice to state leaders, 
there was little opposition to the regime in this arrangement. The church promoted civic 
values, educated good citizens and provided social services such as hospitals, homes for 
the infirm and counseling services.
Upon inheriting the eight Landeskirchen of East Germany at the end of World 
War II, the Stalinist regime saw a benefit in allowing the institution to continue to exist. 
The East German government managed quite successfully to use the Protestant church to 
promote cooperation of citizens within the socialist society, while at the same time 
marginalizing the place of the church among the population.2 While in 1950 the 
proportion of religious adherents was nearly identical in eastern and western Germany,
2 The East German regime was less successful in its attempts to control the 
Catholic church (Ockenfels 1989; Zander 1992). However, because the Catholic church 
represents such a small constituency in eastern Germany, the Protestant church was by far 
the most significant political actor in the struggle. See Krisch 1985, Grass 1990, and 
Spohn 1991 for brief, but illuminating, explanations of the predominance of the 
Protestant church in eastern Germany.
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approximately 90% of the population, by 1989 the proportion of adherents in the East had 
dropped dramatically, to approximately 36% of the population (Lemke 1989).3 
Compromises of the East German Protestant Church
The East German regime managed this dramatic reduction in religious affiliation 
through a series of deliberate maneuvers designed to marginalize the effectiveness of the 
church. At the same time, it permitted the church enough autonomy to continue, as an 
institution of civil society, to legitimize the regime. For example, the church was totally 
excluded from the education of the young when the state took over the operation of the 
schools in 1946 (Hutten 1967). Although religious instruction in the schools was a right 
guaranteed to churches in the 1949 constitution, this practice was nevertheless forbidden 
by the state and the churches were compelled to set up alternative means of religious 
instruction for children. At the same time the Kirchensteuer, the federal tax collected to 
support the churches, was eliminated in East Germany, and the East German churches 
were forced to rely on private donations for support (McCauley 1983).
3 Lemke cited these membership figures as published by Gunnar Winkler, ed., in 
Sozialreport '90. Daten und Jakten zuLsozialen Lage in der DDR (Social Report '90. 
Data and Facts on Social Conditions in the G.D.R.. page 308). For comparison, Roski 
cites 1991 der Spiegel survey church membership statistics of 93% for western Germany 
and 32% for eastern Germany. Similarly, results from a survey conducted by the Institut 
fiir Demoskopie Allensbach in September 1991 show 86% of western Germans and 31% 
of eastern Germans claim membership in a church. The declining rates of church 
membership in eastern Germany are not a function of data manipulation on the part of 
East German demographers but rather a function of the powerful social pressure against 
church involvement exerted upon the East German population during 45 years o f Soviet 
domination.
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Young Christians faced severe discrimination in their educational opportunities, 
the churches faced great difficulties in building repair and maintenance, restrictions were 
placed on the activities of the church — in these and many other ways church members 
were made to feel like second-class citizens (Childs 1983). These concessions provide 
evidence of the marginal position of the church relative to the state, but other 
compromises made by the church had even farther reaching consequences.
The church was compelled to accept the Jugendweihe, the secular confirmation 
ceremony in which young people profess their loyalty to the state. For a time, the church 
opposed this ceremony and refused the religious equivalent to those youth who had 
participated in the secular ceremony, but by 1960 the number of young people opting for 
religious confirmation had dropped so drastically that the church lifted its ban. It was 
clear that the social pressure to participate in the Jugendweihe was far stronger than the 
power of the church to oppose it (Dennis 1988).
Another way the church compromised its position relative to the state was in 
response to the militarization policies of the state. The church was a leader in the 
movement to allow alternatives to full military service in the 1960s, but was unsuccessful 
in its struggle against compulsory military science studies in the schools (Cordell 1990). 
Once again, the church took a strong oppositional stand each time a new policy was 
introduced by the state, but compromised or moderated its position in response to state 
pressure.
A final significant concession made by the church concerned the formation of a 
separate organizational body for Protestant churches in Hast Germany -- the League of
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Evangelical Churches (BEK). The eight Landeskirchen of East Germany had been 
formally united with the other Protestant churches of West Germany through their pan- 
German national organization, the Evangelical Churches in Germany (EKD) since 1948. 
Although they managed to hold out until 1969, difficulties in traveling between East and 
West, as well as increasingly disparate problems of the two societies, finally led church 
leaders to acknowledge the need for separate coordinating bodies (Krisch 1985; Cordell 
1990; Neubert 1991).
Each of these concessions and compromises marginalized the position of the 
church in East German society. Yet there were other instances where the church gained 
concessions from the state and thereby retained its place as an institution of civil society. 
The success of this persistence against the regime elevated the legitimacy of the church, 
which gradually assumed responsibility for the protection and promotion of the 
opposition prodemocracy movement.
Persistence of the East German Protestant Church
The Protestant church in East Germany maintained enough legitimacy in society 
to achieve certain concessions from the state which helped it to persist in society. 
Although the East German communist government was ideologically opposed to religion 
in society, the church provided certain social benefits which the regime recognized as 
useful and necessary. For example, it was a major force in health and social services 
during the years of state socialism, administering over 50 hospitals, 89 institutions for the 
physically handicapped and numerous other similar institutions (Krisch 1985). It was a 
major private employer, providing jobs for people who otherwise would have been
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dependent on the state. It provided counseling and support for thousands, in a state 
threatened by alarmingly high rates of divorce, suicide and alcoholism (Smith 1985). The 
church was also the source of significant sums of hard western currency, generously 
provided by western churches to support the activities of the church in the East (Smith 
1985).
To preserve this uneasy truce between church and state in 1971 Bishop Albrecht 
Schbnherr, head of the BEK, announced that the church was willing to legitimize the 
regime, provided it was taken seriously as a partner. The new church attitude of loyal 
opposition was summed up in Bishop Schbnherr's statement: "We do not want to be a 
church against, or alongside, but in socialism" (Krisch 1985). This compromise led to 
increased concessions by the state to the churches, including permission to establish new 
churches, increased access to radio and TV broadcast time, importation of some church 
literature from the West and increased state financial support for the churches (Smith 
1985).
Opponents of Bishop Schbnherr wanted the church to assume a more oppositional 
role at the time, but the church was not able to directly oppose the state for several 
reasons. First, although it was by far the largest religious denomination in East Germany, 
the church was not a majority organization. At best, no more than a third of the 
population were even nominal adherents by the mid 1970s. Second, because it was 
organized as a state church, most of its support lay within the boundaries of the state. 
Unlike the Polish Catholic church, which could mobilize support worldwide to sway
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world opinion on the plight of workers fighting for democracy, the East German 
Protestant church had lost its last link with the West upon the establishment of the BEK. 
Consequences of the "Church in Socialism" Policy
The advantage of the "church in socialism" policy for the church was a relaxing of 
the Party's control and an increase of the relative power of the church in East German 
society (Scharf 1984; Krisch 1985). The disadvantage was that by aligning itself with the 
state the church could be seen as just another arm of the state, and as the state lost 
legitimacy, so did the church. It was seen by some as having sold out to the regime; they 
felt the church had abdicated its legitimate opposition to the regime to preserve a few 
limited concessions. Therefore, although the church was allowed greater freedom of 
assembly, access to television and radio, as well as its own independent news agency, its 
message reflected at least superficial support of the regime (Childs 1983).
As the church became involved in the peace movement of the 1980's, this attitude 
began to change gradually and it gained recognition as an opposition force. The church 
became an organizational umbrella for various peace initiatives which evolved as a 
reaction to the increased militarization of East German society at all levels. These groups 
organized around public opposition to cold war policies such as mandatory defense 
studies in the schools and compulsory military service for young men. Despite its official 
policy of cooperation with the regime, the church helped create and later support a host of 
oppositional groups in East Germany in the 1980s (Ramet 1984). To a large extent, this 
change was caused by a radical church faction which called on the church to "set an
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example and challenge the state where it feels morally obliged so to do" (Cordell 1990, 
p.56).
From this position, the church needed to make only a small step to support the 
various political reform groups of the late 1980s (Cordell 1990). These included citizens 
committees, or action groups, which evolved from the Peace Movement and became 
increasingly political throughout the decade. They organized mass protest rallies 
attended by thousands, and addressed issues which had long been forbidden in East 
Germany. Although continually harassed by the secret police, these action groups created 
a second public sphere which received strong support from the western media. They 
grew quickly, to nearly 500 separate groups by 1988, and most of them found shelter 
within Protestant churches (Neugebauer 1993). The consequence of the political reform 
movement was German reunification. For church members in particular, some of whom 
could claim an active role in the delegitimation of the communist regime, the end result 
was a mixture of feelings of increased self-worth: pride in being German, enthusiasm 
about reunification and optimism about their future.4
In sum, the loyal opposition of the Protestant churches in East Germany allowed 
them political latitude which was unavailable to any other institution in the regime. As a 
result, the church served as protective "free spaces" for organized protest against the
4The correlation (among eastern Germans) between church membership and 
pride in being German is .14, between church membership and joy about reunification is 
.22, between church membership and optimism (when comparing the present to the past) 
is .17, and between church membership and optimism (when comparing the future to the 
past) is .15. All correlations are significant at p<.001. These data are from the Institut fiir 
Demoskopie Allensbach, survey 5055.
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regime.5 This protest activity gradually broadened from specific actions against 
particularly oppressive policies of the state to broader human rights issues, peace 
initiatives and calls for democratic reforms. As the church took an increasingly public 
stand on these issues, church members felt empowered to support political action, to 
speak out against abuses by the state and to take a stand on democratic reform.
The church, therefore, affected the democratic reform of East Germany in two 
important ways. First, as an institution of civil society, it operated to some extent as a 
loyal opposition to the regime, raising issues of reform and providing organizational 
support for reform movements. Second, church members were increasingly empowered 
by their own political actions within the action groups and by the support of the church 
around these action groups to take the steps necessary to bring about democratic reform.
Poland
Poland has been a Catholic country since 966, when Prince Miezko of Poland 
married the daughter of Catholic Prince Boleslaw of Bohemia (Tobias 1956). Although 
invading armies and changing national borders have influenced the ethnic and religious 
composition of Poland, its predominant religious affiliation has remained Roman 
Catholic up to this day.
The relationship between the Roman Catholic church and the nation of Poland has 
been, since the Middle Ages, one of close identification. What friction there has been 
between church and state has most often been between nationalistic Catholicism and
5See Evans and Boyte (1986) for a more thorough discussion of the importance of 
free spaces, created within civil society, to enable democratic participation.
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liberal Protestantism or between the Catholic state church and the non-Catholic churches. 
The power of the Polish state has traditionally been closely linked with the power of the 
Polish episcopate (Tobias 1956).
One particularly strong characteristic of Polish culture, though, is the fact of 
Polish nationalism. Lacking natural geographic boundaries, such as great rivers or 
mountains, and with an unfortunately weak political structure, Poland has been overrun 
many times in its history, and partitioned out of existence twice in the past 200 years. In 
1795 Poland ceased to exist as a state, having been divided between Tsarist Russia, 
Prussia and Austria. This "century of partition" lasted till the end of World War I and 
severely affected Poland's political culture and national identity. It also strongly affected 
Poland's Roman Catholic identity. Of the three occupying powers, only Austria pursued 
a tolerant policy toward the Poles; both Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia posed 
more fundamental threats to Polish identity. Therefore, the link between Poland and 
Roman Catholicism was strengthened (Ramet 1987). Especially important was the 
church's role in maintaining the Polish language. The church was the only institution 
allowed to express itself in Polish during the years of the partition, and therefore it 
became permanently identified with the protection of Polish language and culture 
(Kennedy and Simon 1983). From the time that Poland was reestablished as a country at 
the end of World War I its national identity as Catholic was firmly established. 
Increasingly, from this time forward, to be Polish meant to be Catholic, and to be Polish 
Catholic meant to be fiercely nationalistic.
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Once again, however, in September 1939, Poland was partitioned -  this time
between Germany and Russia:
In German-occupied Poland, on orders from the Foreign Office of the 
German Evangelical Church, the churches were reorganized: Lutherans 
were to be assimilated into the German Church. Polish literature and 
Bibles were destroyed and the theological faculty closed... In Russian- 
occupied Poland much church property was immediately confiscated and 
some monasteries were stripped. After the incorporation of Eastern 
Poland into the USSR as a republic, the Orthodox Church was temporarily 
protected from the oppression of the former Roman Catholic Church-State 
(Tobias 1956, p.384).
Following this partition the Poland which was reestablished was even more 
uniformly Catholic than before. In fact, the political borders established for Poland after 
World War II increased the proportion of Catholics to greater than 90% of the total 
population:
The post-war border changes along with the German extermination 
of nearly three million Polish Jews made Poland, for the first time in 
centuries, an almost homogeneous Catholic country in which non- 
Catholics made up less than 3 per cent of the population. At the Teheran 
meeting in 1943, the Big Three agreed that the 1920 Curzon line would 
form the basis for Poland's eastern frontier. This meant that the Polish 
lands annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939, where the majority of Poland's 
non-Catholics lived, would remain in Soviet hands. Two years later, at 
Yalta, Poland's right to the lands annexed from eastern Germany was 
recognized, but without being defined. At Potsdam in 1945, the new 
Polish-German frontier, 220 miles west o f the former one, was fixed, and 
Germans were expelled from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
The Catholic Church, with a structure equal to the Communist 
Party's and a wide social base that the Communists lacked — the Party had 
only 40,000 members when the Red Army arrived -  was a worthy 
adversary. The church represented great power, with over 90 per cent of 
the people united in faith (Broun 1988).
It was this social base of the Catholic church in Poland which helped it to evolve 
into an institution of civil society, and an opposition force to the Communist regime in
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Poland. The relationship between Poland and Russia has always been tenuous, and Poles 
were deeply resentful of the Soviet control o f their society following World War II. 
Opposition Between the Church and the State
The separation of church and state was formalized in the constitution o f 1952. 
Questions about religious affiliation were removed from all application forms, the 
teaching of religion in public schools was forbidden, all church property and nearly all 
church-run schools were nationalized, and only civil marriages were recognized as valid 
(Strassberg 1988). In 1953 the state even took over responsibility for appointing bishops 
and pastors and determining parish and diocesan territorial boundaries. Tension between 
the church and the state was so high that the Polish primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, 
was imprisoned from 1953 to 1956 for refusing to cooperate with the government 
(Strassberg 1988).
One of the most effective ways for ordinary citizens to flaunt their opposition to 
the Soviet regime and its communist ideology was by continuing to support the churches. 
Attendance at Sunday Mass become not only a religious obligation, but also a 
reaffirmation o f Polish identity and a subtle form of public protest against the regime 
(Nielsen 1991). Poles who continued to affirm their religious identity in the face of 
totalitarian power were at the same time asserting their autonomy. They delegitimated 
the power o f the state and legitimated the power of the church by their actions.
While this action was not discouraged by the church, it was not the official policy 
of the Polish church to encourage disloyalty to the regime. Cardinal Wyszynski became 
convinced that it was necessary to reach a compromise with the state in order to maintain
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an effective Catholic presence in Poland. So although the Vatican did not recognize the 
legitimacy of the Polish communist regime, Cardinal Wyszynski agreed in 1956 to a 
nineteen-point accord with the state that included concessions on both sides (Nielsen 
1991). Religion could once again be taught in public schools; church authorities 
regained a voice in the selection of bishops, pastors, and chaplains; and while civil 
marriages remained the only form recognized as valid by the state, an additional religious 
ceremony was once again allowed (Strassberg 1988). Additional concessions by the 
church included a loyalty oath for all bishops, state regulation of church-sponsored 
organizations, and state permission before any church-sponsored construction could 
begin.
The church and the state continued their struggles for the allegiance of the people 
throughout Wyszyriski's lifetime. When the regime ordered religious instruction banned 
in the public schools, the church opened its own catechetical centers, which functioned 
even more effectively. And for the millennial celebration of Christianity in Poland in 
1966 the church planned a brilliant appeal to both Polish history and piety. The Cardinal 
called for a year-long round of Marian devotions, a "Great Novena." All Catholics 
personally were to take the vows of loyalty to God and the Virgin Mary made by Polish 
noblemen after they had successfully defended the monastery of Czestochowa against the 
Swedes in 1656. The icon of our Lady of Czestochowa, the "Black Madonna," was sent 
out to visit every church throughout the country. Communist officials made every effort 
to hinder the visitation, and the icon was occasionally "arrested." Many churches were 
visited only by its empty frame (Broun 1988, p. 182). In retaliation, the state revoked
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Wyszynski's passport, thus preventing him from attending the first bishop's synod after 
the Second Vatican Council (Strassberg 1988).
The Prophetic Voice of the Church
Church/state relations evolved in scale from a strictly Polish matter into a more 
international dialog during the 1970s, primarily due to two significant events. The first 
was the Vatican's recognition of state ownership of the western territories. Since World 
War II, the western territories o f Poland had been under the direct jurisdiction o f the Holy 
See. In 1972 Pope Paul VI acknowledged the Polish state as the rightful owners of this 
territory, and the state in turn transferred jurisdiction over them to the Polish bishops 
(Strassberg 1988). This led to more direct links between Polish state authorities and the 
Vatican.
The second significant event of the seventies was the election of Cardinal Karol 
Wojtyla as Pope John Paul II on October 16, 1978. From this moment on, Polish 
church/state relations assumed international proportions. The entire world watched as 
Pope John Paul II returned to his homeland for a nine-day visit in June, 1979. Speaking 
to a crowd of half a million people in the center of Warsaw, the pope issued a strongly 
prophetic appeal to the people for spiritual renewal. He said nothing which could be 
construed as an attack on the regime, nor did he exhort the people to rise in revolt.
Instead, he spoke straight past the government and appealed to the strong link between 
nation and church of the Polish people. "He evoked an ancient Christian nation, as if 
Communist rule was a transient phenomenon of little importance " (Ascherson 1988).
The effect of this visit was immediate, powerful, and long-lasting. The Polish people
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realized finally that the message that KOR and the rest of the Polish opposition had been 
trying to put across was true: the Polish nation was ready for democracy.
The Church and the Solidarity Movement
The independent trade union Solidarity was formed in the late summer of 1980 as 
a result o f the workers' strike at the Lenin shipyard at Gdansk. The workers' opposition 
movement which encompassed it, though, had its roots in the mid-1970s in a coalition 
between intellectuals of the dissident Left and the Catholic church, called the Workers' 
Defense Committee (KOR). This unlikely alliance worked in Poland because both 
groups felt excluded by the state, and they found common ground in the discussion of 
liberal democratic values espoused by the left and essential human rights espoused by the 
church.
KOR did not directly organize the Solidarity Trade Union; Michnik and the other 
members o f KOR initially opposed the demand for free trade unions as unattainable 
(Michnik 1993). Neither did the church have any direct role in the organization of 
Solidarity — in fact, Solidarity always felt much closer to the church than the church felt 
to Solidarity (Ost 1990). Nevertheless, both organizations had an important influence on 
the origin and direction of Solidarity. KOR provided the intellectual framework for 
Solidarity; the church provided spiritual direction and institutional legitimacy.
Solidarity was inextricably linked to the church. Pictures o f the Black Madonna 
of Czestochowa or the Pope accompanied all workers' protests. At the Lenin shipyard in 
Gdansk during the strike the gates would open once a day to allow a priest to enter and 
pray with the striking workers (Ascherson 1988). The workers, for whom patriotism and
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Catholicism were inseparable, simply assumed that because they were acting for Poland,
they had the support o f the church behind them.
The church was more interested in compromise than in conflict, though, fearing
that an escalation might lead to Soviet intervention and suppression of existing rights.
Thus there was no official statement either o f support or protest by the Catholic hierarchy
during this time, although several groups o f Catholic laypersons became increasingly
involved in the movement. Church officials soon became increasingly involved, whether
they wanted to or not:
Cardinal Wyszynski appeared on television to appeal for peace and work, 
and on August 26 the main council of the Polish bishops met at Jasna Gora 
in Czestochowa to discuss the reasons for social discontent, the issue of 
civil rights, and the question of social and moral revival in Poland. On 
August 31 representatives of Solidarity and the state signed the so-called 
Gdansk Agreement, which allowed more religious freedom, including the 
broadcasting of Sunday masses. In early September Cardinal Wyszynski 
met for the first time with Solidarity's leader Lech Walesa, and from 
September 24 to the end of the year, a joint commission of the bishops and 
the government met eighty-one times. During the spring of 1981, after the 
riots in Bydgoszcz, the social tensions in Poland dramatically increased.
Upon receiving a letter from the pope requesting that every possible effort 
be undertaken to solve the existing problems in a peaceful way, Cardinal 
Wyszynski met first with General Wojciech Jaruzelski and, two days later, 
with Lech Walesa. As a result of these meetings, the so-called Warsaw 
Agreement was signed on April 1,1981, as the foundation for a peaceful 
compromise (Strassberg 1988, p. 194).
The succession of Cardinal Jozef Glemp as Primate of Poland upon the death of 
Cardinal Wyszynski in the Spring of 1981 signaled a turn away from active involvement 
o f the church in the Solidarity movement. But social and political pressure continued to 
mount, and martial law was declared on December 13,1981. The Solidarity trade union 
was outlawed and over 10,000 people were confined in internment camps or prisons,
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including even Lech Walesa. The church opposed martial law and served as refuge and 
support for Solidarity activists, but it openly declared its willingness to work with the 
government in finding a solution to the civil unrest (Ost 1990). And the government 
increasingly expressed willingness to work with the church as a legitimate representative 
of civil society.
The conflict continued as it had before, but increasingly the church was drawn in 
as church activists became politicized. In 1983 there was a political battle in defense of 
the right of public schools to display crosses in the classroom. Special masses were held 
for Solidarity and many priests were guest speakers. The end of martial law in July, 
1983, after a second papal visit, resulted in a consolidation of power in Poland between 
the Catholic church on one side and the military government of Jaruzelski on the other 
side. Since Solidarity was gone, except as an illegal opposition, the influence of the 
church increased substantially. Repeatedly, the church called for the restoration of 
Solidarity and civil rights, provided support for the internees and their families, 
distributed food, clothing, and medical supplies brought in by Western voluntary 
organizations, and in other ways provided assistance to the underground opposition.
Finally, in 1984, things came to a head in the conflict between church and state 
with the murder of a priest by a group of secret policemen from the religious affairs 
department o f the ministry o f the interior. Father Jerzy Popieluszko was a very popular 
supporter o f Solidarity, and had been the target o f previous press attacks and police 
harassment. He was kidnaped and assassinated by three policemen in retribution for his 
anti-govemment sermons. The affair caused a tremendous outcry, and the three were
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eventually convicted and given prison sentences. But instead of quelling the movement 
for Solidarity in Warsaw, the death of Father Popieluszko created a martyr for the cause 
and galvanized public sentiment against the regime. Candlelight protest processions were 
organized in the churches and attended by thousands of frustrated citizens. Crosses were 
erected at street intersections to remind protestors of the cost of their sacrifice and to 
protect demonstrators from military intervention. And when the government at last sat 
down to discuss reforms at the Polish Round Table negotiations of February-April 1989, 
the church had an official negotiating seat at those talks.
In sum, the church in Poland influenced the regime change on a more institutional 
level than did the church in East Germany. In Poland, the church was primarily an 
institutional actor; it was legitimated by the people as an official voice o f opposition to 
the regime. It received additional legitimacy from its supranational ties to the Vatican in 
Rome. While the church in East Germany had to rely on the combined voices o f the 
bishops of the nine states of East Germany for their authority, Polish bishops could 
appeal to the Church of Rome for their authority. Thus, the church in Poland was a force 
to be reckoned with in the struggle to reestablish civil society. The prophetic voices of 
John Paul II, Father Popieluszko, and other church leaders who spoke eloquently for a 
return to a democratic Poland certainly furthered the cause of democracy by galvanizing 
public opinion around the issue. But once the power o f the institutional church in Poland 
had been mobilized behind the movement for democracy it is likely that success would 
have been only a matter o f time, even without these voices.
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Hungary
The relationship between church and state in Hungary was quite different from 
that o f either Poland or East Germany. Though the churches in Hungary were also 
repressed by the communist regime, they chose cooperation early on as their preferred 
method of interacting with the regime. The church in Hungary operated alongside the 
state, and there was never the severity o f antagonism between church and state which 
prevailed in Poland and East Germany.
Hungarians have always been religiously plural, about two-thirds Roman Catholic 
and one-third Protestant (Calvinist, the larger denomination, and Lutheran). But 
Catholicism has never been linked with nationalism the way it is in Poland; in fact, some 
Calvinists still regard themselves as the "true Hungarians" (Nielsen 1991). Nevertheless, 
since the naming of Emperor Franz Josef o f Austria as King of Hungary in the middle of 
the 19th century, the country has been linked with Western Europe and identified as 
predominantly Roman Catholic. At this time, religious freedom was granted to almost all 
churches in Hungary. The law identified Roman and Greek Catholics, the Eastern 
Orthodox groups, the Reformed and Lutheran Churches, the Unitarians, and the Jewish 
congregations (since 1895) as "Accepted Religions." Three other denominations — 
Baptists, Methodists, and Mohammedans — were identified as "Recognized Religions" 
and enjoyed the same privileges o f organization and freedom to conduct services and 
teach religion to their children, but they did not receive state support or have the privilege 
of collecting church dues as state taxes. Other religious groups were tolerated, but treated 
as persons "without religion" (Tobias 1956).
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Roman Catholics were always the most numerous of the faiths and were also the 
most closely aligned with the government. In fact, the Catholic bishop of Esztergom 
held, by tradition, the rank of Prince and was second only to the King in political power. 
The Catholic church was the greatest landholder in Hungary; it controlled more than half 
o f all schools and had the power to mandate obligatory religious instruction for all 
children. By the end of 1940 the churches were represented in Parliament by forty-eight 
religious leaders, of whom fourteen archbishops held their offices by "right o f birth" 
(Tobias 1956, p. 430). Financing of the church's operations came from a long tradition of 
royal patronage, as well as income generated from its extensive landed estates. This cozy 
relationship between church and state in Hungary helped to protect the church from some 
of the more serious consequences experienced by churches in Poland and East Germany 
as a result of the significant transformations in the ensuing years of World War II and its 
aftermath.
The Hungarian religious hierarchy originally supported the nation's alliance with 
Nazi Germany, as the church gained lands and people in the alliance. Religious 
leadership was not threatened by the fascists, and the bishops were so adamantly opposed 
to any movement that was even remotely social democratic or communist that they 
interpreted the anti-Nazi activities of these groups as a threat to the established order. 
Church resistance to the Nazi presence in Hungary came primarily from a federation of 
Catholic organizations called the Catholic Social People's Movement. Formed in 1943 
with the support o f Prince Primate Seredi and Baron Archbishop Vilmos Apor of Gyiir, it 
eventually became the Christian Democratic People's Party and played a small part in the
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postwar coalition government (Osa 1989). In contrast to the severe repression 
experienced by church in Poland, which was essentially forced underground for its 
operations, the church in Hungary continued to operate in the same manner as before, 
with the addition of some new restrictions imposed by the state.
With the Soviet takeover o f Hungary after World War II, the Hungarian 
communist regime essentially sought to create a perfect new society. The entire 
institutional structure of society was rebuilt. In an attempt to create an ideal social 
system all the former elites lost their rights and power was delegated administratively.
The primary effect o f this restructuring for the churches was twofold. First, a complete 
restructuring of the religious hierarchy loosened the churches' grip on legitimate social 
power. All Catholic religious orders were banned and several bishops were placed under 
house arrest. Over half of all seminaries were ordered closed, and the church was 
compelled to submit all hierarchical appointments to the newly created State Office for 
the Church for approval (Ramet 1987). This move severely compromised the autonomy 
of the church.
Second, the state instituted a far-reaching series o f land reforms, designed to 
redistribute income more equally. This had disastrous consequences for the church, 
which had been a major landowner. Most church income came from the revenue of its 
estates and the patronage of landed gentry. This money was used to support church 
programs such as schools, hospitals, and seminaries, as well as providing a major source 
of operating revenue for the dioceses. But there was tremendous support for land reform, 
especially among the peasantry, as Hungary transformed itself from a largely agrarian
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society to an industrial society. The church tried to influence land reform so that its own 
economic base would not be seriously undermined, yet at the same time support 
redistribution in general. For example, in September 1945 Bishop Mindszenty urged 
Catholic farmers not to accept lands confiscated from the church (Tobias 1956). The 
church did manage to retain some 90,000 acres o f property, and was subsidized by the 
government after 1951.
In general, the attitude of the church toward the Soviet occupied state was one of 
intransigence, primarily led by the Primate of the Catholic church, Cardinal Mindszenty. 
He refused to negotiate with the government and instead sent dramatic appeals to the 
United Nations, President Truman, and King George VI, publicizing the plight of 
Hungarians living in border areas of Czechoslovakia and Romania as a result o f World 
War II border changes (Osa 1989). Mindszenty fought state takeover of the private 
schools, even though the state offered to leave teaching clergy in their jobs and to allow 
the continuation of religious instruction in the schools. The Primate refused to back 
down; he was arrested in the fall o f 1948 and the compromises were revoked. His 
successor, Archbishop Joseph Grflsz, signed the first agreement between church and state 
in 1950.
The signing of this agreement set the tenor for church/state relations from that 
point on. Those who were without political power -- most of the rural and elderly 
population — retained ties with the church. Those who possessed or sought to acquire 
power distanced themselves from the church. As the state progressed from an 
agricultural economy to an industrial economy the church, in turn, moved from a position
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of nearly equal power with the state to a position very much subordinate in power with
the state. The process is popularly known in the sociology of religion literature as
secularization, and is poignantly described by Tomka as follows:
Rapid industrialization, urbanization, revolutionary growth in education, 
and, in consequence, an extreme mobility, destroyed both the strongly 
traditional religious culture and its interconnecting relationships based 
mostly on kinship and neighborhood, which had formerly sustained the 
religious culture. A crippled church could not substitute for this loss with 
a single hour o f religious instruction and another hour's religious service 
per week; nor could it fully guarantee adequate religious socialization 
(Tomka 1988, p. 172).
In March, 1956, revolutionaries in Hungary attempted a revolt against the Soviet 
regime, which was violently quelled by Russian troops and tanks. All in Hungary 
suffered from this abortive revolution, and church leaders were among its innocent 
victims. Cardinal Mindszenty fled to the American Embassy. The Lutheran bishop,
Lajor Ordass, was imprisoned. Clergy were forced to submit and conform to state policy, 
and those who refused to were forced out o f their positions (Nielsen 1991). But the 
churches had not taken a leadership role in the revolution and thus were not singled out 
for reprisal by Stalin's troops. Instead, the church learned a valuable lesson about the 
devastating consequences of opposition to the Soviet regime from this failed revolution 
and decided that cooperation was the better course o f action to follow.
Officially, the institutional church removed itself from the process of 
sociopolitical change and abdicated responsibility for influencing the evolution of the 
state. The churches operated under the control and supervision of the State Office for the 
Church, to whom they had to appeal for funds, appointments, buildings, and all
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institutional functions. The church accepted as a self-limitation that it had nothing to do 
with the concerns o f secular life, the public affairs o f non-affiliates, or with social 
problems in society. In turn, the state removed all public expression o f religious values 
from society and acknowledged the right o f individuals to private expression of 
religiosity. So long as religion was a purely private and individual affair, religious 
practice was accepted as a human right. But all public expressions o f religiosity were 
effectively marginalized. This meant that groups without social influence — the poor, the 
elderly, the uneducated, and rural peasants — were free to express their religiosity. But 
middle and upper class urban dwellers — those who had a place in society and those who 
sought to improve their place in society -- had to subjugate and strictly privatize their 
religious beliefs or risk losing their place in society . This "social schizophrenia" helped 
bring about a sharp decline in religious practice in the 1960s and 1970s (Tomka 1988). 
Publicly, religion all but disappeared from Hungarian urban culture and society.
Unofficially, though, another religious movement was taking place within 
Hungarian society but outside the authority of the institution itself. Within the Reformed 
church a movement which called itself the Confessing Church came into existence in the 
1950s. Composed of both clergy and laity, it was severely critical o f what it called "the 
dictatorial attitudes of church leaders who allegedly intimidated pastors, forced changes 
upon local congregations, accused their opponents of heresy, and generally acted in 
violation of the Reformation heritage" (Beeson 1982, p. 281). Similarly, from within the 
Catholic church many priests, monks and nuns, whose orders had been legally dissolved 
by the regime, continued to gather in informal community groups to continue religious
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education and a semi-underground Christian fellowship (Bailey 1991). These groups, as 
well as other groups of primarily lay Catholic intellectuals and young people, known as 
"basic" or "base" communities, took it upon themselves to substitute for the church's 
neglect o f such areas as religious education, cultivating religious communities, and 
promoting spirituality, despite lack o f official support or authorization from the 
institution itself. By the early 1970s these groups were so strong that Cardinal Lekai was 
called on by the state to control them. These groups, in contrast to the official institution 
which had maneuvered to a position of public isolation with regard to the state, were 
politically conscious and were often critical of both the state and the ecclesiastic 
hierarchy.
The base communities were particularly critical o f Cardinal Lekai, accusing him 
of failing to take a firm line with the state, as Mindszenty had. Cardinal Lekai insisted on 
a cautious policy of full cooperation with the regime in exchange for small improvements 
for the institution. He believed that this limited partnership between church and state 
provided the best chance for gradual improvement o f conditions in Hungary.
In contrast to Cardinal Lekai, the most threatening of the base communities, 
known as "the Bush," was led by Father Gyorgy Buldnyi. This movement, comprised of 
some 200 groups of eight to fifteen members each, was strongly pacifist in character and 
sought to live out "the quintessential Catholic resistance to atheism. The bush members' 
insistence that the spiritual values of Christianity transcend political and temporal 
expediencies marks them as true heirs of Mindszenty" (Broun 1988, p. 150). This 
movement, and Father Bulanyi in particular, were seen as a threat by both the government
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and the Hungarian religious hierarchy, although the Vatican refused to excommunicate 
him.
The contrast between the two religious leaders, L£kai and Buldnyi, illustrates the 
impossible situation of the church in Hungarian civil society under the Soviet regime.
The official institution, characterized by Lekai, was paralyzed into inactivity by its 
history of cooperation between throne and altar. Every step that was made, every gain or 
concession accomplished from the state, was criticized by the people as too little and too 
late. Committed Christians, such as those who were attracted to Bul&nyi, were repelled 
from involvement with the institution because they felt that Lekai had sold out to the 
regime. Therefore, they did little to push the church to reform. Instead, they gave up on 
the institution and sought religiosity in the base communities. The base communities 
were also the source o f their political consciousness, as social justice was an important 
component of the Christian commitment shared in the base communities.
By the late 1980s, though the churches were in no way united in their 
commitment to or relationship with the regime, they did unite on one particular political 
issue with far-reaching ramifications. Large groups of ethnic Hungarians living in 
Romania had increasingly sought refuge in Hungary as their plight worsened under the 
Ceausescu regime. At the same time, increasingly greater numbers of East German 
tourists arrived in Hungary and sought safe passage there to the West. Because of their 
express commitment to human rights, the churches united to form an ecumenical ministry 
to Romanian and East German refugees.
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And then, in a remarkable appeal, Bishop T6th, the Roman Catholic 
Primate L£szl6 Cardinal Paskai and Dr. L&szlo Lehel, general secretary of 
the Ecumenical Council, urged the government to open the border to 
Austria and guarantee the East Germans safe passage. The government, 
still led by members o f the former Communist Party, agreed. Soldiers 
with wire cutters opened the fences. Land mines were carefully removed.
The frontier was opened so that East Germans and later Czechs and 
Romanian refugees walked safely and easily into Austria. There they were 
welcomed and provided with transportation to West Germany. The first 
chink in the Berlin Wall had been chipped away (Bailey 1991, p. 71).
In sum, the church in Hungary had relatively little to do with the democratic
transition there. Hungary is a confessional ly mixed country with a long tradition of close
cooperation between church and state. Although this relationship had been reinterpreted
with the imposition of communism, it had not disappeared. The churches continued to
operate at the service of the state, supporting government policies almost without
exception. The churches' self-imposed withdrawal from the public sphere accelerated
secularization there, as religion became a strictly private matter. The revolutionary
changes of 1989 were most of all the work of reform communists, and religion benefitted
from them. Religious freedom and tolerance came with the democratic transition, but
collaboration with the communist regime had invaded the church in a way that it had not
in Poland and East Germany.
The differences between the Hungarian experience and that of the churches of
Poland and East Germany are clear. In Hungary there was a communist ordered
hierarchy of control, with the state at the top. Bishops were state appointed. Persons
designated by the state as leaders of religious congregations were held accountable for
what went on in their respective communities. In exchange, they received a certain
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amount o f political power, which came from the state, not from their communities. They 
were expected to control those communities, and if  they proved to be unable to provide 
control, they were removed by the state. Consequently, church members came to 
understand that their religious leaders were compromised by the state and corrupted. In 
response, church attendance dropped dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, as church 
members experienced negative sanctions for affiliation and saw that church leaders would 
not interfere with state policies. The net result was alienation from the churches, 
especially among the younger, better educated, and more urban Hungarians, who stood to 
gain the most from turning away from the church. Therefore, I expect that Hungarian 
church attenders will show less support for democratic values than church attenders in 
either Poland or East Germany, where the churches took more of an opposition stance to 
the regime and were more involved in the democratic transitions.
HYPOTHESES
From the review of the literature in Chapter I, as well as the comparative 
historical framework o f the evolution of church-state relations in East Germany, Poland 
and Hungary reported above, I now formulate the following hypotheses concerning 
church support for democratic values in post-transition societies. The hypotheses are 
arranged according to how well the democratic values express either the priestly tradition 
or the prophetic tradition.
Democratic Values Reflecting the Priestly Tradition -  Power from Above
The priestly tradition is a strong force in the political culture of church members. 
The institutional church will always recognize the authority o f the regime that is in
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power, regardless of its attitude toward the church. This is because the priestly tradition 
emphasizes the need for order over the need for justice. This tradition recognizes that 
earthly power comes from God, and is externally imposed from above in a hierarchically 
arranged system. That is, those who are in power in society, according to the priestly 
tradition, have authority which comes from God and which must be obeyed, regardless of 
the political orientation or morality of the rulers, in order to ensure an orderly society. As 
long at the church is allowed room to operate in society relatively free from constraint by 
the state so that it can promote traditional moral values, preserve ritual and provide for 
the salvation of souls, the church will be inclined to accommodate to the status quo.
That, in turn, has implications for individuals within the church. For individuals, the 
priestly tradition will influence them to express obedient political values. I expect the 
priestly tradition to affect political values among individuals in the following ways:
Hypothesis 1: Church attenders in these post-transition societies will be more 
supportive of the present regime, its political leaders and its institutions than persons who 
do not attend church. The priestly tradition of obedience to authority is a strong tenet of 
faith, especially in these relatively pre-modem churches who have been insulated from 
change by their isolation o f the past 50 years. I expect that more frequent church 
attenders, who show their support (by their attendance) for the institutional church and 
the priestly tradition for which it stands, will more strongly express trust and confidence 
in the institutions of the state and support for the current administration than those who 
do not attend church.
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Hypothesis 2: Church attenders in recently democratized eastern Germany will 
express similar levels o f support for a democratic state as their coreligionists in western 
Germany. Although they do not yet have as much experience with a democratic form of 
state, they do have the example o f western Germany as a successful democratic model, 
and the religious tolerance promised by a democratic state is a right cherished by 
religious people. Church attenders will express greater support for a democratic state and 
non-attenders, in both parts o f Germany.
Democratic Values Which Lie Between the Priestly and the Prophetic Tradition
There are a number of democratic political values which are not clearly influenced 
by either the priestly or the prophetic tradition. Such democratic ideals as political 
tolerance, civil liberties, conflict and protest are difficult to classify into either tradition, 
as they lie generally outside o f the scope of religion. Similarly, questions that deal with 
preference for a particular economic form have less in common with religious attitudes 
than do the other political and moral values examined here. Religious belief does 
influence these values, but the effect of religion is sometimes ambiguous. I have placed 
these relationships between the effects of the priestly and the prophetic traditions, 
because I believe that these values are influenced sometimes by both traditions, and 
sometimes by neither.
Hypothesis 3: Church attenders in post-transition societies will express similar 
attitudes toward individual freedoms and civil liberties as do church attenders in western 
European societies. These liberal democratic values do not correspond well with the 
strong priestly tradition of obedience to authority found in these mostly premodem
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churches. Therefore, these are not democratic values which are actively promoted in the 
church and church members are less likely to have strong feelings about these more 
liberal democratic values. I expect church attenders to express only weak to moderate 
support for individual freedoms and civil liberties.
Hypothesis 4: Church attenders in post-transition societies are also likely to be 
ambiguous about support for protest. Normally, protest behaviors are not supported by 
church attenders, even in democratic societies, as these behaviors contradict the priestly 
tradition of obedience. However, protest behavior is supported by the prophetic tradition 
and public protests were successfully used by several of the churches to promote the 
transition to democracy, particularly in East Germany and Poland. Therefore, I expect 
that church attenders in these societies should be somewhat less likely to oppose protest 
than church attenders in western Germany.
Hypothesis 5: Churches generally uphold communitarian values and tend to 
favor some government redistribution of wealth. The Catholic church, in particular, has 
a long tradition of opposing capitalism for its pro-individual/anti-community values. 
However, church attenders in western democracies have tended to ignore church teaching 
on the role o f government in the economy, interpreting this as the church going beyond 
its mandate. I expect that church attenders in post-transition societies will be similar to 
church attenders in western democracies in their attitudes about government 
responsibility in the economy. That is, church attenders will not support government 
intervention in the economy any more than non-attenders, either in providing jobs or in 
equalizing incomes.
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Democratic Traditions Reflecting the Prophetic Tradition -  Power from Below 
The effect o f the prophetic tradition on the institutional church is more difficult to 
assess. The prophetic tradition recognizes that power is called out from within a 
community, and moves upward and outward into society from below. The prophetic 
tradition from within the institutional church is most often manifested in a call for justice 
on a global or transnational scale. But this call for justice from within can be seen by the 
existing power structure as a direct or implicit threat to the existing social order. That is 
why a transnational church, such as the Catholic church, can call for justice and 
democratic reform among its churches locked behind the Iron Curtain. But a state 
church, such as the organization of the Protestant churches in Germany, threatens its own 
order if  it speaks loudly for reform from within the totalitarian order. Therefore, the 
prophetic call for justice among the Protestant churches was heard first as a call for 
demilitarization, world peace and social justice. It was not until near the end that the 
churches joined in support of the prodemocracy movement. The effect of the prophetic 
tradition within each of the churches can best be assessed here by evaluating the 
emergence o f leaders from within the oppressed churches and how they spoke out to help 
bring about needed social change, as described above.
The effect of the prophetic tradition on individual church members may also be 
hypothesized. Because individual church members placed themselves in a position of 
opposition to the ruling communist regime by their decision to affiliate (or remain 
affiliated) with a church, whether or not they actually took an active part in the 
prodemocracy movement they did make a public statement o f opposition by their
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affiliation. Church members who responded to the prophetic tradition were expressing a 
call for justice. They were demanding social change from below the existing power 
structure. Immediately post-transition these individuals are expressing democratic values 
on a very personal level. They feel that in some way they had a part in winning a 
deciding victory. They now feel and express trust, optimism and efficacy. They are 
ready and willing to invest themselves in the democratic society that they supported and 
in some measure helped bring about. I expect the prophetic tradition to affect political 
values among individuals in the following ways:
Hypothesis 6: Church attenders will express greater levels o f interpersonal trust 
than those who do not attend church, similar to their western coreligionists. Trust is a 
religious value reflecting the communitarian aspect of the prophetic tradition, as well as a 
democratic value. Even though interpersonal trust was very low in communist societies, 
church attenders have faithfully preserved that value and will express higher levels of 
trust in general, as well as trust in family members.
Hypothesis 7: Church attenders in post-transition societies will be more 
optimistic than those who do not attend church, and will likely be more optimistic than 
even their coreligionists in western Germany. They have much to be optimistic about.
The situation for religious believers in post-transition societies is vastly improved over 
their previous situation. Church attenders will likely identify with those church leaders 
who spoke the prophetic call to justice which encouraged others to get involved and to 
help bring about this social change.
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Hypothesis 8: Church attenders in eastern and western Germany will share 
similar feelings o f political efficacy. Though they do not yet have the practical 
experience in democracy of western Germans, eastern German church attenders are 
firmly committed to the democratic system, and believe themselves to be competent 
democrats. The influence of the prophetic tradition and their recent experience in 
participatory democracy should help eastern Germans to feel confident that the 
democratic steps they are taking are the right ones for them. As for personal efficacy, this 
is not a trait that is normally associated with church attenders. In fact, church attendance 
is most often negatively associated with personal efficacy (Hougland and Christenson 
1983) and church attenders tend to be skeptical or resistant to social change. I expect 
church attenders in post-transition societies to be similar to church attenders in western 
Germany in their level of personal efficacy.
CHAPTER III
DATA FOR THIS ANALYSIS 
Data from five separate surveys conducted in the years immediately following the 
transitions are used in this analysis. Most of the data were collected during 1990-91; all 
were collected before early 1993. I will describe each of the data sets here in detail, then 
describe how each of the variables used in this analysis were constructed.
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) coordinates an annual survey 
in at least fifieen European countries (as well as the United States). These data were 
produced by the Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung, Koln and distributed 
through the ICPSR survey data archive at the University o f Michigan. The 1990 survey 
concentrated on the role of government, and included Hungary (977 cases) and eastern 
Germany (1028 cases) as the first of the formerly communist countries to be surveyed, as 
well as western Germany (2812 cases) and eight other western democracies. The 1991 
survey concentrated on the role of religion; this survey was fielded in both eastern and 
western Germany (1486 cases, 1346 cases), as well as the former Soviet satellite 
countries o f Poland (1063 cases), Hungary (1000 cases), and Russia. This survey was 
made available to me by Dr. Andrew Greeley, a member o f the ISSP Study Team.
Similarly, the European Values Systems Study Group carried out a cross-national 
survey of individuals in 42 nations throughout the world in 1990-93. These data were 
documented and distributed through the ICPSR survey data archive at the University of 
Michigan. The World Values Survey (WVS) includes modules on political values,
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religious values, family values, environmental values, and so on. It was also conducted 
in eastern and western Germany (1336 cases, 2101 cases), Poland (938 cases), Hungary 
(999 cases), and several other former Soviet satellite countries. This survey was made 
available to me by Dr. Renata Kficher and Mr. Werner SiiBlin, o f the Institut fu r  
Demoskopie, Allensbach, Germany.
Finally, two surveys were conducted in eastern and western Germany in 
September 1991 and December 1992 by the Institut ftir Demoskopie, Allensbach, 
Germany. Commissioned by Dr. Frederick Weil and Dr. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, the 
surveys ask a barrage o f questions about political values. The 1991 survey (IfD 5055) 
includes 1039 western Germans and 1080 eastern Germans. The 1992 survey (IfD 5074) 
includes 1081 western Germans and 1131 eastern Germans. These five surveys allow me 
to empirically examine the political and religious values of church members in post- 
totalitarian societies and compare them to non-affiliates there and to church members in 
western Germany.
VARIABLES USED IN THIS ANALYSIS 
The relationship that I wish to examine in this analysis is that between religious 
behavior and moral and political values. I want to show that church attendance has an 
effect on moral and political values. To do this, I must first control for other factors 
which also affect religious behavior and attitudes. Previous research has consistently 
shown that church attendance is not the same for all groups of people. Older people, 
women, less educated people, married people, and people from small communities are 
more likely to attend church (Sigelman 1977; Roof and McKinney 1989). To control for
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these contributing factors, I include age, sex, education, marital status, and community 
size as controls in the models examining the relationship between religious behavior and 
moral and political attitudes.
Similarly, people from lower socioeconomic statuses are more likely to attend 
church, as are people who identify themselves as political conservatives. To address this 
relationship, I include dummy variables for employment status, occupation, and political 
party identification. I also include a scale of left/right political self-placement in the 
models to further specify political orientation.
Finally, there are several attitudinal variables that have been shown to affect 
political values. Those persons who express attitudes o f national pride are more likely to 
express positive political attitudes. Those persons who are satisfied with their own 
economic condition are more likely to express positive political attitudes. And those 
persons who are politically engaged — who express an interest in politics -  are more 
likely to express positive political attitudes. These variables must also be included in the 
models, to assess the contribution of religious behavior net of these factors on political 
attitudes. Table 3.1 illustrates the availability of each variable by country, across all data 
sets. One may wish to refer to this table while reading the following details of variable 
construction.
Independent Variables 
These data were gathered by several different groups who employed a variety of 
coding schemes on the variables. In order to make the surveys comparable, I recoded the 
variables to the same scale wherever possible. Where that was not possible, I made sure
Table 3.1 Distribution of Variables Across Datasets and Countries
World Values ISSP
1990 1990
WG EG H p WG EG
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Age Category X X X X X X
Attend Church X X X X X X
Secondary Education X X X X X X
Higher Income X X X X X X
Left-Right Placement X X X X X X
Married or Living as X X X X X X
Female X X X X X X
Community Size X X X X X
Union Member X X X X
Left Radical Vote X X X X
Center-Left Vote X X X X X X
Center-Right Vote X X X X X X
Right Radical Vote X X X
Unemployed X X X X X X
White Collar Occupation X X X X X X
Blue Collar Occupation X X X X X X
Self Employed X X X X X X
National Pride X X X X
Economically Satisfied X X X X
Interest in Politics X X X X X X
ISSP IfD IfD
1991 1991 1992
H WG EG H p WG EG WG EG
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X
X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X X
(table con'd.)
World Values ISSP ISSP IfD IfD
1990 1990 1991 1991 1992
WG EG H P WG EG H WG EG H p WG EG WG EG
CHAPTER IV VARIABLES
Religious Beliefs Factor X X X X
Follow Conscience/Obey X X X
Right/Wrong by God's Law X X X X
Right/Wrong by Society X X X X
Traditional Role for Women X X X
Husband Job/Wife Home X X X X
Family Life Suffers X X X X
Believers Hold Public Office X X X X
Unbelievers Unfit for Office X X X X
Religion Influence Govt. X X X X
Religion Influence the Vote X X X X
Churches Too Much Power X X X X
(table con'd.)
00
World Values ISSP ISSP IfD IfD
1990 1990 1991 1991 1992
WG EG H P WG EG H WG EG H P WG EG WG EG
CHAPTER V VARIABLES
Confidence in State Inst. X X X X X X X X X X X X
Trust Government X X X X
Support Democratic Form X X X X
Freedom and Law X X X X
Tolerate Free Speech X X X X
Citizens Have Free Speech X X X X
Free Speech Factor X X X X
Support Protest Behaviors X X X
Tolerate Protest Behaviors X X X
Government Repression X X
Government Provide Jobs X X X X X X X
Government Equalize Income X X X X X X X
Family Can be Trusted X X X X
People Can be Trusted X X X X X X X X
Life is Happy X X X X
Reunification Joy X X X X
Now Better Than Past X X X X
Future Better Than Past X X X X
Political Efficacy Factor X X X X
People Can't Change Lives X X X X
Favor Change X X X
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that the variables that I used measured the same thing across data sets and that they were 
coded in the same direction across data sets. For example, "income" means "total 
household income" whether it is measured in zlotys or Deutsche marks, and greater 
income is given a greater value. All opinion questions are recoded so that missing values 
are included in a middle category.
Age. Most of the surveys restricted their samples to adults aged 18 and over in 
the population. However, in the ISSP 1991 Poland restricted its sample to adults 
between the ages of 16 and 65 in the population. Some of the surveys reported 
respondents' actual ages. Other surveys reported age by categories. I recoded age into six 
categories, so that the scale would be the same for each data set. Age ranges from a value 
of one for those who are 24 years old or less to a value of six for those who are 65 years 
old or greater.
Church Attendance. The primary independent variable, used to measure 
strength of affiliation with a religious denomination, is a five-point scale o f frequency of 
church attendance. Each of the data sets used a variety of coding schemes to code 
church attendance. In order to standardize across the data I recoded the variable where 
necessary into five comparable categories. The categories range from zero for those who 
say they never attend church to five for those who say they attend at least weekly.
Education. Education was measured using country-specific coding for level of 
education attained by the respondent. Sometimes this was reported as years o f education, 
sometimes it was reported as school level completed by respondent. For comparability, I
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have recoded education into a dummy variable. Education has a value of one for 
respondents who completed at least secondary education and zero for those who did not.6
Income. This variable measures respondents' total household income for all data 
sets, but proved to be unwieldy to recode into the same metric. Each survey uses 
country-specific income categories to report income, and furthermore, the number of 
income categories range from a low of five categories to a high o f 22 categories. Rather 
than try to convert country-specific amounts to some standard (such as exchange value in 
$US at the time of the survey) and then restrict the converted values to comparable 
categories across data sets, I elected to retain the integrity o f the original reported 
incomes. Therefore, across all countries in all surveys greater values for income 
represent greater levels of household income, with no further comparability implied.
Left/Right Self-Placement. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a 
scale o f political ideology. In most cases this was a ten-point scale; one represents the 
political left and 10 represents the political right. The IfD surveys employed a 100-point 
scale; zero represents the political left and 100 represents the political right. Rather than 
trying to impose some sort of reducing metric on this scale to force it to conform to the 
ten-point scale, I left the scales as they are reported. Therefore, increased values in
6I also tested education as it was originally coded, with several categories of 
education — higher values indicating more education completed. There was very little 
difference in effect between either coding scheme, and the value for church attendance 
did not change significantly in any model. Therefore, I chose to display the results for 
education coded as a dummy variable, since completion of secondary education is a more 
meaningful threshold concept.
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left/right self-placement indicate increased identification with the political right; no 
further comparability is implied.
M arital Status. Again, a variety of coding schemes measured current marital 
status of respondent. The ISSP surveys reported married or living together as one 
category. In all the other surveys I recoded those who reported they are married as well 
as those who reported they are single but living with a partner into one category. I then 
created a dummy variable for marital status. This variable has a value of one for those 
who are married or living with a partner and zero for those who are not.
Sex. This variable was coded identically across all surveys. I recoded the 
variable into a dummy variable, with a value of one for females and zero for males.
Community Size. Respondents were asked to report the size o f their community 
of residence. Although these data sets used a variety of coding schemes to report size of 
community, it was possible to recode each of them into a comparable scale. Community 
size is reported here in a five-point scale, with a value of one for communities with less 
than 5,000 residents and a value of five for communities with more than 100,000 
residents.
Union Membership. This variable was not available in all surveys, but was 
included in the analysis wherever it could be incorporated. Union membership is a 
dummy variable with a value of one for those who report they belong to a union and zero 
for all others.
Political Party Identification. All surveys asked respondents some form of 
question about identification with a particular political party. Since Europeans do not
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usually formally affiliate with a political party, the most common way to ask about party 
identification is to ask respondents to identify which political party they would vote for if  
a federal election were held on the following day . Using this question, and the objective 
political orientations o f the various country-specific parties, I created four dummy 
variables for political party identification.
Left-radical vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for the party 
most strongly identified with the former communists in that particular country (PDS or 
DKP in eastern Germany, MSZMP in Hungary, PZPR in Poland, doesn't exist for western 
Germany), zero otherwise.
Center-left vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for the major 
center-left party (SPD in Germany, the center-left opposition alliance of MSZP, SZDSZ 
and FIDESZ in Hungary, and the Social Democrats in Poland), zero otherwise. Center- 
right vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for the major center-right 
party (CDU/CSU/DSU in Germany, the center-right ruling coalition of MDF, FKgP and 
KDNP in Hungary, and the Christian Democrats and Solidarity in Poland), zero 
otherwise.
Right-radical vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for an ultra­
nationalist party (NPD and Republikaner in Germany, Real Politic Union or National 
Party for Poland), zero otherwise (see Racz 1993 for Hungarian parties' ideologies and 
Jasiewicz 1993 for Polish parties' ideologies).
In this way I have captured both extremes of political party identification for each 
of the countries, as well as the two main center parties (or party coalitions). The omitted
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reference category for political party identification includes all those who would not 
express a political preference, as well as those who named a party not identified with 
either extreme or with the center. For example, Germans who said they would vote for 
the Greens/Bundnis '90 Party would be included in the omitted reference category, as that 
party is neither centrist nor extreme.
Unemployment. Experience of unemployment is measured in different ways in 
several of the surveys. The World Values Survey reports whether the respondent (or the 
chief wage earner, if that is not the respondent) is currently unemployed. The ISSP 
surveys report current unemployment status only for the respondent. I constructed a 
dummy variable for unemployment for each of these surveys, with current unemployment 
coded one and employment coded zero.
The IfD surveys ask several questions about whether the respondent or anyone 
else in the household is unemployed, has been unemployed in the last two years, or fears 
becoming unemployed in the next six months. From a count of positive responses to 
these questions I constructed a variable that ranges from zero to six. The lowest values 
represent those who have not experienced unemployment and do not fear becoming 
unemployed, and increasing values represent increased experience or fear of 
unemployment.
Occupation. Country-specific occupation codes are subsequently recoded into 
more general, derived categories o f occupation in the WVS and the ISSP surveys. From 
these categories I created dummy variables for white collar occupation, blue collar 
occupation, and self-employed. For the WVS those respondents (or the chief wage
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earner, if  that is not the respondent) who reported that they were either 
employer/managers, professional workers, or middle or junior level non-manual workers 
were coded one for white collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those who reported 
occupation as either foreman/supervisor, or skilled, semiskilled or unskilled manual 
workers were coded one for blue collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those respondents 
(or the chief wage earner, if that is not the respondent) who reported that they were self 
employed were coded one for self employment, zero otherwise.
The ISSP is handled similarly, except that there is no question to identify whether 
or not the respondent is also the chief wage earner. Therefore, respondents whose 
occupation is scientific/technical professional, manager/administrative professional, 
clerical or service are coded one for white collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those 
respondents whose occupation is trade professions, professions in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and commercial animal husbandry, or those who are in industrial production, 
manufacture, transportation services, or unskilled laborers are coded one for blue collar 
occupation, zero otherwise. Data restrictions prevented me from excluding farm-related 
occupations from this category, as is routinely done. Another question asking whether 
the respondent is self employed is coded one for self employed, zero otherwise.
The IfD surveys, like the WVS, ask the occupation of respondent or chief wage 
earner. Those who respond that their occupation is managing or non-managing 
employee, or high, middle or lower-level services are coded one for white collar 
occupation, zero otherwise. Those who report that their occupation is technical/trade 
worker or other worker are coded one for blue collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those
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who report that they own a large firm, are self employed business people or self 
employed hand workers are coded one for self employed, zero otherwise.
National Pride. This variable asks respondents to report how proud they are to 
be their particular nationality. Since pride measures a continuum of attitude, with a 
strong negative attitude having the lowest value, and a strong positive attitude having the 
highest value, I recoded missing values to the middle category. Therefore, a value of one 
corresponds to those who say they are not at all proud to be their nationality, and a value 
of five corresponds to those who say they are very proud to be their nationality.
Economic satisfaction. This variable measures respondents' subjective level of 
economic satisfaction. The World Values Survey asks respondents to rank themselves on 
a ten point scale, according to their level of financial satisfaction. Values range from one 
for dissatisfied to ten for satisfied. The IfD surveys ask respondents two questions about 
economic satisfaction. The first asks them to rank general economic conditions in 
Germany today. The second asks them to rank their own economic situation. Each 
question is measured on a five-point scale, from very bad to very good. The questions 
were summed to form a Likert-type scale of economic satisfaction, ranging from two for 
very dissatisfied to ten for very satisfied.
Interest in Politics. This variable asks respondents to report how interested they 
are in politics. Responses range from one for not at all interested to five for very 
interested (WVS 1990 and ISSP 1990 surveys). Response categories for the IfD surveys 
range from one for not at all interested to three for very interested.
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Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables here are grouped according to the chapter in which they 
are examined, as described in the hypothesis section in Chapter Two. That is, dependent 
variables that address particular moral values to be discussed in chapter four are grouped 
here under the heading "Chapter Four Variables" and the dependent variables that address 
particular political values to be discussed in chapter five are grouped under the heading 
"Chapter Five Variables" for purposes of discussion. Each of these dependent variables 
is not always available in each of the different surveys; refer to Table 3.1 for clarification. 
Chapter Four Variables 
Religious Beliefs
Religious Beliefs Factor. Respondents were asked about their level of belief in 
God, as well as five other articles o f belief. Belief in God is measured on a six-point 
scale, ranging from one for no belief in God to six for no doubt in the existence of God. 
The other five articles of belief -  belief in an afterlife, the devil, heaven, hell, and 
miracles — were each measured on a five-point scale, ranging from one for definitely do 
not believe to five for definitely do believe. Factor analysis revealed a one-factor 
solution, for each country separately as well as for all four countries pooled, so the factor 
score is used as the dependent variable of religious beliefs (Table 3.2).
Authority vs. Autonomy
Follow Conscience Rather Than Obey. The question text reads, "In general, 
would you say that people should obey the law without exception, or are there 
exceptional occasions on which people should follow their consciences even if  it means
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Table 3.2 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of
Religious Beliefs8 
Western Eastern
Germany Germany Hungary Poland
Factor and Items_______________ Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading
Religious Beliefs
Hell .87 .88 .85 .83
Devil .86 .87 .76 .73
Heaven .85 .82 .88 .83
Afterlife .76 .82 .82 .79
Miracles .65 .60 .76 .72
God .64 .70 .68 .62
Eigenvalue 3.63 3.71 3.8 3.45
Percent o f Variance
Explained 60.5% 61.8% 63.3% 57.5%
Source: ISSP 1991
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows: 
Western Germany .74, .68, .46, .33, .15 
Eastern Germany .78, .61, .42, .35, .13 
Hungary .75, .50, .42, .31, .22 
Poland .82, .58, .52, .37, .26
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breaking the law?" Response categories range from one for those who say obey the law 
without exception to three for those who say follow conscience on occasion.
Right/Wrong Should be Based on God's Law. This variable asks respondents 
how much they agree with the statement "Right and wrong should be based on God's 
laws." Response categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for 
those who strongly agree.
Right/W rong Should be Determined by Society. Similarly to the previous 
question, respondents here are asked how much they agree with the statement "Right and 
wrong should be determined by society." Response categories range from one for those 
who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.
Family Values
Traditional Role for Women. The variable is a factor scale, composed of a 
factor analysis of respondent's responses to the following questions, each recoded so that 
the more conservative answer is high:
• A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (strongly agree is 
high)
• A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children (strongly 
agree is high)
• Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (strongly agree is high) 
These were the variables which loaded most consistently on the same factor in each of the 
three countries (Table 3.3), as well as in the pooled model including all three countries.
Traditional Family Roles. This variable asks respondents how much they agree 
with the statement "A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the
Table 3.3 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components 
Analysis of Traditional Role for Women0
Western Eastern 
Germany Germany Hungary
Factor and Items Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading
Traditional Role for Women 
Pre-school Children Suffer .63 .63 .64
Women Want Home and Childre .80 .81 .84
Housewife as Fulfilling as Work .77 .81 .77
Eigenvalue 1.62 1.71 1.72
Percent o f Variance Explained 54.1% 57.1% 57.2%
Source: WVS 1990
“Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows: 
Western Germany .80, .57 
Eastern Germany .78, .51 
Hungary .80, .48
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home and the family.” Response categories range from one for those who strongly 
disagree to five for those who strongly agree.
W orking Women. Respondents are asked how much they agree with the 
statement "Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job." Response categories 
range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree. 
Attitudes about religion and politics
It is Better if Religious Believers Hold Public Office. This variable asks 
respondents how much they agree with the statement "It would be better for [respondent's 
country] if  more people with strong religious beliefs held public office." Response 
categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly 
agree.
Those Who Do Not Believe in God are Unfit for Public Office. For this 
variable respondents report how much they agree with the statement "Politicians who do 
not believe in God are unfit for public office." Response categories range from one for 
those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.
Religious Leaders Should Not Influence the Government. Respondents are 
asked how much they agree with the statement "Religious leaders should not try to 
influence government decisions." Response categories range from one for those who 
strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.
Religious Leaders Should Not Influence the Vote. This variable asks 
respondents how much they agree with the statement "Religious leaders should not try to
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influence how people vote in elections." Response categories range from one for those 
who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.
Churches and Religious Organizations Have Too Much Power. This variable 
asks respondents how much they agree with the statement "Do you think that churches 
and religious organizations in this country have too much power or too little power." 
Response categories range from one for those who say "far too little power" to five for 
those who say "far too much power".
C hapter Five Variables
Confidence and Trust in the Institutions of Government
Confidence in State Institutions. Respondents were asked to measure their level 
o f confidence in each of up to thirteen various institutions; response categories range 
from one (no confidence) to four (a great deal of confidence) or five (for ISSP 1991). 
Factor analysis for each of the countries, as well as for pooled models including all of the 
countries together, most often produced a two-factor solution in each country, with minor 
variations among the variables included in each factor. When the variables loading most 
strongly on the same factor in each country were included together in a second factor 
analysis, a one factor solution was produced for each country, as well as for the pooled 
models. The institutions included in this factor include schools, courts, Parliament, and 
civil service. These variables were the ones which most often loaded on the same factor 
in each o f the countries. See Tables 3.4 - 3.6 for results o f the factor analysis of these 
variables.
Table 3.4 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components 
Analysis of Confidence in State Institutions (World Values Survey)0 
Western Eastern
Germany Germany Hungary Poland
Factor and Items Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading
Confidence in State Institutions
Parliament .79 .66 .76 .81
Courts .77 .74 .76 .57
Civil Service .75 .74 .76 .80
Schools .66 .68 .69 .58
Eigenvalue 2.21 2 2.2 1.97
Percent o f Variance
Explained 55.2% 50.0% 55.1% 49.2%
Source: WVS 1990
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .75, .57, .48
Eastern Germany .91, .56, .53
Hungary .86, .54, .40
Poland 1.26, .51,.27
Table 3.5 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components 
Analysis o f Confidence in State Institutions (International Social Survey
Program)3 
W estern Eastern
Germany Germany Hungary Poland
Factor and Items Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading
Confidence in State Institutions
Parliament .70 .68 .79 .67
Courts .78 .76 .75 .73
Civil Service .78 .78 .82 .72
Schools .65 .65 .66 .66
Eigenvalue 2.12 2.07 2.3 1.95
Percent of Variance
Explained 53.0% 51.7% 57.4% 53.0%
Source: ISSP 1991
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .80, .54, .54
Eastern Germany .80, .60, .53
Hungary .89, .49, .32
Poland .81,-64, .60
Table 3.6 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components 
Analysis of Confidence in State Institutions (Institut fuer Demoskopie
Surveys)8
Western Eastern W estern Eastern
Germany Germany Germany Germany
(91) (91) (92) (92)
Factor and Items Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading
Confidence in State Institutions
Parliament .76 .77 .81 .77
Courts .73 .73 .79 .71
Civil Service .73 .71 .72 .68
Schools .61 .58 .69 .62
Eigenvalue 2.00 1.97 2.27 1.95
Percent o f Variance
Explained 50.0% 49.2% 56.8% 48.8%
Sources; IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992) 
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows: 
Western Germany (91) .80, .68, ,52 
Eastern Germany (91) .84, .70, .50 
Western Germany (92) .73, .60, .40 
Eastern Germany (92) .79, .72, .54
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T rust in Government. This variable is comprised of a factor scale of three
questions:
• How much.of the time do you think you can trust the government in Bonn to do 
what is right -- just about always, most o f the time, only some of the time, or none 
o f the time? (never, sometimes, don't know, usually, always)
• Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking 
out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all people? (special interests, 
don't know, all people)
• Do you believe that the representatives in Bonn first and foremost represent the 
interests o f the populace or do they have other interests which are more important 
to them? (other interests, don't know, all people)
The questions are coded so that positive responses indicate greater trust in government.
Factor analysis indicates an underlying dimension of confidence in government, so the
factor score is used as the dependent variable here (Table 3.7).
Support for Democracy as a Form of State
Support for Democracy. This variable is comprised of a factor scale o f opinions
on the following three questions:
• Do you believe that the democracy that we have in Germany is the best form of 
state or is there another form of state which is better? (another better, don't know, 
best form of state)
• If someone says, "We can solve the problems we have in the Federal Republic 
with democracy," would you agree or not? (disagree, don't know, agree)
• Two men are discussing how a country should be governed. The one says: "I 
like it best when the people place the best politician at the top and give him 
complete governing power. He can then clearly and quickly decide with a few 
chosen experts. Not much talking is done and something really happens!" The 
other says: "I prefer that a number o f people have to determine something in the 
country. They do sometimes go round and round until something is done, but it is 
not so easy for abuse of power to occur." Which of these two opinions is closest 
to your own view — the first or the second? (one person, don’t know, several 
politicians)
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Table 3.7 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of
Trust in Government0
Western Eastern W estern Eastern
Germany Germany Germany Germany
(91) (91) (92) (92)
Factor and Items Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading
Trust in Government
Government Run for All .83 .81 .79 .80
Trust Bonn to do Right .78 .80 .80 .82
MPs Represent the People .75 .79 .74 .78
Eigenvalue 1.87 1.93 1.82 1.93
Percent o f Variance
Explained 62.3% 64.4% 60.5% 64.3%
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992) 
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows: 
Western Germany (91) .64, .49 
Eastern Germany (91) .55, .52 
Western Germany (92) .65, .53 
Eastern Germany (92) .58, .49
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The questions are coded so that positive responses indicate greater support for 
democracy. Again, factor analysis indicates an underlying dimension of support for 
democracy, so the factor score is used as the dependent variable (Table 3.8).
Political Freedoms and Political Rights
Freedom vs. Living Standard. This question asks respondents to decide which 
is better, to have freedom and law or to have a higher standard o f living. The responses 
are coded so that one is higher living standard, two is don't know, three is freedom and 
law.
Tolerate Freedom of Speech. A set o f questions from the IfD surveys asks 
respondents whether one should tolerate a speech made by a racist or a revolutionary. 
These questions come originally from the General Social Survey, and are adaptations of 
Stouffer's (1955) tolerance questions. The questions are worded:
• There are some people whose views are considered extreme by the majority. First 
consider people who want to overthrow the government by revolution. Do you 
think that such people should be allowed to hold public meetings to express their 
views? (don't allow, don't know, allow)
• Now consider people who believe that whites are racially superior to all other 
races. Do you think that such people should be allowed to hold public meetings 
to express their views? (don't allow, don't know, allow)
The questions are coded so that positive responses indicate greater tolerance. Both
questions loaded on the same factor in each country, as well as in the pooled data, so the
factor scale is used as the dependent variable as it captures an underlying dimension of
political tolerance (Table 3.9).
Believe Citizens Have Free Speech. The question asks "Do you feel that one
can express his political opinions freely in Germany today, or is it better to be careful?"
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Table 3.8 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis o f
Support for Democracy"
W estern Eastern Western Eastern
Germany Germany Germany Germany
(91) (91) (92) (92)
Factor and Items Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading
Support fo r  Democracy
Solve Problems with Dem .74 .81 .72 .78
German Democracy Best .73 .82 .70 .79
Deliberative Body is Best .52 -.06 .56 .25
Eigenvalue 1.34 1.33 1.32 1.29
Percent o f Variance
Explained 44.7% 44.2% 44.0% 43.1%
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992) 
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows: 
Western Germany (91) .92, .74 
Eastern Germany (91) .99, .67 
Western Germany (92) .90, .78 
Eastern Germany (92) .99, .72
80
Table 3.9 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of
Tolerance for Freedom of Speech3
Western Eastern Western Eastern
Germany Germany Germany Germany
(91) (91) (92) (92)
Factor and Items Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading
Tolerate Freedom o f  Speech 
Revolutionary Speech OK .85 .81 .85 .82
Racialist Speech Allowed .85 .81 .85 .82
Eigenvalue 1.44 1.3 1.45 1.35
Percent of Variance Explaine 71.9% 65.2% 72.7% 67.3%
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .56
Eastern Germany (91) .70
Western Germany (92) .55
Eastern Germany (92) .65
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The question is coded so that higher values represent agreement that people can speak 
freely.
Right to Free Expression. This question is a factor score from two items 
developed in 1968 by Rudolf Wildenmann and Max Kaase (Kaase 1971). Response 
categories range from one for full disagreement to six for full agreement. The questions 
read: "On these cards, we have put together a series of commonly-heard opinions about 
peoples' behavior. We would like to find out what people really think. Please sort out the 
cards on this scale according to how much you agree or disagree with each statement:
• Every citizen has the right to go to the streets for his convictions if  necessary
• Everyone should have the right to stand up for his opinion, even if  the majority 
disagrees
Factor analysis o f these two items yielded one underlying factor of support for the right 
of free expression, which was used as the dependent variable (Table 3.10).
Protests
Support Protest Behaviors. This variable is a Guttman scale, made up of five 
variables which measure whether or not the respondents had ever engaged in various 
forms of protest behavior, or were inclined to do so. These variables were replicated 
from the Political Action Data Set, conducted in the mid 1970s in eight countries of 
western Europe and the United States.7 These five variables are presumed to have 
unidimensional and cumulative properties, therefore making them suitable for Guttman
7See Barnes and Kaase, 1979, for additional information about the original data 
set, particularly the Technical Appendix for information about variable construction.
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Table 3.10 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of
Right to Freedom o f Expression0
Western Eastern Western Eastern
Germany Germany Germany Germany
(91) (91) (92) (92)
Factor and Items Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading
Right to Freedom o f  Expression
Take Convictions to Streets .83 .80 .83 .81
Stand Up for Own Opinion .83 .80 .83 .81
Eigenvalue 1.39 1.28 1.37 1.31
Percent o f Variance
Explained 69.5% 64.2% 68.7% 65.7%
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .61
Eastern Germany (91) .72
Western Germany (92) .63
Eastern Germany (92) .69
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scaling. Response categories are one for have done, two for might do, and three for
would never do. The original question wording is as follows:
I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people 
can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have 
actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, 
under any circumstances, do it.
a) Signing a petition
b) Joining in boycotts
c) Attending lawful demonstrations
d) Joining unofficial strikes
e) Occupying buildings or factories
In order to construct a Guttman scale from these five items I followed the same
procedure detailed in the technical appendix by the creators of the Political Action Data
Set. I reproduced a protest activity scale, with responses ranging from zero (never done
any protest activity) to five (have done or might do all five items) for each country.
Tolerate Protest Behavior. This series of questions was also taken from the
Political Action Data Set. As in the variable above, this variable is also a Guttman scale,
made up of six variables which measure whether or not the respondents think these
various forms of protest behavior should be allowed. Again, these six variables are
presumed to have unidimensional and cumulative properties, therefore making them
suitable for Guttman scaling. Response categories range from one for definitely allowed
to four for definitely not allowed. The original question wording is as follows:
There are many ways people or organizations can protest against a government 
action they strongly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and 
which should not be allowed by ticking a box on each line. (Please tick one box 
on each line).
a) Organizing public meetings to protest against the government
b) Publishing pamphlets to protest against the government
c) Organizing protest marches and demonstrations
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d) Occupying a government office and stopping work there for several days
e) Seriously damaging government buildings
The variable was created using the same procedure as above for creating the variable of
support for protest activity.
Oppose Government Repression. A final variable measuring attitude toward
public protest was also reproduced from the Political Action Data Set. This variable is a
factor scale, composed of four questions which ask respondents whether they approve or
disapprove of a variety o f forms of government repression of protest activity. The
questions are worded as follows:
What do you think about the following behaviors? Please tell me for each one, 
whether you approve or disapprove of this behavior?
a) Police attack demonstrators with clubs
b) Judges impose severe sentences against protesters who attack police defense 
lines
c) The government forbids public demonstrations in the interest of public safety 
and order
d) The federal government employs the national guard or the army to end a strike 
The questions are coded so that opposition to government repression has the highest 
value. All of the questions loaded on the same factor of opposition to government 
repression in each country, as well as in the pooled data, so the factor score is used as the 
dependent variable (Table 3.11).
Economic Issues
Not the Responsibility of Government to Provide Jobs. Not the 
Responsibility of Government to Equalize Incomes. These variables are the only two 
replicated in 1991 from a series o f questions about the responsibilities o f government
Table 3.11 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis 
of Opposition to Government Repression3
Western Eastern
Germany Germany
(91) (91)
Factor and Items Factor Loading Factor Loading
Oppose Government Repression 
Police Attacks on Demonstrator .74 .74
Severe Sentences for Protestors .69 .59
Forbid Public Demonstrations .74 .64
Troops Intervene in Strikes .67 .82
Eigenvalue 2.02 1.97
Percent of Variance Explained 50.5% 49.3%
Source: IfD 5055 (1991)
“Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows: 
Western Germany .88, .58, .53 
Eastern Germany .99, .69, .34
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asked in 1990. The question text reads, "On the whole, do you think it should be or 
should not be the government's responsibility to:"
• Provide a job for everyone who wants one
• Reduce income differences between the rich and poor
Answer categories range from one for definitely should to five for definitely should not. 
Interpersonal Trust
Family Members Can Be Trusted. This question asks respondents to rank how 
much they can trust various groups of people; the first group asked about is "your 
family." Response categories range from one for no trust at all to five for complete trust.
People Can Be Trusted. This question asks respondents whether, generally 
speaking, they would say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful 
in dealing with people. Responses were recoded so that a value of one indicates the 
response that most people can be trusted and zero indicates that one must be careful in 
dealing with people.
Optimism
Describe Life as Happy. This variable asks respondents, "If you were to 
consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you say you are, 
on the whole?" Response categories range from one for not at all happy to five for very 
happy.
Joyful about Reunification. This question was asked on the IfD surveys, for 
both parts of Germany. The question reads, "Is the German reunification more an
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occasion for joy or concern for you?" Response categories are one for concern, two for
don't know, and three for joy.
Evaluation of Present and Future Relative to the P as t The IfD surveys asked
respondents to rate from zero to ten the general situation in their part of the country at
three points in time. The question is worded:
If you think back to the time when Germany was still divided, what do you 
generally think of the situation at that time? Tell me according to this ladder:
Zero would mean that the situation in our part o f Germany was very bad, and 10 
would mean that the situation here was very good. Which number best expresses 
what the situation here was like back then? What is the situation like at the 
present time? Which number best expresses the present situation in our part of 
Germany?
The rating for the past situation was subtracted from the rating for the present situation to 
obtain the respondent's evaluation of relative improvement since reunification. The 
rating for the present situation was subtracted from the rating for the future situation to 
obtain the respondent's projection for improvement in the future. Positive values indicate 
optimism about the present and future situations in Germany, relative to the past.
Efficacy and Attitude toward Change
Political Efficacy. This set o f four efficacy questions is replicated from the 
University o f Michigan National Election Studies. For each item, respondents are asked 
whether they agree (1), don't know (2), or disagree (3). The question is worded: "On this 
list are opinions that one sometimes hears. Please tell me for each opinion whether you 
agree or disagree."
• Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the 
government runs things
• I don't think that public officials care much about what people like me think
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• Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me 
can't really understand what's going on
• People like me don't have any say about what the government does
Factor analysis resulted in a single factor o f efficacy for each country separately, as well 
as for the pooled data, so the factor score is used as the dependent variable o f political 
efficacy (Table 3.12).
People Can Do Little to Change Their Lives. A measure of personal efficacy 
comes from a question asked on the ISSP 1991 survey. This question asks people 
whether they agree with the statement, "There is little that people can do to change the 
course of their lives." Response categories range from one for disagreeing strongly to 
five for agreeing strongly.
Attitude toward Change, Three questions were asked about personal attitudes 
toward change, which provide another measure of respondent's personal efficacy. A 
factor scale is created out of these three questions asking people to rank their outlook on 
life, according to a ten point scale. Responses indicating personal efficacy and openness 
to change were ranked high. The questions included:
• You will never achieve much unless you act boldly (vs. One should be cautious 
about making major changes in life)
• New ideas are generally better than old ones (vs. Ideas that have stood the test of 
time are generally best)
• When changes occur in my life, I welcome the possibility that something new is 
beginning (vs. When changes occur in my life, I worry about the difficulties they 
may cause)
Factor analysis indicated that all three questions loaded on one factor in each country, as 
well as in the pooled data, so the factor score was used as another measure o f personal 
efficacy (Table 3.13).
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Table 3.12 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of
Political Efficacy®
Western Eastern Western Eastern
Germany Germany Germany Germany 
(91) (91) (92) (92)
Factor and Items Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading
Political Efficacy
Vote Not Only Influence .63 .60 .63 .50
Officials Care What I Thin .74 .70 .59 .71
Politics Not Complicated .72 .69 .59 .66
People Have Say in Govern .72 .81 .72 .74
Eigenvalue 1.99 1.99 1.61 1.74
Percent of Variance
Explained 49.7% 49.9% 40.3% 43.5%
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992) 
"Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows: 
Western Germany (91) .78, .66, .57 
Eastern Germany (91) .82, .68, .51 
Western Germany (92) .91, .79, .69 
Eastern Germany (92) .91, .71, .65
Table 3.13 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components 
Analysis of Attitude Toward Change0
Western Eastern
Germany Germany Hungary
Factor and Items Factor Loading Factor Loading Factor Loading
Attitude Toward Change
Welcome Change in My Life .81 .79 .75
Act Boldly to Achieve in Life .81 .76 .74
New Ideas Better than Old Ones .79 .74 .60
Eigenvalue 1.93 1.75 1.47
Percent o f Variance Explained 64.2% 58.5% 48.9%
Source: WVS 1990
°Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows: 
Western Germany .56, .51 
Eastern Germany .66, .58 
Hungary .85, .69
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Altogether, there are twelve dependent variables to be discussed in chapter four, 
dealing with church attenders religious beliefs and attitudes toward certain moral and 
social issues. These variables are important to explore the breadth and depth o f the 
influence of religion in these postcommunist societies. Then there are twenty-one 
dependent variables to be discussed in chapter five, dealing with church attenders1 support 
for the government and political values. This broad spectrum of variables is necessary to 
explore the terrain of church influence on political values in these postcommunist 
societies. As was set out in the hypotheses, certain of these democratic values reflect the 
priestly tradition of the church, others reflect the prophetic tradition, and still others 
cannot easily be identified with either tradition. By exploring the effect of church 
attendance on each of these variables of democratic support we can better understand just 
how the church is operating in civil society in each of these countries.
METHODS
To provide the most parsimonious model for each dependent variable, while at the 
same time provide a model that explains variance within each country, I first ran a full 
regression model for each dependent variable. In this full model I included church 
attendance as the primary independent variable. I also included other demographic 
variables known from the literature to be associated with church attendance (age, sex, 
marital status, education, income, political ideology, and community size). I included 
union membership as a control variable to capture the influence of this other aspect of 
civil society.
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Finally, I included several variables often associated with support for democratic 
values, such as political party identification, occupation, national pride, economic 
satisfaction, and interest in politics. Any variable that achieved a minimum level of 
significance (p<. 10) for any of the four countries was retained for inclusion in the final 
models for all countries. Therefore, for each dependent variable, the model reported in 
the tables is the most parsimonious model that includes variables important for explaining 
variation in at least one of the four countries. Any variable that was included in the full 
model but was dropped from the final models because it failed to achieve significance in 
any of the countries is indicated in the tables by a dash. And any variable that was not 
included in the final model for a particular country because it was not asked of that 
country in that data set is indicated in the tables by "n/a".
Each table reports standardized regression coefficients, along with their 
significance levels. Since these are standardized regression coefficients their size or 
significance cannot be compared across models. The conclusions that I draw from these 
models are based on the relative strength of each of the independent variables in the 
equations, not on their absolute values.
CHAPTER IV
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CHURCHES IN EASTERN EUROPE 
The churches in central and eastern Europe are once again free to operate, after 
nearly 50 years of government repression. Before we can speak meaningfully of the 
political values of church attenders in post-transition societies we need first to evaluate 
the present condition of these churches. In this chapter I examine church membership 
characteristics of East Germany, Poland and Hungary to see who still belongs after two 
generations of communism. Then I explore the sociodemographic characteristics of 
church members, to search for patterns o f disaffiliation. Next I analyze religious beliefs, 
to determine whether church attenders differ from non-attenders in their religious beliefs. 
Finally, I examine a variety of moral and social values to see whether church attendance 
has an effect on these values.
Church Membership 
For purposes of this analysis I have recoded church membership into a dummy 
variable, coded zero if the respondent claimed no religious affiliation and one if the 
respondent claimed a religious affiliation. I have done the same for Catholic and 
Protestant affiliation (one if the respondent reported self as Catholic or Protestant, zero if  
not). Poland and Hungary report the highest rates of religious affiliation (see Table 4.1), 
with non-affiliation rates of only 4.8% and 6.1%, respectively. 95% of Poles are 
Catholics; there are no Polish Protestants in this sample (ISSP 1991). In Hungary, 
72.4% are Catholics, 21.4% are Protestants. Each of these countries has retained very
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Table 4.1 Church Affiliation Rates and Characteristics o f Church Members 
(proportion of church members in each category, by country)
Western Eastern
Germany Germany Hungary Poland
Church Affiliates .89 .35 .93 .95
Catholics .43 .06 .73 .95
Protestants .45 .29 .21 .00
Age Category
Under 25 .13 .06 .08 .16
65 and Older .18 .25 .16 .06
Secondary Education Complet .26 .17 .32 .36
Higher than Average Income .59 .69 .72 .52
Right of Center Self Placement .52 .44 n/a .58
Married or Living as Married .60 .63 .72 .69
Female .53 .66 .57 .53
Community Size
<5000 people .12 .46 .31 .43
>100,000 people .63 .20 .30 .28
Union Member .16 .24 .40 .18
Left Radical Vote Intention n/a .01 .01 n/a
Center-Left Vote Intention .33 .26 .27 .00
Center-Right Vote Intention .27 .25 .22 .04
Right Radical Vote Intention .01 .00 n/a .00
Unemployed .02 .06 .01 .09
White Collar Occupation .50 .47 .23 .19
Blue Collar Occupation .35 .47 .34 .34
Self Employed .08 .13 .04 .13
Source: ISSP 1991
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high levels o f religious affiliation. In contrast, western Germany, which did not have a 
policy of official repression of religion, reports a non-affiliation rate o f 10.7%. 42.6% of 
the western German sample are Catholics, and 44.7% are Protestants. Eastern Germany 
has the lowest rate of affiliation; greater than 64% of the sample claim no affiliation with 
any organized religion. 29% of the eastern German sample are Protestants; only 5.7% 
are Catholics.
When Germany was divided into two countries after World War II, religious 
affiliation was very similar between East and West. The main religious difference 
between them was that East Germany was almost entirely Protestant while West 
Germany was about evenly divided between Protestants and Catholics. To compare 
overall affiliation rates, in 1950 the proportion of religious adherents was nearly identical 
in eastern and western Germany, approximately 90% of the population. But by 1989 the 
proportion of adherents in the East had dropped dramatically, to approximately 36% of 
the population (Lemke 1989).
The significant drop in religious affiliation in eastern Germany could be due to at 
least two possible contributing factors. First, the drop could be due to a rapid 
secularization o f East German society. Secularization theory proposes that as society 
modernizes more material values tend to replace traditional values and the place of 
religion in society is displaced by modem science and technology (see Greeley 1982; 
Wilson 1982; Luckmann 1983). For many years East Germany was the model of 
advanced Soviet society, exemplifying the very latest in Soviet technology and 
development. Perhaps this modernizing pressure on East German society led to a more
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rapid secularization of this society. If so, then younger East Germans should have 
disaffiliated at a more rapid rate than their elders, as they have been more subjected to 
these modernizing pressures through their education. If the secularization process is the 
primary cause of disaffiliation in eastern Germany then we would expect to see younger 
eastern Germans disaffiliating in greater numbers than older eastern Germans.
However, another possible cause of disaffiliation could be the severe repression of 
the churches by the Soviet authorities. Repression of religious expression, particularly 
religious affiliation, may have been especially harsh in East Germany, the showcase of 
Soviet society to the West. We know from historical accounts that religious clergy were 
harshly sanctioned in East Germany. Accounts of the repression of citizens who 
continued to express their religious faith have also been documented (see Chapter Two). 
Repression, though, affects all age levels of society. As churches are closed and public 
worship is negatively sanctioned, persons of all age groups are equally affected. If 
repression were the primary cause of disaffiliation, then church membership rates should 
be lower across all age groups in eastern Germany, especially when compared to 
membership rates in western Germany. Figure 4.1 illustrates percentage of church 
members (of any denomination) for each age group, by country. One sees immediately 
that church membership is dramatically lower for eastern Germans across all age 
categories.
Sanctions against church membership were particularly detrimental for younger 
people in East Germany; for example, young Christians faced severe discrimination in 
educational and occupational opportunities (Childs 1983; Dennis 1988; Cordell 1990).
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But Figure 4.1 shows that disaffiliation was successfully promoted across all age groups. 
This is the effect one would expect if  repression of church membership is the primary 
cause of the decrease in church membership rates. No similar effect is seen in any of the 
other countries.
Since eastern Germany has a predominantly Protestant tradition (Lutheranism 
originated in eastern Germany) and Catholics are associated with higher rates of 
affiliation, I next restricted the sample to non-Catholics and again looked at percentage of 
church members by age group. Again, church membership is much lower for eastern 
Germans, across all age groups (Figure 4.2). The line for Polish non-Catholics is 
misleading; there are so few Polish non-Catholics in the sample that they are not even 
represented in all age categories. Therefore, that line was omitted from the figure.
The line representing Hungarian non-Catholics is interesting here, because it 
shows more of the effect expected from secularization theory. Younger Hungarian non- 
Catholics (those below age 45) are much less likely to be church members than are older 
Hungarians, an effect associated with secularization. Note that for eastern Germans there 
is a similar effect, though not as pronounced as for Hungarian Protestants. However, 
when one takes into account the fact that church membership in East Germany was about 
90% of the population prior to World War II, the differences in membership rates for all 
ages between Hungarian Protestants and eastern German Protestants suggest that the 
decline in membership among eastern Germans is not attributable primarily to 
secularization, but is more likely to have been caused by state repression of the churches 
there. In contrast, Hungarian non-Catholics show more of a secularization pattern in
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their church membership, since the older cohorts have not disaffiliated to any significant 
degree. This is not to say that Hungarian society is secularized. Church membership 
rates in Hungary overall are still nearly 95% of the population, as reported above. This 
membership pattern does allow for speculation, though, that membership rates in 
Hungary's Protestant churches may continue to decline as younger, less affiliated cohorts 
replace the older, more affiliated cohorts.
Characteristics of Church Members
Table 4.1 also presents some demographic characteristics of church members for 
eastern Germany, Hungary and Poland. Again, figures for western Germany are included 
as a benchmark reference point for comparison. Eastern German and Hungarian church 
members are slightly more likely to be female than western German church members, 
but Polish church members are equally likely to be female. The age distribution also 
shows similarities between Poles and western Germans, and between eastern Germans 
and Hungarians. The Polish sample was restricted to persons between the ages of 16 and 
65, so the distribution of church members at the upper end of the age spectrum is 
probably not representative for Poland.
In terms of education, just over one quarter of western German church members 
have completed a secondary school education (secondary technical or trade school). In 
contrast, more than a third o f Polish church members have completed secondary school 
education. Hungarian church members are similar to Poles in education completed, and 
eastern German church members have the lowest rates of completed secondary education.
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Church members in all four places are most likely to be married or living with a 
partner. Eastern German church members are the more likely to be widowed than 
members in the other four countries, and church members in Poland and western 
Germany are more likely to be single. Polish and eastern German church members are 
more likely to live in a small community of less than 5,000 persons, while western 
German church members are more likely to be urban dwellers. In Hungary, church 
members are rather more equally distributed between rural and urban communities.
Political orientation of church members reflects a somewhat right o f center 
ideology in all countries but eastern Germany. In that country only forty-four percent of 
church members placed themselves to the right of the mean ideology score for their 
country. Political ideology was not reported for Hungary. As for vote intention, church 
members show little support for radical political parties on either end of the ideological 
spectrum. Between a quarter and a third of church members report they would vote for 
either a center-left or a center-right party, in all countries except Poland. However, there 
were so few Poles who were willing to identify with a political party in the survey 
(somewhat under 15%) that meaningful comparisons here are not possible.
Finally, Hungarian church members are most likely to be members o f a union, 
followed by eastern Germans, Poles and western Germans. Poland has the highest 
percentage o f church members who are unemployed, but even there less than ten percent 
of church members are unemployed. Nearly half the church members in both parts of 
Germany report white-collar employment; about one-fourth of Hungarian church 
members and about one-fifth of Polish church members are white collar workers. About
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one-third of church members in western Germany, Hungary and Poland are blue collar 
workers; forty-seven percent of eastern German church members are blue collar. And 
although church members are unlikely to be self-employed, fully thirteen percent of 
church members in both eastern Germany and Poland are self-employed.
Church Attendance
While church membership rates can tell us something about the extent o f Soviet 
repression in Eastern Europe, church attendance is a better measure of religious 
attachment. In other words, chinch membership rates are only a crude measure of 
religious attachment; better measurement of the extent of religious socialization is more 
accurately captured by examining church attendance. For example, although about 89% 
of western Germans claim to be members o f a church, more than 21% admit they never 
attend services. Mean rates of church attendance by age for each country are illustrated 
by Figure 4.3. The figure shows similar country-specific patterns of church attendance 
as was seen in Figure 4.1 for church membership. Poles show the highest rates of church 
attendance, eastern Germans show the lowest rates o f church attendance, and church 
attendance rates for Hungarians and western Germans are nearly identical.
American research on religious participation suggests that participation increases 
with age (Hout and Greeley 1987). Since we already know that Catholic participation 
rates are higher than Protestant rates, restricting the sample to Protestants only (Figure
4.4) shows more clearly the age effect on participation, particularly in Hungary. Note, 
however, that the expected age effect does not hold for eastern Germany. Participation 
rates for eastern Germany are at their lowest among 45- to 54-year-olds: the cohort
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which came of age during the imposition of the communist regime in East Germany.
This group was most heavily influenced by the antireligious message of the Soviet 
regime, but later cohorts do not appear to be as influenced; their participation rates are 
similar to those of older eastern Germans.
Religious Beliefs
Perhaps more illuminating to an understanding of the persistence of religion in 
post-transition societies than who continues to affiliate formally with a church is the 
question of what religious beliefs have endured. The data here show some very 
interesting comparisons. Respondents were asked to evaluate their level o f belief in six 
different items of religious faith: God, the devil, heaven, hell, an afterlife, and miracles. 
Consistently, Poles show higher mean levels of belief across all age categories (with the 
anomalous exception that younger western Germans report slightly higher levels of belief 
in miracles). This finding reflects the strong position of the Polish Catholic church in 
Polish society, even during the years of Soviet domination (see Chapter Two).
Another consistency is the finding that eastern Germans report lower mean levels 
o f belief across all age categories (again, with the interesting exception that younger 
Hungarians are less likely than eastern Germans of the same age to believe in miracles). 
With church membership rates at only about 35% one would expect average levels of 
belief to be low in eastern Germany. The mean levels of belief for Hungarians and 
western Germans show the life cycle effect we would expect to find in a modem western 
society (Hout and Greeley 1987). That is, levels of belief tend to decline among 
individuals as they leave home to form their own families and establish careers. Mean
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levels of belief reach their lowest levels with the 35-44 age group and then rise again in 
the older age groups. This pattern suggests a curvilinear relationship between age and 
belief, at least for Hungary and western Germany.
To explore a model that could explain religious belief for each country, I first 
created an indicator of religious beliefs from a factor analysis of those six variables, 
which taps an underlying dimension of religious belief for each country. The dependent 
variable o f religious beliefs is the factor score, comprised of respondents' relative levels 
o f belief in God, life after death, heaven, hell, the devil, and miracles. Each of these 
variables loaded on a single dimension of religious belief in each country. Figure 4.5 
illustrates the mean of this factor score o f religious beliefs for each age category, within 
each country. The curvilinear relationship between age and beliefs is seen most clearly in 
the lines representing Hungary and eastern Germany.
There are a number of sociodemographic variables that are known in the literature 
to affect religious belief. The literature suggests that church attendance is the most 
important predictor of religious beliefs, but other variables are also important in 
predicting religious belief. Gender has been shown to be an important predictor of 
religious beliefs (women express higher levels o f religious beliefs), as has age (older 
persons express higher levels of religious beliefs), education (more educated persons tend 
to express lower levels o f religious beliefs), marital status (married persons express 
higher levels o f religious beliefs), and community size (rural residents express higher 
levels of religious belief). Conservative political attachments are also associated with 
higher levels o f religious belief.
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To understand which characteristics best explain religious beliefs in each of the 
countries I next ran a set o f regressions of the religious beliefs factor score on these 
sociodemographic characteristics, as well as church attendance, separately for each 
country (see Table 4.2). I found, as expected, that church attendance was the most 
important independent variable explaining religious beliefs for each o f the countries. 
Several o f the other sociodemographic variables also predicted religious beliefs. Older 
people in both East Germany and Hungary expressed higher levels of belief, but in West 
Germany it was younger people who expressed higher levels o f belief. Those who place 
themselves on the right politically expressed higher levels of belief, in all countries 
except Hungary. This variable was not reported for Hungary, so had to be omitted from 
that model. However, I expect that the same relationship would hold in the Hungarian 
model, had that variable been available. Extremist vote intention predicted lower levels 
o f belief in both regions o f Germany, as did white collar employment in eastern 
Germany. Finally, unemployed persons in West Germany and Hungary expressed higher 
levels of belief. Altogether, the models fit the data well, with nearly a third o f the 
variation in religious beliefs explained in western Germany and Poland, and nearly forty 
percent o f the variation explained in eastern Germany and Hungary.
Besides religious beliefs, church attenders in these post-transition societies also 
have definite attitudes about the distribution of moral values in society. Other questions 
are available in the survey which allow me to compare church attenders with non- 
attenders on a variety of attitudes about moral authority, family values, and the role of
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Table 4.2 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Religious Beliefs Factor
on Selected Independent Variables
Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(Older) -.06 * .07 ** .10 ** -.03
Attend Church .51 ** .56 ** .55 ** .50 **
Secondary Education Complet -.04 + .00 -.01 .04
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) .06 * .08 ** n/a .07 *
Married or Living as Married - - - -
Female .06 * .06 * .08 ** .02
Larger Community Size - - - -
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - -.04 + -.03 -
Center-Left Vote Intention -.06 * -.02 -.04 -.04
Center-Right Vote Intention - - - -
Right Radical Vote Intention -.06 * -.04 + - -.04
Unemployed .07 * .00 .07 * .00
White Collar Occupation -.02 -.06 * .00 -.03
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - “
Adjusted R2 .29 .38 .37 .27
N 1323 1458 987 978
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey 
Source: ISSP (1991)
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religion in politics. Using the same models which were employed above to predict 
religious beliefs, I next tested these attitudes about the role of religion in public life.
Authority vs. Autonomy 
Another set o f variables measures various aspects o f respondents' attitudes toward 
authority, as well as the relative merit of autonomy versus obedience. A question was 
asked of Germans and Hungarians whether it is better to obey the law without question or 
whether one should follow their conscience (Table 4.3). Western German church 
attenders were more likely to favor obedience, but it was not one of the strongest 
predictors in this model of support for autonomy over obedience. Older persons, less 
educated persons, lower income persons and those on the political right were associated 
with obedience for western Germany. The same relationship holds in Hungary for older 
persons and the less educated. In eastern Germany it is females and those on the political 
right who advocate obedience. And in both parts of Germany persons who say they are 
interested in politics are more likely to advocate following one's conscience, rather than 
obedience. Church attendance does not affect opinion on this variable in either eastern 
Germany or Hungary. Could this lack of association be due to a movement toward 
individual autonomy among church members in these post-transition societies? Two 
other variables are available which allow us to test this speculation.
The ISSP 1991 asks respondents in all four countries what should be the basis for 
moral decision making. The questions ask whether right and wrong should be based on 
God's law, or whether right and wrong should be a matter determined by society. These 
questions provide further illumination to the autonomy/obedience question posed above.
I l l
Table 4.3 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Would 
Follow Conscience Rather Than Obey on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany Hungary
Age Category(Older) - .2 0  ** -.05 -.23 **
Attend Church -.04 + .06 .03
Secondary Education Complete .09 ** .01 .16 **
Higher Income .05 * .03 .0 2
Left-Right Placement (Right) -.08 ** -.07 + -
Married or Living as Married - - -
Female - .0 1 -.08 * -.03
Larger Community Size - - -
Union Member - n/a n/a
Left Radical Vote Intention - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention - - -
Right Radical Vote Intention - - -
Unemployed - - -
White Collar Occupation - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - -
Self Employed - - -
National Pride - - -
Economically Satisfied - - -
Interest in Politics .1 0  ** .11  ** .05
Adjusted R2 .1 0 .03 .1 0
N 2060 740 763
**p<.01, * p<,05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country
Source: ISSP 1990
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In all four models it is very clear that church attenders firmly believe that right and wrong 
are not matters to be left up to the individual conscience, but rather that moral decisions 
should be based on God's law (Table 4.4). Again, older people, lower incomes, those on 
the political right, and people from smaller communities are also associated with this 
attitude in all four countries. Roughly a quarter to a third of the variation in attitude is 
explained by these models. Thus, it does not appear that church members in post­
transition societies question obedience to the law. Rather, it seems more likely that they 
question the validity of political authority. Perhaps, as they reflect on the arbitrary laws 
and practices o f the previous regime, church members in post-transition societies are less 
willing to blindly obey.
We see this questioning of popular authority again in another question (Table
4.5). This one asks respondents whether right and wrong should be a matter that is 
determined by society. Once again, church attenders in all four countries reject this 
attitude. Women, too, disapprove of socially relative morality. Although the model does 
not explain as much of the variation here, nevertheless it helps illustrate the point that 
church attenders are neither moral relativists nor blindly obedient.
Family Values
Further information about the distribution o f moral values in post-transition 
societies can be found when we look at a set of questions about family values in society. 
One indicator — a factor score composed of respondents' answers to four items about 
working women and their families (see question texts in Chapter Three) -  shows a strong 
association between church attendance and preference for a traditional role for women for
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Table 4.4 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Right and 
Wrong Should be Based on God's Law on Selected Independent Variables
Western Eastern
Germany Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(Older) .17 ** .16 ** .26 ** .1 0  **
Attend Church .40 ** .47 ** .40 ** .40 **
Secondary Education Complet - - - -
Higher Income -.06 * -.06 * -.08 ** -.05
Left-Right Placement (Right)
*oop .08 ** n/a
-*■00o
Married or Living as Married - - - -
Female - - - -
Larger Community Size -.06 * -.08 ** -.05 + -.06 *
Union Member - .0 2 -.05 * -.05 + -.07 *
Left Radical Vote Intention - -.06 * - .0 2 -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention -.03 .0 2 .05 + .06 +
Right Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
Adjusted R2 .25 .34 .37 .2 2
N 1150 1334 924 954
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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Table 4.5 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Right and 
Wrong Should be Determined by Society on Selected Independent Variables
Age Category(Older)
Attend Church
Secondary Education Complet 
Higher Income 
Left-Right Placement (Right) 
Married or Living as Married 
Female
Larger Community Size 
Union Member 
Left Radical Vote Intention 
Center-Left Vote Intention 
Center-Right Vote Intention 
Right Radical Vote Intention 
Unemployed 
White Collar Occupation 
Blue Collar Occupation 
Self Employed
Adjusted R2 
N
Western 
Germany 
.06 * 
-.10 * *
- . 1 1  * *
-.03
.02
1339
Eastern 
Germany 
.06 * 
-.07 *
-.13 * *
.05
.03
1474
Hungary 
.04 
-.10 * *
n/a
-.07
.00
.01
987
Poland 
.09 ** 
-.08 *
-.11 * *
.00
.02
1056
**p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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eastern Germany and Hungary, as well as for western Germany (Table 4.6). In fact, 
church attendance is one of the strongest predictors in each model, along with age and 
national pride. These models would indicate a clear preference for traditional family 
values among church attenders in post-transition societies. But the evidence for this 
relationship becomes less compelling when we look further. Two other questions are 
available to us which also measure church attenders' attitudes toward traditional family 
values.
The first question asks respondents to rank their agreement with the statement,
"A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and the 
family" (Table 4.7). Church attenders are more likely to agree with this statement in 
eastern Germany and Poland, as they do in western Germany. But no such relationship 
holds for Hungary. The strongest predictors in each model are older people, less 
educated, lower incomes, and males. The model fits best in western Germany (R2 is .30), 
but explains variation relatively well in the post-transition societies, too. Explained 
variation is .19 for both eastern Germany and Hungary, and .11 for Poland.
A second question again asks respondents to rank their agreement with the 
statement, "All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job" (Table 4.8). 
Once again, church attenders are more likely to agree with the statement in both parts of 
Germany, but there is no relationship between church attendance and agreement with this 
statement for either Hungary or Poland. Church attenders do not seem to be as 
conservative on these family values in post-transition societies as they are in western 
Germany. The strongest relationship in each model is age; older people tend to agree that
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Table 4.6 .Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who 
Favor a Traditional Role for Women on Selected Independent Variables
Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany Hungary
Age Category(Older) .2 0  * .13 * .1 2  *
Attend Church .1 2  * .17 * .15 **
Secondary Education Complete -.08 * -.09 * -.09 *
Higher Income -.06 * -.09 * -.05
Left-Right Placement (Right) .09 * .06 + .01
Married or Living as Married .01 .06 * .06
Female - .1 0  * -.09 * -.06
Larger Community Size - - -
Union Member - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - -.08 * -.03
Center-Left Vote Intention .04 + .04 .0 0
Center-Right Vote Intention .07 * .1 2  * .03
Right Radical Vote Intention - - -
Unemployed .04 + .0 2 -.0 1
White Collar Occupation -.07 * -.04 -.08 *
Blue Collar Occupation - - -
Self Employed - - -
National Pride .15 * .07 * .1 2  **
Economically Satisfied - - -
Interest in Politics -.08 * - .1 1  * - .0 1
Adjusted R2 .23 .2 2 .11
N 1715 1216 696
** p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: WVS(1990)
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Table 4.7 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Husband's
Job is to Earn Money; Wife's Job is Home and Family on Selected Independent
Variables
Western Eastern
Germany Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(Older) .30 ** .16 ** j g ** .16 **
Attend Church .13 ** .08 ** .04 .1 0  **
Secondary Education Complet _ 18 ** - .1 2  ** - .2 2  ** -.17 **
Higher Income -.19 ** - .1 2  ** - .1 0  ** -.06 +
Left-Right Placement (Right) .1 0  ** .16 ** n/a - .0 1
Married or Living as Married .09 ** - .0 1 .01 .06 +
Female -.09 ** _ 11 +* _ 13 ** .  14  **
Larger Community Size -.05 * _ 0 9 -.07 * -.03
Union Member -.04 -.06 * - .0 2 - .0 1
Left Radical Vote Intention - -.07 * .0 2 -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention - - - -
Right Radical Vote Intention .03 -.05 + .01
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation .09 ** .08 * .0 2 .0 2
Self Employed - - - -
Adjusted R2 .30 .19 .19 .11
N 1150 1334 924 954
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP(1991)
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Table 4.8 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Attitude That Family 
Life Suffers if Women Work Outside the Home on Selected Independent Variables
Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(Older) .19 ** .11  ** .16 ** .2 1  **
Attend Church .1 1  ** .13 ** .03 .05
Secondary Education Complet -.16 ** -.04 -.09 * -.06 +
Higher Income -.17 ** -.03 -.07 + -.06 +
Left-Right Placement (Right) 1 j ** I ] ** n/a .0 2
Married or Living as Married .08 * .0 2 .0 2 .08 *
Female l o 00 * -.04 .0 0 _ +*
Larger Community Size -.06 * -.05 + -.08 * .01
Union Member - .0 2 -.05 + .04 .05
Left Radical Vote Intention - -.08 ** - 1 1 ** -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention - - - -
Right Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - .0 1 .05 .04 .05
Self Employed - - - -
Adjusted R2 .17 .09 .07 .1 0
N 1150 1334 924 954
**p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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family life suffers if women work outside the home. This relationship holds in each of 
the four models.
Attitudes about Religion and Politics 
A final set of variables allow us to examine church members' attitudes about the 
proper relationship between religion and politics. These questions ask respondents about 
how much influence the church should have in political life. They address the issue of 
morality in public service, and they show that church attenders in post-transition societies 
feel quite strongly about this issue, as do western German church attenders.
The first question (Table 4.9) asks respondents whether it is better if religious 
believers hold public office. Church attendance is the strongest predictor o f assent on 
this issue, in each country. Older people also agree with this statement, as do those on 
the political right. The less educated tend to disagree (though the relationship is only 
significant for eastern Germany and Poland), as do those who would vote for a radical 
right party (but only in Germany). The model fits best for western Germany, with nearly 
30% explained variation, but it fits reasonably well in the post-transition societies as well.
A similar question (Table 4.10) asks respondents whether those who do not 
believe in God are unfit for public office. Again, church attendance is the strongest 
predictor in the model in each country, though not completing secondary education is 
equally strong in the Polish model. Older people agree with the statement, as do those 
who have not completed secondary education, people with lower incomes (not in Poland), 
those on the political right, and those from smaller communities.
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Table 4.9 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That It is Better 
if Religious Believers Hold Public Office on Selected Independent Variables
Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(Older) .13 ** .06 * .1 2  ** .06 +
Attend Church .45 ** .36 ** .31 ** .30 **
Secondary Education Complet - .0 2 -.06 * -.04 -.07 *
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) 09 ** ] 1 ** n/a ] i **
Married or Living as Married - - - -
Female - - - -
Larger Community Size - - - -
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - -.05 + -.05 -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention - - - -
Right Radical Vote Intention -.04 + -.05 * - .01
Unemployed .01 -.04 + .0 0 .03
White Collar Occupation - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
Adjusted R2 .28 .18 .14 .1 2
N 1323 1458 987 978
**p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
121
Table 4.10 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Those
Who Do Not Believe in God are Unfit for Public Office on Selected Independent
Variables
Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(Older) 14 ** .11  ** .1 2  ** .09 *
Attend Church .32 ** .23 ** .25 ** .19 **
Secondary Education Complet -.08 ** - .1 0  ** -.14 ** -.19 **
Higher Income -.07 * -.06 * -.09 * -.04
Left-Right Placement (Right) .07 * .16 ** n/a 09 **
Married or Living as Married - - - -
Female -.0 1 .06 * .0 2 .07 *
Larger Community Size -.05 + -.08 ** -.08 * -.06 +
Union Member -.03 l o * -.03 - .0 1
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention - - - -
Right Radical Vote Intention -.04 -.06 * - .01
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed .0 2 - .0 2 - .0 2 .04
Adjusted R2 .19 .17 .19 .13
N 1150 1334 924 954
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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Two further questions ask about how much influence religious leaders should 
have in political life. Church attenders are less consistent in their attitudes about the 
proper role of religious leaders in political life than they were about the proper role of 
religious believers in political life in the two questions above. The models do not 
predict these two questions nearly as well, for any of the countries. Church attendance is 
still the strongest predictor of disagreement with the statement that religious leaders 
should not influence the government (Table 4.11). Church attenders agree that there 
should be a moral influence in political life, but they appear hesitant to turn over that 
responsibility to religious leaders. Church attenders also tend to disagree with the 
statement that religious leaders should not influence the vote (Table 4.12), though the 
relationship is not significant in eastern Germany and the model is not significant for 
Hungary.
Finally, when respondents were asked whether churches and religious 
organizations have too much power (Table 4.13), church attenders voiced strong 
disagreement with this statement, in all four countries. Church members agree that 
religion has a role in political life. They agree that it is better when religious believers 
hold public office. But they hesitate to endow religious leaders with the authority to 
speak for all believers. Church attenders are less in agreement that religious leaders 
should influence the government or the vote.
The results of this preliminary look at religious values in the postcommunist 
societies of Eastern Germany, Hungary and Poland point to some interesting similarities 
and differences. The figures on church membership by age category illustrate
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Table 4.11 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Religious 
Leaders Should Not Influence the Government on Selected Independent Variables
Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(Older) .07 * 08 ** .11 * -.03
Attend Church -.23 ** -.09 ** -.12 ** -.12 **
Secondary Education Complet .0 0 .0 2 .07 + 09 **
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) - - n/a -
Married or Living as Married .0 2 -.06 * .01 .03
Female -.06 * -.03 .01 .08 *
Larger Community Size - - - -
Union Member .04 .07 * .01 .0 0
Left Radical Vote Intention - .08 ** .0 2 -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention -.06 + -.03 .0 0 .0 2
Right Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - .0 1 .06 + .04 - .0 1
Self Employed .05 + .0 2 - .1 0  ** .05
Adjusted R2 .06 .03 .0 2 .03
N 1339 1474 984 1056
**p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP(1991)
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Table 4.12 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Religious 
Leaders Should Not Influence the Vote on Selected Independent Variables
Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(Older) - - - -
Attend Church -.18 ** - .0 1 -.06 + -.09 *
Secondary Education Complet .03 .05 + -.03 .07 +
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) -.04 -.06 * n/a -.08 *
Married or Living as Married - - - -
Female t o * -.05 + .01 - .0 2
Larger Community Size .01 .05 + - .0 1 - .0 2
Union Member .08 ** .04 .07 * -.04
Left Radical Vote Intention - .05 + .01 -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention - - -
Right Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation .0 2 .05 .01 .04
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
Adjusted R2 .06 .0 2 .0 0 .0 2
N 1323 1458 987 978
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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Table 4.13 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Attitude That Churches
and Religious Organizations Have Too Much Power on Selected Independent
Variables
Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(Older) - - - -
Attend Church -.28 ** -.18 ** -.15 ** -.36 **
Secondary Education Complet - - - -
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) .0 0 -.09 ** n/a - .1 0  **
Married or Living as Married - - - -
Female -.06 * -.03 .01 .01
Larger Community Size - - - -
Union Member .1 0  ** .0 0 .01 - .0 2
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention -.05 + -.03 -.06 + -.06 *
Right Radical Vote Intention .06 * .0 2 - -.04
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
Adjusted R2 .11 .05 .03 .16
N 1323 1458 987 978
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
126
dramatically the effect o f Soviet repression on church membership in Eastern Germany, 
and show how minimal that effect was among Catholics in both Hungary and Poland. 
When Catholics are removed from the sample the figure shows a moderate secularization 
effect for Hungary and eastern Germany, with the age groups bom after the imposition of 
communism most strongly affected by the pressure to disaffiliate.
Church attenders in all three post-transition societies express strong religious 
beliefs, as do church attenders in western Germany. Fifty years of communism does not 
appear to have had as much impact on religious beliefs as it has had on religious 
behavior. Church attenders also have very different attitudes than non-attenders in their 
opinions about where the authority for moral decision-making rests. Church attenders are 
much more likely than non-attenders to declare that moral authority rests in God's laws, 
and they are likewise less likely to agree that moral authority rightly resides within 
society.
However, in attitude toward conventional family roles church members in these 
post-transition societies do not appear to be as traditional as their western German 
counterpart. Hungarian church attenders, in particular, are no more likely than non- 
attenders to support traditional family roles. This is further evidence, I would argue, of a 
more secular character to Hungarian society. Churches in Hungarian society have made a 
concerted effort to cooperate with the state and stay out o f the concerns of everyday 
economic realities. Church members here are less likely to feel that the church takes a 
stand, either one way or the other, on issues such as the role o f women in the home and in
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the workplace. Polish church attenders, likewise, feel no more strongly about women 
working outside the home than to non-attenders. This is not an issue for the church there.
Church attenders in post-transition societies do feel strongly, though, that religion 
does have a place in public life. They agree that it is better for society if religious 
believers hold public office. They agree that non-believers should not hold public office. 
They feel that it is right for religious leaders to have an influence in the government.
They disagree that religious organizations, such as churches, have too much power. But 
they do not necessarily agree that religious leaders should influence the vote. They 
appear to recognize the importance of the sanctity o f the polling booth, and the necessity 
o f a free and confidential ballot for the proper operation o f democratic process. In other 
words, church attenders agree that religious believers have a moral obligation to be 
politically engaged and to exert their moral influence in the public process of democracy. 
But they resist the right o f anyone, even religious leaders, to interfere with democratic 
process by influencing the vote.
These findings make it clear that religion is alive and well in these post-transition 
societies. Although the effects of repression of the churches will continue to be felt, 
probably for several generations, there is a vitality to religious belief and moral values 
that reflects well when compared to that of religious believers in western Germany. 
Similarly, it seems that democracy is also alive and well in these post-transition societies. 
Apparently nurtured by the churches during the years o f totalitarianism, healthy attitudes 
about the role o f religion in a democratic state have persisted in these societies. Further 
research on the relationship between religious behavior and other democratic values in
the next chapter will help us to better understand just what role the churches have had 
preserving democratic values in these societies.
CHAPTER V
POLITICAL VALUES OF CHURCH ATTENDERS 
In the previous chapter I examined patterns of church membership and church 
attendance for the period immediately following the transition to democracy in each of 
these postcommunist countries. I found that repression of the churches was most strongly 
experienced in East Germany, where church attendance has been more than halved across 
all age groups since World War II. While church repression was also experienced by 
Poland and Hungary during that same time period (see Chapter Two) its effect on church 
attendance has been very different in these two countries. Church membership in Poland 
remains very high across all age groups, and repression appears to have had little effect 
on church attendance in this country. In Hungary church membership also remains 
relatively high, but when examined by age group we see that younger Hungarians report 
lower levels of church attendance than older Hungarians, a secularization (or life cycle) 
effect seen also in western Germany.
As I discussed in Chapter One, I expect church attendance to have a differential 
effect on political values depending on the political structure o f church/state organization 
in the country prior to its democratic transition. I expect church attendance to have a 
stronger effect on political values in countries where the church was heavily repressed by 
the communist government -- Poland and East Germany -  in countries where the church 
was the only institution of civil society allowed to exist alongside the government. I 
expect church attendance to have less o f an effect on political values in Hungary, a
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communist country that allowed for church participation in political life, where the 
church was less severely repressed than in Poland and East Germany. Though I do not 
empirically test this state/civil society contextual variable, I have provided details o f its 
composition and effect in Chapter Two and have demonstrated evidence of its existence 
in an analysis of church membership and church attendance in Chapter Four. Therefore, I 
examine individual-level models separately for each country to control for this country- 
specific effect.
In this chapter I examine a broad variety of political values to see what effect 
church attendance has on political values in each of these countries. I group the variables 
into categories reflecting some aspect o f the political culture captured by those variables, 
then describe how church attendance affects each of those variables in each country. 
Though I do not empirically verify the relationship between certain democratic values 
and either the priestly or the prophetic tradition of the church, I have argued in Chapter 
One for the face validity o f this conceptual scheme. There are certain democratic values 
that reflect the priestly tradition of the church. Democratic values such as confidence and 
support in the regime reflect the priestly tradition’s insistence on the legitimacy of earthly 
authority.
Other democratic values are not consonant with the priestly tradition of the church 
but they do reflect the prophetic tradition of the church. Democratic values such as 
interpersonal trust and political and personal efficacy are not highly valued in the priestly 
tradition of the church, and church members are not ordinarily associated with these 
particular democratic values. But in a repressive society, where the individual rights of
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church members have been oppressively compromised by the regime, the call for a return 
to justice spoken by the prophetic tradition of the church resonates with individual church 
members. The more the church was repressed by the regime, the stronger became the call 
o f the prophetic tradition and the more it allied with these democratic values o f trust for 
others and individual efficacy. Therefore, these democratic values are likely to be found 
among church members in these post-transition societies, even though they are values not 
usually associated with church membership.
Finally, there are democratic values which do not particularly reflect either the 
priestly or the prophetic tradition of the church. Such democratic ideals as political 
tolerance, civil liberties, and attitudes toward conflict and protest are difficult to classify 
into either tradition, as the church generally defines these values as outside o f the scope 
o f religion. Similarly, questions that deal with preference for a particular economic form 
have little to do with religious attitudes, although they do inform us about democratic 
values. Religious belief does influence these values, but the effect of religion is 
sometimes ambiguous. I have placed these relationships between the effects o f the 
priestly and the prophetic traditions, because I believe that these values are influenced 
sometimes by both traditions, and sometimes by neither. In this way I am able to 
describe the "landscape" of the political culture in each country and how it is 
differentially affected by the church.
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Democratic Values Reflecting the Priestly Tradition -  Power from Above 
Confidence and Trust in the Institutions of Government
Confidence and trust are very important aspects o f the political culture, indicating 
some measure of legitimation of the current regime by the populace. Legitimation is a 
very complex concept, however, and confidence and trust reflect a somewhat superficial 
level o f democratic support, related to government performance. People are likely to 
indicate confidence and trust in the regime as long as civil order is maintained, the regime 
is stable, and economic conditions are not fluctuating too severely. This is but one level 
o f support for democratic values, however, and is not a particularly reliable indicator of 
the true depth of democratic legitimation (see Weil 1987, Weil 1989).
Confidence and trust in the regime by church attenders reflects the priestly 
tradition of obedience to authority. As I said before, obedience is a strong tenet of faith 
promoted by the priestly tradition of the church. The isolation of the past forty years of 
these churches from their counterparts in the West has had the result of preserving 
relatively pre-modem churches in the East. Because of this, church attenders in the East 
are likely to be even more conservative than their counterparts in the West, especially 
when it comes to attitudes of obedience to authority, as I stated in hypothesis one.
Aspects o f this concept are captured by two separate variables -- a factor of 
confidence in state institutions and a factor o f trust in government. Confidence in State 
Institutions is a commonly asked question in surveys o f political attitudes. It is included 
in all o f the surveys I analyzed here, and the factor includes the identical institutions 
across all countries (see Chapter Three for variable construction details). Table 5.1
Table 5.1 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Confidence in State Institutions Factor on
Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany Hungary Poland
1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991
Age Category(Older) .05 + .08 * .05 .02 .01 .00 .13 * .05
Attend Church .10  * .11  * .04 .18 * .07 + .12  * .12  * .11 **
Secondary Education Complet .02 - -.07 * - -.03 - -.05 -
Higher Income - .06 * - - .02 - -.09 * - .02
Left-Right Placement (Right) .11 * .11 * -.07 * .10  * -.01 n/a .08 * .08 *
Married or Living as Married - - - - - - - -
Female .04 -.08 * .09 * -.02 .01 .04 -.01 .05
Larger Community Size .00 .00 -.05 + -.05 + -.08 * -.08 * n/a -.08 *
Union Member - .02 - .06 * - -.04 - -.01
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -.06 * - .01 - - ■
Center-Left Vote Intention .07 * .01 .13 * .07 * .08 * .10  * - .02 -.03
Center-Right Vote Intention .12 * .09 * .05 .14 * .10 * .21 * .06 + .05
Right Radical Vote Intention - - - - - - - -
Unemployed .01 - .06 * - -.04 - n/a -
White Collar Occupation - .02 - -.03 - .02 - -.08 *
Blue Collar Occupation - - - - - - - -
Self Employed - - - - - - - -
National Pride .16 * n/a .16 * n/a .17 * n/a .24 * n/a
Economically Satisfied .15 * n/a .16 * n/a .13 * n/a .06 n/a
Interest in Politics .06 * n/a .12 * n/a .00 n/a .09 * n/a
Adjusted R2 .16 .07 .11 .10 .07 .08 .14 .04
N 1839 1150 1220 1334 706 924 653 954
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any countiy 
Sources: WVS (1990), ISSP (1991)
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presents standardized regression coefficients for models in all four countries for 1990 and 
1991. The models are not identical, however, and care should be taken not to extend 
inferences across models. The variables measuring pride, satisfaction with the economy, 
and interest in politics were not asked on the 1991ISSP survey, but they were asked on 
the 1990 World Values Survey, so the 1991 models do not include those variables.
Church attendance is one of the most significant and consistent predictors of 
confidence in state institutions within each model. With the exception of East Germany 
in 1990, church attenders express more confidence in state institutions in each of the 
countries. Those who indicate pride in their country are also more likely to indicate 
confidence in its institutions, as are those who are satisfied with their economic situation 
(but not in Poland), and those who are interested in politics (but not in Hungary). Older 
people are also usually more likely to indicate confidence in state institutions, as are 
people who express a preference for the political right or who would vote for a right of 
center party.
Table 5.2 models the same dependent variable, but focuses specifically on eastern 
and western Germany in 1991 and 1992. Comparison of Tables 5.1 and 5.2 shows how 
important questions measuring national pride and economic satisfaction are to properly 
specifying this model. A look at the explained variance for the models for the two 
Germanies on these tables illustrates the point. For western Germany adjusted R2 nearly 
doubles in size when these two variables are included in the model, and model fit
Table 5.2 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Confidence in 
State Institutions Factor on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991 1992 1991 1992
Age Category(Older) - - - -
Attend Church .10 * .16 ** .1 1  * .05 +
Secondary Education Complete .03 - .04 -
Higher Income -.03 - -.04 -
Left-Right Placement (Right) .07 + .04 .11 * .1 0  **
Married or Living as Married - - - -
Female - - - -
Larger Community Size -.06 * - .1 0  ** - .01
**00o1
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention - .08 * - .07 *
Center-Right Vote Intention .13 * 24 ** .11 * .16 **
Right Radical Vote Intention - .1 2  * - .1 1  ** - .1 0  * - 1 1 **
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
National Pride .13 * .03 .15 * .1 0  **
Economically Satisfied .14 * .26 ** .17 * .23 **
Interest in Politics - - - -
Adjusted R2 .13 .24 .15 .18
N 1 0 1 2 1039 1039 1105
** pc.Ol, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
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increases substantially for eastern Germany, too.8 Once again, church attenders are more 
likely to support state institutions, as are those who would vote for a center-right party, 
those who express pride in their country, and those who indicate they are satisfied with 
their economic situation. Those who would vote for a right-radical party (the 
Republikaner) indicate less confidence in state institutions.
Trust in Government (Table 5.3) is another measure of support for the current 
regime. Like confidence in institutions I expect church attenders to express trust in their 
government. This variable is a factor score, comprised of three separate items asking 
about trust in the government (see Chapter Three for question texts and variable 
construction). Church attenders in both eastern and western Germany indicate trust in 
their government, for both years. And these two years were particularly trying ones for 
both parts of the recently reunited Germany. Reunification extracted a heavy financial 
toll on western Germans, which they experienced most strongly in 1991 and 1992, And 
by 1991 and 1992 some of the transition euphoria had worn off in eastern Germany, and 
the realities of unemployment and a seriously inadequate infrastructure had become 
apparent. But church attenders in both parts o f Germany reflect a basic trust in their 
government, again indicative of the priestly tradition of acquiescence to authority. Those
8To test whether the addition of these variables significantly improves the fit of 
the model, I ran a hierarchical multiple regression test on each o f the models for this 
variable in the WVS. F-test results indicate a significant improvement in each model 
with the addition of the variables o f national pride, economic satisfaction, and interest in 
politics. For West Germany the value of F was -56.83, with d f for K2 12 and for 9; for 
East Germany the value of F was -15.62, (df for K2 12, for K, 9); for Hungary the value 
of F was -4.48, (df for K2 12, for 9); and for Poland the value of F was -11.41 (df for
K2 10, for K, 7).
Table 5.3 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Trust in 
Government on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991 1992 1991 1992
Age Category(Older) - - - -
Attend Church .07 * .1 1  ** .08 * .09 **
Secondary Education Complete -.03 .0 0 .0 2 -.05 +
Higher Income - .0 2 .01 -.0 1 -.05 +
Left-Right Placement (Right) .13 * .07 * .2 0  * .17 **
Married or Living as Married - - - -
Female .08 * .05 .03 - .0 1
Larger Community Size - -.05 + -.05 +
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention -.07 * .05 .0 0 .07 *
Center-Right Vote Intention .31 * .29 ** .24 * 27 **
Right Radical Vote Intention -.08 * .  11 ** - .0 2 - .1 1  **
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation .0 2 - .0 2 -.07 * -.06
Blue Collar Occupation - -.07 + - -.06
Self Employed - - - ' -
National Pride .1 0  * .08 * .1 2  * .13 **
Economically Satisfied .18 * .2 0  ** .25 * .24 **
Interest in Politics - -.01 - -.06 *
Adjusted R2 .31 .25 .31 .33
N 1 0 0 2 1039 1039 1104
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
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who place themselves to the political right, those who would vote for the center-right 
party, those who express national pride and those who indicate satisfaction with their 
economic situation also indicate greater trust in government.
Support for Democracy as a Form of State
This item refers to democratic support on a somewhat deeper, more 
philosophical level. Relative to the previous measures of democratic legitimation, this 
concept gets at support for democracy in principle, irrespective of government 
performance. While we would expect the church to express support for a democratic 
form of government from a purely utilitarian motive -  democracy is at most agnostic, 
while the Soviet regime was deliberately atheistic - - 1 argue that support for a democratic 
form of state among church members reflects a change in orientation among the churches 
toward democracy. The church has learned, particularly as a result of experiences since 
World War II, that a democratic form of state is more closely aligned with religious 
values. That is, a democratic state is preferred over an autocratic state because the good 
of the community is preserved without sacrificing the good of the individual. Therefore, 
as I stated in hypothesis two, I would expect church attenders to be more supportive o f a 
democratic state than non-attenders. But surveys indicate that a reservoir of democratic 
legitimation tends to build up in a society, as people develop experience with a 
successfully functioning democratic structure (see Weil 1989). Therefore, I would also 
expect that church attenders in western Germany would indicate stronger levels of 
support for a democratic form of state than their counterparts in eastern Germany, since 
they have many years o f experience with a successful democratic state.
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Several questions were asked of respondents to find out their opinions on 
democracy as a form of state (see Chapter Three for question texts). The factor score of 
these questions provides a measure o f the underlying dimension of democratic support. 
Table 5.4 describes the influence of church attendance on democratic support for eastern 
and western Germany. Church attenders are more likely to indicate support for 
democratic values in western Germany, both in 1991 and 1992. In eastern Germany 
church attenders were also more likely to indicate support for democratic values in 1991, 
but by 1992 church attenders were no more likely than non-attenders to express 
democratic support. A further look at the model for 1992 in eastern Germany helps 
explain why this relationship faded. Extremist vote intention, both on the right and on 
the left, significantly reduced support for democratic values in eastern Germany as the 
harsher realities o f reunification gradually replaced the initial optimism. Center-right 
vote intention, satisfaction with the economic situation, and national pride (in eastern 
Germany) also affect support for democratic values.
Democratic Values Which Lie Between the Priestly and the Prophetic Tradition 
Political Freedoms and Political Rights
A very important tenet of democracy is individual liberty and political tolerance.
In a democracy individual liberty is protected by law, as is the right of individuals to 
pursue their own self interest. This particular set of democratic values is not so clearly 
aligned with Christian values, however. The church does support and promote individual 
human rights and in cases of individual liberty versus state control does tend to stand on 
the side of the individual. However, the transcending value for the church is the
Table 5.4 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Support for a 
Democratic Form of State on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991 1 2 2 2 1991 1992
Age Category(Older) - -.04 - .07 *
Attend Church .08 * 1 2  ** .09 * .04
Secondary Education Complete - .07 * - -.03
Higher Income .0 0 - -.08 * -
Left-Right Placement (Right) -.06 + -.03 .1 0  * .07 *
Married or Living as Married .05 - - .0 1 -
Female - -.0 1 - -.07 *
Larger Community Size -.08 * - .07 * -
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - .0 2 - -.07 *
Center-Left Vote Intention .09 * .16 ** .01 .11  **
Center-Right Vote Intention .13 * .17 ** .16 * .13 **
Right Radical Vote Intention -.09 * - .0 2 .03 -.13 **
Unemployed -.09 * -.04 .0 0 -.06 +
White Collar Occupation .05 - -.03 -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
National Pride -.08 * -.06 .06 + .06 +
Economically Satisfied .17 * .1 0  ** .14 * .14 **
Interest in Politics - .08 * - .05
Adjusted R2 .1 0 .08 .11 .14
N 1 0 1 2 1039 1039 1116
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country 
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
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promotion of the community, not the individual. The common good is valued more 
highly than individual liberty. Therefore, church support o f this democratic value tends 
to be less strong. The rights of individuals are valued only insofar as they promote the 
common good. Individual rights which are divisive or extreme are not supported by the 
church. As I stated in hypothesis three, I do not expect church attenders to be any 
stronger than non-attenders in their support of individual freedoms and civil liberties.
Several questions from these data measure various aspects of individual freedoms 
and allow us to examine this relationship in more detail. One question asks respondents 
to decide which is better, to have freedom and law or to have a higher standard o f living. 
Table 5.5 displays multiple regression results for this variable. Unambiguously, church 
attenders prefer freedom and law over a higher standard of living, for each part of 
Germany. However, notice how this question does not really address the idea of 
individual liberty, but merely asks whether freedom and law is preferable to economic 
security. One can answer in favor o f freedom and law here without stating a preference 
for individual liberty over the common good. This answer is consistent with the priestly 
tradition of the church, which values individual autonomy only insofar as it promotes the 
common good. When individual liberties threaten the common good they are not 
supported by the priestly tradition. That is why church members tend to be somewhat 
less tolerant o f civil liberties and individual freedoms.
The next three tables show how church support diminishes when the issue of 
political freedom involves choosing between individual liberty and the common good. 
These questions probe the respondent's understanding of and support for the right of free
Table 5.5 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who
Prefer Freedom and Law over Higher Living Standard on Selected
Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991 1992 1991 1992
Age Category(Older) - - - -
Attend Church .1 2  * .06 + .07 * .06 *
Secondary Education Complete - - - -
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) - _ 1 1 ** - -.09 *
Married or Living as Married .03 - .0 1 .01 .04
Female - .06 + - - .0 1
Larger Community Size - - - -
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention - .09 * - .05
Right Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Unemployed -.08 * - - .0 1 -
White Collar Occupation -.05 - - .0 2 -
Blue Collar Occupation -.03 - -.04 -
Self Employed 1 o 00 * - .0 2 -
National Pride .07 * - .01 -
Economically Satisfied .09 * .07 * .03 .1 0  **
Interest in Politics .1 2  * .15 ** .0 2 11 **
Adjusted R2 .06 .04 .0 0 .04
N 1019 1039 1076 1116
** pc.Ol, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
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speech. Table 5.6 reports regressions o f a factor score o f respondents' tolerance for 
extremist speech. Church attenders in western Germany are not tolerant of extremist 
speech. More educated persons are similarly intolerant, as are white collar workers.
Those who would vote for the right extremist party are more tolerant o f extremist speech, 
but this effect is partly an artifact of variable construction. Since the variable measures 
support for right radical or revolutionary speakers, right extremists are indicating support 
for like-minded persons.
In eastern Germany there is no apparent relationship between church attendance 
and tolerance for extremist speech. Older persons are less likely to endorse such speech, 
as are those who are satisfied with the economic situation. And just as in the west, those 
who would vote for a right radical party are more tolerant of extremists such as 
themselves.
Table 5.7 asks respondents to evaluate whether they feel that individual citizens 
have freedom of speech in Germany. Western German church attenders do not differ 
from non-attenders on this question, but eastern German church attenders in 1991 
expressed strong agreement that individuals have free speech. Compared to their 
situation in previous years, clearly they did gain the right to express their political 
opinions freely. And since political opinions were being expressed from pulpits and 
within religious gatherings under threat of political repression prior to the transition, the 
freedom of speech that came about as a result of the transition was felt particularly 
strongly by church affiliates. However, by 1992 the political climate had changed in 
eastern Germany and church attenders were less euphoric about their newly found
Table 5.6 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Tolerance of
 the Right of Free Speech on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991 1992 1991 1992
Age Category(Older) -.05 -.03 -.11 * -.10 *!
Attend Church - .1 0  * -.08 * -.03 .0 0
Secondary Education Complete .07 * .08 * .03 .01
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) - .00 - .11 * !
Married or Living as Married - .03 - -.07 *
Female -.10 * - -.05 + -
Larger Community Size - - - -
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention - -.04 - -.01
Right Radical Vote Intention .09 * .15 ** .10 * .09 *'
Unemployed - .09 ** - .06 +
White Collar Occupation .11  * .09 * -.01 -.07
Blue Collar Occupation .10 * .07 -.03 -.01
Self Employed - - - -
National Pride -.12 * - .01 -
Economically Satisfied .01 -.07 * -.06 * -.09 *
Interest in Politics - .02 - .05
Adjusted R2 .07 .07 .03 .05
N 1019 1039 1076 1116
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
Table 5.7 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Those Who
Believe Citizens Have Free Speech on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991 1992 1991 1992
Age Category(OIder) - - - -
Attend Church - .0 2 - .0 1 .1 0  * .03
Secondary Education Complete - - - -
Higher Income - - .0 2 - -.09 **
Left-Right Placement (Right) - - - -
Married or Living as Married .06 + - -.05 + -
Female - .0 1 .0 2 -.08 * - .1 0  **
Larger Community Size - - - -
Union Member - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention .08 * - .01 -
Center-Right Vote Intention .09 * .05 .17 * .2 0  **
Right Radical Vote Intention -.09 * - .1 0  ** .0 2 .04
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
National Pride - - - -
Economically Satisfied .18 * .1 2  ** .11  * .11  **
Interest in Politics - -.0 1 - . 09 **
Adjusted R2 .05 .03 .07 .08
N 1019 1055 1076 1106
**p<,01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
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freedom of speech. Males in eastern Germany are more likely to agree that political 
opinions can freely be expressed, as are those who would vote for the prevailing center- 
right party and those who are satisfied with the economic situation.
Finally, Table 5.8 reflects opinions about the individuals’ right to freedom of 
expression -- a more philosophical form of the question (see Chapter Three for question 
wording). Church attenders in both parts of Germany in 1991 were less likely to agree 
that people have the right to free expression . By 1992 this relationship no longer held, 
for either part of Germany. Younger people are more likely to agree with the right to 
freedom of expression, as are those who would place themselves on the political left (at 
least in 1991), those who would vote for a center-left party, and those who claim an 
interest in politics.
These previous four tables illustrate the ambiguity o f support for certain 
democratic values among church members. When individual rights do not conflict with 
the common good, they are supported by the church. This again reflects the priestly 
tradition of respect for authority. For example, the right to freedom of speech was 
supported by church members when it promoted the transition from totalitarianism, but 
when free speech became divisive in 1992 (as a result of reunification pressures, the 
skinhead movement, anti-foreigner activities, etc.) church attenders saw that democratic 
value as conflicting with the common good and withdrew their support.
Protest Behaviors
Protest against the government is contrary to the priestly tradition of the church.
In general, church leadership is opposed to protest, as it disrupts order and threatens
Table 5.8 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Right to Free
Expression on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991 1992 1991 1992
Age Category(Older) - .1 2  * -.03 -.06 + _ 0Q +>H
Attend Church -.11 * -.04 - .1 0  * -.05
Secondary Education Complete .09 * .09 ** .0 2 .0 0
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) - .1 2  * - -.07 + -
Married or Living as Married b 00 * - .0 0 -
Female - - - -
Larger Community Size - .03 - -.06 *
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention .06 + .07 * .07 * - .0 2
Center-Right Vote Intention - - - -
Right Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation .06 + - .0 0 -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
National Pride -.06 + -.06 + -.04 -.03
Economically Satisfied .09 * - .04 -
Interest in Politics .16 * .15 ** .11  * .05 +
Adjusted R2 .15 .05 .05 .01
N 964 1055 1013 1124
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
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authority. However, the prophetic tradition of the church, which calls upon individuals to 
speak out and act against injustice, often endorses protest as a means of addressing 
injustice. At several points in history church members have engaged in protest with 
varying degrees of institutional support. In East Germany, Poland and Hungary church 
members engaged in protest against the government, sometimes with institutional support 
and sometimes alone. However, the institution itself (both the Catholic Church and the 
various Protestant Churches) when speaking as a public body, always spoke out in favor 
of peace and against protest. Therefore, church members in these post-transition societies 
received a mixed message from the church. While the official organization publicly 
deplored protest activities, at the same time they witnessed the public protests of certain 
brave individuals and occasionally even church leaders against an oppressive regime. 
Consequently, church members in these post-transition societies are somewhat less 
conservative when it comes to public protest than we would expect church members to 
be. I stated in hypothesis four that I do not expect church attenders to support protest 
more than non-attenders, but I expect that opposition to protest might be somewhat lower 
for church attenders in these post-tradition societies than it is among western German 
church attenders.
Table 5.9 shows respondents’ willingness to engage in political protest behaviors 
(See Chapter Three). A Guttman scale is formed of respondents' answers to a list of 
protest behaviors. Respondents are asked whether they have ever engaged in any of these 
protest behaviors, or whether they might ever engage in any of those behaviors.
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Table 5.9 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Support for
Protest Behaviors on Selected Independent Variables
Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany Hungary
Age Category(Older) -.27 * -.39 * -.24 **
Attend Church .0 2 .0 0 -.04
Secondary Education Complete .1 2  * .01 .05
Higher Income - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) - .2 0  * -.06 * -.04
Married or Living as Married - .0 2 .0 0 - .1 2  **
Female l o * -.15 * - .1 0  *
Larger Community Size .05 * .08 * .09 *
Union Member .11  * .0 2 .1 0  *
Left Radical Vote Intention - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention .0 0 -.05 + .1 0  *
Center-Right Vote Intention - - -
Right Radical Vote Intention - - -
Unemployed - - -
White Collar Occupation - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - -
Self Employed - - -
National Pride - .2 2  * -.15 * -.04
Economically Satisfied - .0 1 -.03 -.09 *
Interest in Politics .26 * .17 * .24 **
Adjusted R2 .43 .31 .24
N 1359 872 557
**p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey 
Source: WVS(1990)
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Church attenders are no more or less willing to engage in protest than are non- 
attenders. Older persons are much less likely to indicate willingness to protest. Those 
who say they are interested in politics are much more likely to be willing to engage in 
protest. Males are more likely to protest, as are those from larger communities. Union 
members in western Germany and in Hungary are more likely to support protest, and in 
both parts o f Germany those who would place themselves on the political left and those 
who say they are not proud to be German are more likely to support protest behaviors.
The next table (5.10) asks about respondents' tolerance for protest behavior.
Again, a Guttman scale is formed from respondents answers about whether the same list 
of protest behaviors as above should or should not be allowed. This variable, then, 
addresses respondents' tolerance for protest, rather than their proclivity to engage in 
protest. As expected, church members in western Germany are not tolerant o f protest 
behavior. But there is no significant relationship between church attendance and 
tolerance for protest in either eastern Germany or Hungary.
As I stated above, church attenders in these post-transition societies have been 
receiving mixed messages about protest from their religious leaders, and tend therefore to 
be somewhat less intolerant of protest than we would otherwise expect. This is a result 
o f conflicting messages in these Eastern European churches coming from both the 
priestly and prophetic traditions. Normally, protest behaviors are not supported by the 
church, even in democratic societies, as these behaviors contradict the priestly tradition of 
obedience to authority. However, public protest is an acceptable means to fight 
oppression and injustice, well recognized from within the prophetic tradition of the
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Table 5.10 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Would
Tolerate Protest Behavior on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany Hungary
Age Category(Older) -.27 ** -.16 ** - .2 0  **
Attend Church - .1 0  ** - .0 2 - .0 1
Secondary Education Complete .08 ** .08 + .16 **
Higher Income - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) - - -
Married or Living as Married - - -
Female -.04 * -.08 + _ 17 **
Larger Community Size .05 * .03 .1 2  **
Union Member - n/a n/a
Left Radical Vote Intention - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention -.08 ** -.13 ** .04
Right Radical Vote Intention - - -
Unemployed - - -
White Collar Occupation .05 .03 -.14 *
Blue Collar Occupation .03 - .0 2 -.15 *
Self Employed - - -
National Pride - - -
Economically Satisfied - - -
Interest in Politics 14 +* .14 ** .15 **
Adjusted R2 .19 .1 0 .18
N 2113 574 650
** p<.01, * p<.05, -t- p<.10, - not significant in any country 
Source: ISSP 1990
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church, and public protests were successfully used by several o f the churches to promote 
the transition to democracy, particularly in Poland and East Germany. Therefore, church 
members in these post-transition societies tend to look on protest somewhat differently 
than their counterparts in western Germany, who still interpret protest as being dangerous 
to the common good, reflecting the priestly tradition.
The rest of the profile of those who would support protest remains substantially as 
it was in the previous table. Younger people are more tolerant o f protest, as are those 
who say they are interested in politics, males, and those from larger communities (except 
for eastern Germany). Union membership was not asked here for either eastern Germany 
or Hungary, and neither political identification nor national pride were significant 
predictors in any of the countries.
The other side of protest is attitude toward government repression of protestors. 
Table 5.11 presents regression models of a factor score composed of attitudes about a 
variety of forms of government repression of protest activity (see Chapter Three). In 
general, as I said above, the priestly tradition of the church opposes protest and we would 
expect church members to endorse the necessity o f government intervention to prevent 
protest. Table 5.11 shows that church attenders in western Germany do support 
government repression of protest. But church attenders in eastern Germany are not likely 
to either endorse or oppose government repression of protest. As before, church attenders 
in post-transition eastern Germany are ambiguous about the place of public protest in 
society. They are no more likely than non-attenders to favor government repression of 
protest. Older people do support government repression, as do males, those who say they
Table 5.11 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who
Oppose Government Repression of Citizens on Selected Independent
Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Age Category(Older)
1 2 2 1  
-.16 **
1991
-.19
Attend Church -.10 ** .04
Secondary Education Complete - -
Higher Income - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) -.19 ** - .1 2
Married or Living as Married - -
Female .07 * .11
Larger Community Size - -
Union Member - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - -
Center-Left Vote Intention - -
Center-Right Vote Intention I o 00 * -.07
Right Radical Vote Intention - -
Unemployed - -
White Collar Occupation .13 * .0 2
Blue Collar Occupation .11 * .03
Self Employed .07 + .0 0
National Pride -.23 ** -.14
Economically Satisfied .0 2 .0 0
Interest in Politics 09 #* .09
Adjusted R2 .26 .11
N 1 0 0 2 1059
**p<.01, * p<.05, + p< 10 , - not significant in any country
Source: IfD 5055 (1991)
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are proud to be German, those who place themselves on the right politically, and those 
who would vote for the prevailing center-right party. Females and those who express an 
interest in politics tend to oppose government repression of protestors.
Economic Issues
In general, economic issues are separate from democratic values. There exists 
within democratic governments a continuum of economic organization ranging from 
democratic capitalism on one end to democratic socialism on the other. Those who argue 
that the responsibilities o f government should be limited fall toward the democratic 
capitalism end of the continuum. Democratic socialism, at the other end, favors more 
government involvement in the economy. Democratic socialism argues that the 
responsibilities of government include some level of involvement in the economy to 
ensure the welfare o f all citizens. Therefore, questions about what should or should not 
be included in the responsibilities of government reflect particular economic orientations. 
That is, those who favor a restricted role for government would tend to align more closely 
with democratic capitalism than with democratic socialism. Neither orientation, 
though, would be defined as undemocratic or antidemocratic.
The orientation of the church, with its emphasis on the welfare of the community 
above the good of the individual, tends to be in the direction of democratic socialism. 
While the individual is highly valued and human rights are to be protected, the priestly 
tradition teaches that the good of the community transcends individual rights. The 
priestly tradition also admonishes that it is the responsibility o f the community to ensure 
that the needs o f individuals are met. The purpose of government, according to this
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tradition, is to provide for the welfare of the community and ensure just treatment for all. 
Therefore, the priestly tradition of the church will influence church members to support 
the ideals o f democratic socialism. As I stated in hypothesis five, I expect that church 
attenders will be no more likely than non-attenders in these post-transition societies to 
support government intervention in the economy. A question which asks whether it 
should be the responsibility of government to provide jobs for every person who wants to 
work would be answered in the affirmative by those who support democratic socialism.
It would be answered in the negative by those who support democratic capitalism. 
Similarly, a question which asks whether it should be the responsibility of government to 
reduce income differences between the rich and the poor would be endorsed by those who 
support democratic socialism and opposed by those who support democratic capitalism.
Table 5.12 shows regression results for the question of whether the government 
should provide jobs. Models are provided here for all four countries, although the data 
are available for Poland only in 1991. In each model, except for Poland, it is males, those 
who place themselves on the political right and those who have completed secondary 
education who are most likely to agree that it is not the responsibility of government to 
provide jobs. For Poland it is males, those who are younger, those on the political right, 
and those who do not attend church who agree that the government should not provide 
jobs. For the 1990 models, those who have higher incomes agree that the government 
should not provide jobs but this relationship does not repeat in the 1991 models, except in 
eastern Germany. In general, church attenders do not have a clear opinion on this issue. 
Eastern German church attenders in 1990 were more likely to agree that the government
Table 5.12 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f  Those W ho Say It Is N ot the Responsibility 
o f  Government to Provide Jobs on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany Hungary Poland
1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1991
Age Category(Older) .07 ** .03 .01 .01 .00 .05 -.10 *
Attend Church -.03 -.05 + .09 * .03 -.04 .00 -.08 *
Secondary Education Complete .09 ** .13 ** .13 ** .08 * .12 * .22 ** .05
Higher Income .11 ** .05 .10 * .08 * .08 * .03 .05
Left-Right Placement (Right) .06 * .08 * .07 + .06 * n/a n/a o 00 *
M arried o r Living as Married - .00 - -.06 + - .00 .02
Female -.09 ** -.14 ** -.10 * -.06 * -.19 ** -.11 ** -.12 **
Larger Community Size .04 .04 -.07 + .02 .09 * .02 .06 +
Union M ember .05 *
*ooor n/a -.03 n/a .00 -.01
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -.06 * - -.03 -
Center-Left Vote Intention - -.07 * - 1 b * - .09 * -.04
Center-Right Vote Intention .04 + - .02 - -.04 - -
Right Radical Vote Intention .04 + -.01 .07 + .05 + - - .02
Unemployed -.05 * .00 -.01 -.06 * .02 -.02 -.04
W hite Collar Occupation - - - - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation -.05 * - -.02 - -.02 - -
S elf Employed - .05 - .00 - .01 -.01
National Pride n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Economically Satisfied n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Interest in Politics - n/a - n/a - n/a n/a
Adjusted R2 .05 .06 .05 .03 .08 .07 .05
N 2060 1150 740 1334 763 924 954
**p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Sources: ISSP 1990, ISSP 1991
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should not provide jobs. Church attenders in western Germany and Poland in 1991 
reflect more of a democratic socialist attitude; that is, they are more likely to agree that it 
is the responsibility of government to provide jobs.
This democratic socialist orientation of church attenders in western Germany and 
Poland is repeated in Table 5.13, which examines attitudes about government 
responsibility to equalize incomes. Church attenders in both of these societies agree that 
governments should work to reduce income differences between rich and poor. Eastern 
German and Hungarian church attenders do not reflect this same attitude. In general, it is 
better educated, higher income, political right oriented, males, and self-employed who 
agree that it is not the responsibility of government to reduce income differences between 
rich and poor.
Democratic Traditions Reflecting the Prophetic Tradition -  Power from Below 
Interpersonal T rust
Just as trust in government is important for a successful democracy, so, too, is 
interpersonal trust important to democracy. When people share decision making power 
they must be willing to extend a certain level o f trust to their fellow citizens.
Democratic decision making relies upon cooperation among like-minded individuals who 
have organized themselves to promote their cooperative interests. This activity cannot 
take place without some level of interpersonal trust. And a notorious hallmark of 
totalitarian government is a carefully cultivated level of interpersonal distrust, because 
those who can trust one another are more likely to entrust one another with confidences 
and organized activity. It is in the interest o f totalitarian government to keep levels of
Table 5.13 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f  Those Who Say It Is Not the Responsibility 
o f  Government to Equalize Incomes on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany Hungary Poland
1990 1991 1990 1991 1990 1991 1991
Age Category(Older) .02 .00 -.05 -.08 ** -.07 + .05 -.09 *
Attend Church -.05 + -.06 + -.01 .03 -.01 .01 -.07 *
Secondary Education Complete .06 * .05 .19 ** .13 ** .12 ** .16 ** .05
Higher Income .16 ** .09 * .14 ** .04 .09 * .11 * .08 *
Left-Right Placement (Right) .12 ** .15 ** .05 .09 ** - n/a .11 **
Married or Living as Married - -.02 - -.06 * - -.08 * -.03
Female .01 -.10 ** -.11 ** -.06 + -.16 ** .03 -.08 *
Larger Community Size .01 .08 * .04 .04 .09 * .02 .11 **
Union M ember .06 * - n/a - n/a - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention .08 * .08 * .08 + .03 .01 .01 -.02
Right Radical Vote Intention - - - - - - -
Unemployed -.04 + - .00 - .02 - -
White Collar Occupation - - - - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation -.02 -.07 * -.02 .00 -.08 + .02 -.06
S elf Employed .03 .10 ** .10 ** .08 * .09 * .01 .07 +
National Pride n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Economically Satisfied n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Interest in Politics - n/a - n/a - n/a n/a
Adjusted R2 .06 .07 .10 .05 .09 .04 .06
N 2060 1150 740 1334 763 924 954
**p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Sources: ISSP 1990, ISSP 1991
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interpersonal trust as low as possible, in order to reduce the likelihood that people will 
organize themselves in opposition to the prevailing powers.
Trust in others is also a religious value, though it has little to do with the priestly 
tradition. It reflects more the prophetic tradition of a call to believers to return to 
community. The prophetic tradition is not as prevalent as the priestly tradition, and is 
only sporadically experienced in the church. But the prophetic tradition is heard most 
often during times of crisis, such as immediately prior to and during the democratic 
transition in Eastern Europe. I argue, therefore, that the influence of the prophetic 
tradition will be reflected more strongly among church attenders in Eastern Europe, and 
that this influence will be seen in their attitudes toward particular democratic values 
which mirror the same values. As I stated in hypothesis six, I expect that church 
attenders will express greater levels of interpersonal trust than do those who do not attend 
church.
Table 5.14 examines relative levels of trust in family members. Only in western 
Germany and Hungary are church attenders more likely to indicate they trust their family 
members. In eastern Germany and Poland trust in family members is not related to 
church attendance. Married people are more likely to trust their families, for each of the 
countries, as are those who say they are financially satisfied.
Trust in family members is not crucial to democratic success, however. It may be 
indicative of some level of interpersonal trust in society, but far more important to a 
democratic transition is the broader perception that people in general can be trusted.
Table 5.15 examines this level of interpersonal trust. We can see from this table that
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Table 5.14 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Family
Members Can Be Trusted on Selected Independent Variables
Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(OIder) -.09 * .04 -.0 1 -.07 +
Attend Church .09 * .00 .08 + .04
Secondary Education Complete - - - -
Higher Income .03 .0 2 .13 ** .03
Left-Right Placement (Right) .07 * .0 0 -.07 + .03
Married or Living as Married .19 * .2 2  * .14 ** .08 +
Female - - - -
Larger Community Size -.04 -.08 * -.05 n/a
Union Member - - - n/a
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention .07 * .01 .05 .03
Center-Right Vote Intention .07 * -.03 .01 -.04
Right Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Unemployed - - - n/a
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
National Pride .07 * .01 .09 * .05
Economically Satisfied .1 2  * .07 * .11 ** .05
Interest in Politics - - - -
Adjusted R2 .1 0 .06 .08 .01
N 1715 1206 696 650
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey 
Source: WVS(1990)
Table 5.15 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That People Can Be Trusted on Selected
Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany Hungary Poland
1990 1991 1992 1990 1991 1522 i m 1990
Age Category(OIder) -.05 + .01 - -.05 .06 + - .02 .08 +
Attend Church .07 * .06 .08 * .14 ** .05 .03 .04 .08 +
Secondary Education Complete .06 * .02 - .07 + .11 ** - .11 * .09 +
Higher Income .02 - - .01 - - .08 + .00
Left-Right Placement (Right) -.03 -.07 + - -.06 + .00 - -.04 .00
Married or Living as Married .04 .05 - -.01 -.08 * - -.03 -.02
Female .01 .01 - -.05 + -.05 + - -.01 -.01
Larger Community Size - -.08 * - - .02 - - n/a
Union Member - - - - - - - n/a
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - - - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention - -.04 .06 + - .07 * .13 ** - -
Center-Right Vote Intention .03 - .03 .07 * - .10 ** -.01 -.02
Right Radical Vote Intention -.05 + -.08 * - - -.05 + - - -
Unemployed - - - - - - - n/a
White Collar Occupation - - -.06 - - -.01 - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - -.09 * - - -.08 + - -
Self Employed - - - - - - - -
National Pride -.06 * - - -.1 0  ** - - I © 'O * .03
Economically Satisfied .09 * * .12 * * .22 * * .08 * .07 * . 1 1  * * .07 + .09 *
Interest in Politics .06 * .05 .12  * * .05 + .07 * .02 .08 * .02
Adjusted R2 .03 .04 .09 .05 .04 .04 .04 .01
N 1715 1002 1055 1216 1059 1128 696 650
** p<,01, * p<.05, + P<-10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Sources: WVS (1990), IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
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church attendance is associated with greater levels of interpersonal trust, though the 
relationship is not always significant in all o f the models. The most consistent predictor 
o f interpersonal trust in all of these models is economic satisfaction. Those who are 
satisfied with their financial situation are more likely to agree that people can be trusted. 
Similarly, those who say they are interested in politics are more likely to say that people 
can be trusted. Those who have achieved at least a secondary education are also more 
likely to agree that people can be trusted.
Optimism
Optimism is not necessarily a democratic value, but it certainly has a positive 
effect on a democratic regime when citizens are optimistic about the course o f their lives. 
This attitude again reflects the prophetic tradition, which exhorts people to take charge of 
their lives, to get involved, to take responsibility for themselves and to act in a positive 
manner. Hypothesis seven posits that church attenders in post-transition societies will be 
more optimistic than those who do not attend church.
Church attenders in the new democracies of Eastern Europe are more likely to 
describe their lives as happy (see Table 5.16). This relationship illustrates just how 
powerful an experience this transition has been for church attenders in these countries. 
There is no similar relationship between church attendance and happiness in western 
Germany. Church attenders in Eastern Europe have reason to celebrate, as they are 
finally out from under the shadow of repression, and they reflect this in their reported 
levels o f happiness. As expected, younger people, married people, and those with higher 
incomes are also more likely to describe their lives as happy, in all four models.
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Table 5.16 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Describe 
Their Life as Happy on Selected Independent Variables
Western Eastern
Germany Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(Older) -.08 * -.06 * -.17 ** -.18 **
Attend Church .0 2 .1 0  ** .09 * .06 +
Secondary Education Complet .03 -.03 .06 + .07 *
Higher Income 14 ** .11 ** .11  * .15 **
Left-Right Placement (Right) .05 .03 n/a .11  **
Married or Living as Married .24 ** .11  ** .24 ** 17 **
Female .04 -.0 1 -.04 -.08 *
Larger Community Size - - - -
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention .01 .06 + .01 .0 0
Center-Right Vote Intention .01 .07 * .04 .06 +
Right Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Unemployed -.09 ** -.08 ** .0 0 _ j 2  **
White Collar Occupation -.08 + .01 .01 -.05
Blue Collar Occupation -.08 .04 -.09 + -.09 *
Self Employed - - - -
Adjusted R2 .11 .06 .13 .11
N 1150 1334 924 954
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey 
Source: ISSP (1991)
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We can see this same relationship reflected in the next table (5.17). Here we look 
at attitudes about reunification, for both parts of Germany. Church attenders in both 
western and eastern Germany expressed joy about the reunification of Germany in 1991. 
This was a most significant event for church members in Germany, who could rejoice in 
the reunification of a church that had been artificially divided by the state in 1969. For 
western Germany, economic satisfaction is the only variable in the model more strongly 
related to joy about reunification. That is, those who were not financially disadvantaged 
by reunification, as well as those who say they are interested in politics, city dwellers, and 
males were more likely to express joy about reunification in western Germany. In eastern 
Germany it was people who stood to gain the most from reunification who expressed joy, 
as well as those who supported the prevailing political party. Younger people, church 
attenders, those on the right politically, those who would vote for the center-right party 
(the party in power in the West at the time of reunification) were more likely to express 
joy about reunification in 1991. People who were proud to be German and those who had 
jobs or were satisfied with their financial situation also expressed joy about reunification.
By the next year the relationship between reunification joy and church attendance 
had moderated, for both parts of Germany, as the realities of the financial burden of 
reunification began to sink in. Those who were profiting from reunification -- who were 
satisfied with their economic situation and proud to be German, as well as those who 
supported the ruling center-right party -- were willing to express joy about reunification. 
But the rest o f the population had more mixed feelings about reunification. In eastern 
Germany, the model in 1992 explains reunification joy even more explicitly — more than
Table 5.17 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Reunification
Joy on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991 1992 1991 1992
Age Category(Older) .06 .03 -.09 * - .1 0  **
Attend Church .1 0  * .04 .13 * .04
Secondary Education Complete .01 - .04 -
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) .0 2 -.04 .21  * .13 **
Married or Living as Married -.06 + - .0 0 -
Female -.07 * -.05 + -.04 -.06 *
Larger Community Size .08 * - .0 2 -
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - .0 0 - -.15 **
Center-Left Vote Intention - -.07 * - - .0 2
Center-Right Vote Intention .06 .08 * .08 * .08 *
Right Radical Vote Intention -.06 + - .0 2 -
Unemployed -.05 - .01 - .1 0  * - .1 2  **
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
National Pride .05 .1 0  ** .1 1  * .1 0  **
Economically Satisfied .14 * .23 ** .19 * .27 **
Interest in Politics .07 * - .0 0 -
Adjusted R2 .07 .1 0 .21 .26
N 1 0 0 2 1039 1059 1116
+* p<.01, * p<.05, +p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
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a quarter o f the variation is explained by the model. The same variables as in 1991 
explain reunification joy, with the exception of church attendance. That is, those who are 
gaining from reunification are joyful. Extremists are not joyful, the unemployed are not 
joyful. But young people, males, political rightists, economically satisfied, and those 
who are proud to be German are more likely to express joy about reunification.
Church attenders in the post-transition societies also evaluate their current 
situation and their future situation in more optimistic terms, relative to the past. Table 
5.18 describes attitudes comparing the present situation relative to the past, for both parts 
of Germany in 1991 and 1992. At both times, church attenders in eastern Germany are 
more likely to say the present is better than the past; there is no such relationship in 
western Germany. Objectively, the situation now is much better than in the past for 
church attenders in the East. They are finally free to gather and associate without fear of 
repression by the authorities. As in the previous tables, those who are gaining by 
reunification are more optimistic. For eastern Germany young people, those on the 
political right, those who vote for the center-right, those who are proud to be German, and 
those who are economically satisfied are more likely to give a positive evaluation of the 
present relative to the past. For western Germans, too, those who are least impacted by 
reunification give a positive evaluation. Primarily, those who are economically satisfied 
and those who are urban (in 1991) or not married (in 1992) say the situation now is better 
than the past. Those who would vote for an extremist party are more likely to give a 
negative evaluation.
Table 5.18 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who
Say the Situation Now is Better Than the Past on Selected Independent
Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991 1992 1991 1992
Age Category(Older) -.03 - .01 -.07 * - .1 1  **
Attend Church .03 -.04 .1 1  * .08 **
Secondary Education Complete - - - -
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) -.03 - .0 2 .25 * .19 **
Married or Living as Married - - .1 0  ** - .0 2
Female - - - -
Larger Community Size .1 0  * - .11  * -
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - .0 2 - -.14 **
Center-Left Vote Intention - -.07 * - - .0 1
Center-Right Vote Intention .03 .0 0 .1 0  * .09 **
Right Radical Vote Intention -.07 * -.07 * .05 + -.06 *
Unemployed .04 .01
♦00p1* -.09 **
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
National Pride - .0 2 .03 .13 * .09 **
Economically Satisfied .2 2  * .32 ** .25 * .26 **
Interest in Politics - - - -
Adjusted R2 .06 .11 .30 .29
N 1 0 0 2 1039 1059 1116
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
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When they predict into the future, too, church attenders are more optimistic than 
non-attenders (Table 5.19). Even in western Germany, church attenders in 1991 were 
more likely to predict an optimistic future relative to the past. As before, younger people 
and the economically satisfied are more likely to be optimistic about the future. For 
eastern Germany, church attenders in both 1991 and 1992 are optimistic about the future 
relative to the past. Also young people, those on the political right, those who would vote 
for the center-right party , and those who are proud to be German say the future will be 
better than the past. A full thirty percent of the variation in this attitude is captured by 
this model for 1992 in eastern Germany, I expect that these models would behave 
similarly for Hungary and Poland had the data been available.
Efficacy and Attitude Toward Change
Political efficacy is the feeling that one has a say in the political process, that 
each citizen is an actor who has a voice which can be used to effect change in a 
democratic system. As I stated in hypothesis eight, church attendance is not usually 
associated with political efficacy. I expect that church attenders in these post-transition 
societies will be no more likely than non-attenders to express political efficacy.
A standard set o f questions from the University of Michigan National Election 
Studies is commonly used to capture the concept o f political efficacy. A factor score 
created from factor analysis of four of these questions forms the dependent variable for 
Table 5.20. We see in the table that church attenders are not particularly efficacious. In 
fact, the only significant relationship is for church attenders in western Germany in 1991
Table 5.19 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who
Say the Future Situation is Better Than the Past on Selected Independent
Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991 1992 1991 1992
Age Category(OIder) - .1 0  * -.04 - .1 0  * -.09 **
Attend Church .08 * -.03 .1 0  * .06 *
Secondary Education Complete - - - -
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) .03 - .0 2 .23 * .2 2  **
Married or Living as Married - -.06 + - .01
Female -.06 + - -.03 -
Larger Community Size .13 * - .07 * -
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - .0 2 -.14 * *
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention .05 .08 * .1 1  * . 1 1  * *
Right Radical Vote Intention -.06 + -.07 * .0 2 -.06 *
Unemployed .04 .04 -.06 * -.04
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
National Pride .01 .06 + .13 * . 1 1  * *
Economically Satisfied .18 * .29 ** .2 2  * .25 **
Interest in Politics - .08 * - .01
Adjusted R2 .06 . 1 1 .26 .30
N 1 0 0 2 1039 1059 1116
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
Table 5.20 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Political 
Efficacy Factor on Selected Independent Variables
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1991 1992 1991 1992
Age Category(Older) -.09 * -.07 * -.14 * -.15 **
Attend Church -.07 * .04 .04 .05
Secondary Education Complete .11 * .15 ** .09 * -.03
Higher Income - - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) .0 2 -.09 ** .07 * - .0 2
Married or Living as Married - .01 - .01
Female -.04 l O * - .1 1  * -.06 +
Larger Community Size - - - -
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - -.05 + - .01
Center-Left Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Right Vote Intention .1 0  * .19 ** .03 .08 *
Right Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Unemployed -.05 - -.06 + -
White Collar Occupation - - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - .0 2 - -.13 **
Self Employed - - - -
National Pride -.09 * -.06 * -.04 .0 2
Economically Satisfied .15 * .1 0  ** .18 * .16 **
Interest in Politics .2 2  * .27 *+ .18 * .2 0  **
Adjusted R2 .16 .2 0 .13 .13
N 1 0 0 2 1039 1059 1116
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)
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who are less likely to say they have political efficacy. Younger people are more likely 
to claim political efficacy, as are the politically interested and the economically satisfied. 
Those who have completed secondary education are also more likely to claim political 
efficacy, except in the eastern German model for 1992. Among eastern Germans, males 
are also more likely to say they have political efficacy.
Personal efficacy, a similar concept, is the feeling that one has control over one's 
life. This form of efficacy is also not a concept that is normally associated with church 
attenders. In fact, the priestly tradition of the church teaches church members to be 
obedient to those in authority and to defer personal will to the will of God. The prophetic 
tradition, in contrast, calls church members to stand up and speak out against injustice. It 
exhorts church members to action, to do something to change their lives, to attain 
personal efficacy. But the priestly tradition if the church is the prevalent tradition. 
Church members for the most part tend to be somewhat conservative. Church attenders 
tend to be skeptical o f change and resistant to social change. The final two tables in this 
analysis allow us to examine whether the prophetic call to social change was strong 
enough in Eastern Europe to cause church attenders there to have a more efficacious 
attitude toward social change.
In Table 5.21 the dependent variable is respondents' attitudes toward a statement 
that people can do little to change their lives. Agreement with this statement equates 
roughly to an admission of lack of personal efficacy. As can be seen from the table, 
church attenders in all four countries tend to agree that people can do little to change their
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Table 5.21 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions o f Attitude That People
Can Do Little to Change Their Lives on Selected Independent Variables
Western
Germany
Eastern
Germany Hungary Poland
Age Category(Older) .16 ** .21 ** .04 .07 *
Attend Church 09 ** .11 ** .12 ** .13 **
Secondary Education Complet -.13 ** -.06 * - .1 0  * -.13 **
Higher Income -.05 + -.05 .0 0 -.15 **
Left-Right Placement (Right) .01 .08 ** n/a - .1 0  **
Married or Living as Married .08 * - .0 2 -.03 .0 2
Female .05 08 ** .1 0  ** -.03
Larger Community Size - - - -
Union Member - - - -
Left Radical Vote Intention - - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention .05 .0 2 -.09 * -.06 +
Center-Right Vote Intention - - - -
Right Radical Vote Intention .03 -.05 + - .03
Unemployed - - - -
White Collar Occupation -.07 * -.08 * -.06 + .09 *
Blue Collar Occupation - - - -
Self Employed - - - -
Adjusted R2 .09 .1 0 .07 .08
N 1150 1334 924 954
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)
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lives. From these models we would have to argue that the effect of church activism in 
the democratic transition has not been enough to cause church members in these post­
transition societies to achieve personal efficacy. Older people are also less efficacious, as 
are females (in eastern Germany and Hungary). Those who have completed secondary 
education are more efficacious, as are white collar employees (except in Poland, where 
white collar workers claim less efficacy).
Finally, one more variable addresses the concept of personal efficacy. This is a 
factor score, created from factor analysis of three questions which ask people for their 
outlook on life, each ranked on a ten-point scale(see Chapter Three). In general, higher 
values indicate a more favorable attitude toward change in one's life. We see from Table 
5.22 that western German church attenders have a more negative attitude toward change, 
as we would expect from the priestly tradition. As stated above, church members tend to 
be somewhat conservative and resistant to social change. The models show that older 
persons and females are also resistant to change, as we would also expect. These two 
groups are also typically seen as somewhat conservative and resistant to social change. 
And those who say they are interested in politics, as well as the more educated and 
economically satisfied (except in Hungary) exhibit a favorable attitude toward change, 
also as expected. The politically engaged, the more educated and the financially stable 
are all likely to have a more favorable attitude toward change in their lives.
What is unexpected in these models is the lack of association between church 
attendance and attitude toward change in the post-transition societies. We expect to see a 
negative relationship between church attendance and attitude toward change, as described
174
Table 5.22 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Favorable
Attitude Toward Change on Selected Independent Variables
Age Category(Older)
Western 
Germany 
-.27 *
Eastern 
Germany 
-.16 *
Hungary 
-.17 *+
Attend Church -.09 * -.04 .00
Secondary Education Complete .06 * .1 0  * .06
Higher Income - - -
Left-Right Placement (Right) -.07 * .03 - .0 2
Married or Living as Married - - -
Female 1 o {Si * -.05 + - .1 2  **
Larger Community Size - - -
Union Member -.03 .0 2 - .1 1  **
Left Radical Vote Intention - - -
Center-Left Vote Intention -.04 - .0 2 .1 0  *
Center-Right Vote Intention -.07 * .0 0 .03
Right Radical Vote Intention - - -
Unemployed -.03 .01 -.08 *
White Collar Occupation - - -
Blue Collar Occupation - - -
Self Employed .05 * .01 .03
National Pride -.06 * .08 * - .0 2
Economically Satisfied .1 2  * .07 * .06
Interest in Politics .1 2  * .15 * .07 +
Adjusted R2 .2 0 .09 .11
N 1839 1 2 2 0 707
** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey 
Source: WVS(1990)
above and as noted in the case o f western German church attenders. But there is no 
relationship between church attendance and attitude toward change for either o f the post­
transition societies here. It is not possible to say that the influence of the prophetic 
tradition has caused attitudes of personal efficacy to change among church members in 
these societies. But the lack of relationship provokes speculation that something different 
has occurred in these two societies to dilute the expected negative relationship between 
church attendance and attitude toward change.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
Discussions o f political values often ignore the importance o f church affiliation in 
explaining democratic attitudes. This research shows that there is an important 
relationship between church attendance and democratic values, one which should not be 
ignored or minimized. A close reading of the tables from the previous chapter provides 
evidence that church attendance does affect democratic values, both in the established 
democracy o f western Germany and in the new democracies of Eastern Europe. In the 
first two chapters I explained why this relationship should exist. In brief, many of the 
values that churches teach and promote are also values that support and promote 
democratic society, so it is to be expected that church attenders would support democratic 
values. Such values resonate with the ideals that they hear from their religious leaders. 
And democratic society is more favorable to the institution of the church. Democracy is 
agnostic, but the Soviet regime was consciously atheistic. So the church gets a better deal 
in a democracy. But there is more to church support of democratic values than 
institutional self-interest and convenience.
As I discussed in Chapter One, the relationship is more complex than this. It is 
true that many of the values taught by the church are democratic values. This is one way 
in which the church affects political culture. As an institution of civil society, the church 
interacts with the state to affect the political culture. And I have shown in Chapter Two 
that the church was virtually the only institution of civil society allowed some measure of
176
177
autonomous existence by the communist regimes in East Germany and Poland.
Therefore, the church contributed substantially to the democratic transitions in those two 
countries.
But the situation in Hungary was somewhat different. In Hungary repression of 
the churches was less severe, and the churches selected a different strategy in their 
relationship to the state. From early on, the church in Hungary identified strongly with 
the state and chose to work within the existing power structure rather than in opposition 
to it. This course of action, while it may have preserved more political latitude for the 
church in Hungary, nevertheless necessarily stigmatized the church by its identification 
with the regime. As Tocqueville said, “religion cannot share the material strength of the 
rulers without being burdened with some of the animosity roused against them” (p. 297). 
Because the church accommodated to communism, church members lost touch with the 
Tocquevillian idea o f getting along with each other. Therefore, the church in Hungary 
was less active in the democratic transition than it was in either Poland or East Germany 
and consequently had less of an impact on the political values o f its church members. So 
the relationship between the church and the state becomes an important contextual 
variable which interacts with church support for democratic values on both the 
institutional as well as the individual level.
I have demonstrated that the church does influence the political culture, and not 
only as an institution but also through the actions of individual church members. Chapter 
Four looks at what remains of the churches in these post-transition societies. By 
examining patterns o f church membership and church attendance in these post-transition
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societies we begin to see how the state vs. civil society context affected individual church 
members in each of these countries.
The effect o f official state repression is seen most strongly in East Germany, 
where the churches have suffered dramatic losses in affiliates since the end of World War 
II. And examination of church membership by age groups shows that these losses are 
consistent across all age groups — it is not just the young who have left the church. State 
repression had the weakest effect on the church in Poland, where Roman Catholicism is 
deeply intertwined with Polish nationalism. To be identified as a practicing Catholic in 
Poland meant simultaneously that one was a member o f the Polish nation and in 
opposition to the foreign-imposed power of the state. In Hungary, state repression had 
practically no effect on the oldest two age groups — those who were already socialized 
before the imposition of communism. But in the younger age groups church membership 
tapers off substantially, with younger groups reporting significantly lower levels of 
membership, as they were increasingly assimilated into Soviet-controlled society.
This differential age effect on church membership makes sense in light of the 
different configurations of state vs. civil society in these three countries. In both East 
Germany and Poland the church was severely repressed -- church leaders were killed or 
threatened, most church-sponsored institutions were either transferred to state control or 
forced to close. People in both countries felt intense pressure to reject their religious 
faith. The people in East Germany tended to comply with the state and select the more 
politically expedient path of disaffiliation. But the people of Poland for the most part 
resisted this repression and continued to adhere to their religious faith, which was so
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strongly bound up with their sense of national identity. For Poles, to disaffiliate from 
their religious faith meant to give up their Polish identity, and most Poles resisted this 
pressure.
In Hungary we see a different configuration between church and state. Churches 
were also repressed in Hungary; church leaders and church property there were also 
sacrificed. But the church in Hungary had always been closely aligned with the state, and 
church leaders quickly saw that they would have better prospects for survival if  they 
cooperated with the state and participated in the reorganization of Hungarian society into 
the socialist model. Therefore, the reorganization of the Hungarian state resulted in far 
less disruption for Hungarian church members than it did for either Poles or East 
Germans. Older Hungarians continued to practice their faith relatively unhindered, just 
as they had before the time of Soviet occupation. Younger Hungarians were increasingly 
socialized into the model of Soviet citizenry, which rejected religious faith and religious 
instruction. Increasingly, younger people either disaffiliated from the religious faith of 
their parents or chose not to affiliate at all. This explains why Hungarian church 
membership remains high among the oldest age groups, then drops consistently by nearly 
2 0  percentage points between each of the younger four age categories.
Church attendance patterns have similar characteristics as church membership 
patterns. And regressions of church attendance on a variety o f religious beliefs and moral 
issues show that church attenders in the East are substantially like their counterpart in 
western Germany in their religious orientation toward these issues. Church attenders in 
post-transition societies support the same moral values as western German church
attenders, with two telling exceptions. In Table 4.3, a question about whether it is better 
to follow one's conscience or obey, western German church attenders are more likely to 
agree that it is better to obey. But eastern German and Hungarian church attenders are no 
more likely than non-attenders to hold this opinion. The priestly tradition of the church 
strongly advocates obedience to authority, and this position is reflected in the attitude of 
western German church attenders. The fact that it is not present in the post-transition 
societies suggests a change in attitude from what we would expect for church attenders. 
The other exception occurs in Tables 4.7-4.8, questions referring to traditional family 
arrangements. Here we note that Hungarian church attenders are no more likely than 
non-attenders to favor traditional family arrangements. Since family arrangements are 
also related to economic conditions, this anomaly may be reflecting a different attitude 
toward women in the work force in Hungary, rather than any particular change in moral 
attitude by Hungarian church attenders.
Chapter Five, then, examines thoroughly how individual church attenders feel 
about democratic values in these post-totalitarian societies. Here we can see more clearly 
the subtle way that the priestly and the prophetic traditions within the church interact to 
affect support for democracy. In the discussion from Chapter One we saw how these two 
countervailing traditions have always existed within the church. The priestly tradition 
tends to prevail at most times, advocating the need for obedience to authority in order to 
ensure public order. As long as the earthly authority allows the church some latitude to 
operate, the priestly tradition acknowledges and legitimates the power o f that earthly 
authority. But the prophetic tradition can emerge as a voice from within the church
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during times of stress and rapid change. The prophetic tradition advocates individual 
opposition to oppression as a response to social injustice. Certain democratic values are 
more expressive of the priestly tradition, others reflect the values o f the prophetic 
tradition, and some democratic values are not advocated by either tradition. We see 
evidence of these two traditions by examining the tables in Chapter Five.
These tables are organized according to the democratic values which are shared 
by each of the traditions within the church. First, the democratic values which resonate 
with the priestly tradition are discussed. Confidence in state institutions and trust in 
government (Tables 5.1-5.3) are democratic values which are strongly supported by 
church attenders in all of the countries. These values reflect the priestly tradition's 
admonition to obey and trust in the earthly authorities whose legitimate power derives 
from God. In other words, authority exists on Earth because God knows we need it, as a 
result of our condition of original sin.
Next, there are democratic values which do not reflect clearly either the priestly or 
the prophetic tradition o f the church. These are either democratic values which address 
the gray area between respect for individual rights and consideration of the common 
good, or else they are democratic values which have more to do with economics than with 
politics. One aspect o f democratic values which falls into this "gray area" between 
individual rights and the good o f the community is the whole concept o f political 
freedoms and political rights. Tables 5.5-5.8  illustrate my point here. Depending on 
question wording, church attenders try to balance the democratic value of individual 
liberty (which can, under times of severe repression, be consistent with the prophetic
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tradition of the church) with the priestly tradition's admonition to value order for the good 
of the community.
For example, Table 5.5 reflects strong church support for a preference for freedom 
and law over a higher standard ofliving. But in this question no one is being asked to 
favor the individual over the community. The next three tables (Tables 5.6-5.8 ), having 
to do with the right to freedom of speech, are either not supported by church attenders or 
in several cases church attenders reject these democratic values. The right o f an 
individual to the free expression of his or her beliefs is interpreted generally as being 
threatening to public order.
The tables addressing public protest (Tables 5.9-5.11) illustrate this same point 
about individual rights vs. order, but they also more clearly point out the tension between 
the priestly and the prophetic tradition in these post-transition societies. Table 5.9 shows 
that church attenders are no more likely to engage in public protest than non-attenders.
But Tables 5.10 and 5.11, where individuals are asked about their tolerance for protest 
(and against government repression of protest) show that church attenders in western 
Germany, where there has been no severe government repression, strongly oppose public 
protest and approve of government repression of protest. This is consistent with what one 
would expect of church members from the priestly tradition. But in the post-transition 
societies o f eastern Germany and Hungary, where churches played a part in the 
democratic transitions, one does not see this expected relationship. Church members in 
those societies witnessed the effectiveness o f the prophetic tradition of the church when 
church leaders and church members protested against unjust societies and successfully
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contributed to change in those societies. This has had a profound and visible (but 
probably short-lived) effect on the strength of the priestly tradition in their world view.
Tables 5.12 and 5.13 illustrate the point that certain democratic values which have 
to do primarily with economic issues are not interpreted by church attenders as having 
anything much to do with their moral values. I expected that church attenders would tend 
to uphold communitarian values and would therefore favor some government 
redistribution of wealth. There is some evidence of this hypothesized relationship for 
western Germany and Poland in these tables, but the relationship is not strong. There is 
no evidence of such a relationship for either eastern Germany or Hungary. In fact, 
eastern German church attenders immediately after the transition tended to agree that it is 
not the responsibility of government to provide jobs. But there is no evidence of this 
relationship in the 1991 model. Church attenders in eastern Germany and Hungary 
apparently interpret these questions only on the level o f economic interest, and do not see 
a relationship between the responsibilities o f government and the moral values espoused 
by the church.
Finally, the last nine tables (5.14-5.22) provide evidence of what I expect to be a 
rather ephemeral effect of the prophetic tradition in post-transition Eastern Europe. These 
tables have to do with democratic values which reflect the prophetic tradition. Such 
democratic values as interpersonal trust, political efficacy, optimism, and openness to 
change are values which echo the prophetic tradition, calling for individuals to stand up 
and speak out to bring about change in an oppressive situation. As Brueggemann (1978, 
p. 13) describes the prophetic voice: "The task o f prophetic ministry is to nurture,
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nourish, and evoke a consciousness and perception alternative to the consciousness and 
perception of the dominant culture around us." These tables illustrate how church 
members in these oppressed societies were influenced, at least for a brief time, by this 
prophetic voice coming from their midst.
Tables 5.14 and 5.15 describe determinants of trust. Although the levels of 
explained variance are not high, church attenders do tend to trust family members and 
other people in general. Interpersonal trust was generally low in communist societies 
because people were encouraged to report non-sympathizers to the authorities, but church 
attenders show some evidence of rejecting this aspect of the dominant culture and instead 
declare their trust for family members and fellow citizens. These tables show evidence of 
the effect o f the prophetic tradition in these oppressed societies in changing the attitudes 
o f church attenders away from the attitudes of the dominant culture.
Levels o f optimism in these post-transition societies are another sign of the 
prophetic tradition at work. Church attenders in eastern Germany, Hungary and Poland 
are more likely than non-attenders to describe their life as happy (Table 5.16). This 
relationship does not hold for western Germany; western German church attenders are no 
more likely than non-attenders to describe their lives as happy. I argue that this is 
because church attenders in these post-transition societies feel that they have something 
to celebrate. Life is qualitatively better for them now that they have religious liberty and 
freedom to associate with one another. However, this euphoric feeling is likely to fade 
with time, as they become adjusted to the realities of their new way of life.
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Evidence that the effect o f the prophetic tradition in these post-transition societies 
is probably transitory can also be seen from the models in the next three tables (5.17- 
5.19). These tables show how this optimism among church attenders, while still strong in 
1991, already shows signs of decline by 1992. As the realities o f reunification sink in 
among both eastern and western German church attenders their initial euphoria recedes.
In both tables asking for evaluation relative to the past (5.18 and 5.19) eastern German 
church attenders are much more likely than non-attenders to express optimism; there is no 
such relationship among western German church attenders. This is evidence of the effect 
of the prophetic tradition on the optimistic attitude of eastern German church attenders. 
But already in the 1992 models this relationship shows signs of weakening, and I suspect 
that it will, in time, disappear entirely as the priestly tradition once again establishes itself 
in the attitudes o f eastern German church attenders and they become more like their 
western counterparts.
Finally, the tables that explain efficacy and attitude toward change also show the 
prophetic tradition at work. Table 5.20, a factor o f political efficacy, shows the expected 
negative relationship between church attendance and political efficacy for western 
Germany. But this relationship does not exist for eastern Germany. Church attendance in 
eastern Germany is not related to political efficacy. Perhaps eastern German church 
attenders feel a little more efficacious because they have recently witnessed the power of 
political action to change the system. However, this attitude is likely to be short-lived. 
Table 5.21 shows that post-transition church attenders have little sense of personal 
efficacy. Like their western counterparts, church attenders in the post-transition societies
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of Eastern Europe agree that people can do little to change their lives. But Table 5.22 
shows that, for right now, eastern German and Hungarian church attenders do not have 
the same negative attitude toward change as do western German church attenders. For 
the period immediately after the transition there remains evidence of optimism and 
efficacy, as church members identify with those who spoke up and brought about political 
change in their country.
CONCLUSIONS
So what does this examination of the political and moral values of church 
attenders in post-transition societies lead us to expect? This research shows that churches 
and church members in the post-transition societies o f Eastern Europe are remarkably 
similar to the West, despite half a century of repression and isolation. The resilience of 
the institution in these societies is reflected in the similarity of attitude between East and 
West.
Once again I return to the role of the church in civil society. As Tocqueville
pointed out so long ago in Democracy in America, there is a definite connection between
the moral values o f a society and its political practices. Democracy requires a
functioning civil society to provide a medium for the formation of democratic consensus.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a German Lutheran pastor, writing in 1940 about
experiences o f oppression during his recent past, explained how he saw the church
recovering democratic values out of totalitarianism:
...everything connected with Christianity was severely repressed. Against 
the worship of irrationality, blood, and the bestial instinct in man, it was 
necessary to counterpose reason, against arbitrary law -- the written law,
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against barbarism — culture and humanism, against coercion — freedom, 
tolerance and the rights of man, against the politicization of art and science 
— the autonomy of these different spheres of life. And so it happened that 
among the defenders of these maligned values as well as among 
Christians, there grew a sense of a certain kind of alliance. It turned out 
that all o f these values — reason, scholarship, humanism, tolerance, 
autonomy — which had until recently served as battle cries in the struggle 
against Christianity and the Church, were in fact extremely close to the 
Church. This was a time of the most unprecedented attacks on 
Christianity, a time when its most fundamental truths were harshly 
denounced in the most uncompromising manner, contrary to all norms of 
reason, culture, humanism, and tolerance. And the more Christianity was 
persecuted and oppressed, the stronger became its alliance with these 
values, which unexpectedly widened Christianity’s horizons (as cited in 
Michnik 1993, p. 122).
The churches in the totalitarian societies o f Central and Eastern Europe 
experienced much the same sort o f conditions as Bonhoeffer describes. And out of these 
experiences the churches, especially the churches of Poland and eastern Germany, have 
made a heart-felt conversion to democracy. They have learned democracy, just as 
Tocqueville reported of the civil institutions of American democracy, through the process 
of recreating civil society in their societies. Through the actions of church members and 
others committed to promoting a democratic transition who came together within the 
protective spaces provided by the churches themselves, they began a process of 
democratic discourse which led, inevitably, to democratic transitions.
Adam Michnik, the Polish leftist intellectual, recognized the importance of civil 
society to a democratic transformation. First, he said, transformation can only come 
through reform from below — that is, through concerted action on the part o f individuals 
without political power to associate and negotiate a democratic transformation. Second, 
the only way those seeking such a transformation could succeed was to recognize the
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commonality o f their democratic commitments and use that as a bridge to overcome
political, cultural, and religious differences. Michnik (and Vaclav Havel, the Czech
intellectual, as well) argued that to achieve a democratic transformation of totalitarian
society one must create a civil society “as i f ’:
People should act as if  they lived in a free society, and in the process they 
would constitute moments and places for a free existence. They should 
speak primarily to one another, not to their political overlords, expressing 
their differences but with mutual respect. In this way, at least some 
aspects of an independent social existence would be created (Goldfarb 
1992, p. 15).
This experience of coming together, usually within the protective confines o f the church, 
in order to recreate civil society caused church members to become the carriers of 
democratic values within these societies. Out of this process of recreating civil society 
church members in these post-totalitarian societies have learned how to be democratic 
citizens.
And as Putnam (1993) suggests in his recent book, the shape of this civil society 
is important to the success of a democratic outcome. Putnam argues that even within a 
democratic society, when civil society is organized along a vertical dimension, when 
patronage and favors determine allegiance, and interpersonal relationships are marked by 
distrust, exploitation and powerlessness, democratic outcomes are less likely to occur.
But when civil society is organized along a horizontal dimension, with dense networks of 
local associations and active engagement in community affairs marked by trust and 
efficacy, democratic outcomes are more likely to occur.
I have shown in this research how civil society in these post-transition societies of 
Eastern Europe has been shaped to some extent by the churches operating to preserve 
and recreate civil society within these formerly totalitarian societies. I extend Putnam's 
work on the importance of the horizontal links o f civil society for democratic outcomes 
by exploring how the churches contributed to support for democracy in these totalitarian 
societies. I showed in Chapter Two how churches in the vertically organized, totalitarian 
societies of Eastern Europe preserved democratic values and promoted horizontal 
linkages in society, especially in places such as Eastern Germany and Poland, where all 
associations of civil society were severely repressed. The discussion of church support 
for democratic values in Chapter Five showed how church attenders continue to support 
democratic values in these post-transition societies o f Eastern Europe. I expect that the 
churches o f these post-transition societies will continue to work toward strengthening and 
broadening the scope of civil society and contributing to the network of horizontal 
linkages between people that are so important to the success of democracy. Evidence of 
such activity is already being seen in Poland, where new democrats have strongly 
opposed efforts by entrenched conservatives to reimpose measures such as a ban on 
legalized abortion in the country. And in eastern Germany the churches are continuing to 
work with environmental groups and others to improve the quality of life for eastern 
German citizens. All o f these efforts will help to broaden and enrich the horizontal 
linkages within civil society which were so carefully preserved by the churches during 
the years of totalitarianism.
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As the new democracies consolidate and routinize in eastern Europe, it will be 
interesting to see how church/state relationships evolve. Further research should explore 
what happens as the prophetic tradition recedes in influence and the priestly tradition 
once again attains precedence in these churches. I expect that church attenders in these 
post-transition societies will become increasingly like their democratic counterparts in 
western Germany as time goes on. That is, I expect that church members will continue to 
express strong support for democratic values, but primarily those democratic values 
which reflect the priestly tradition. The church is once again in a favorable situation in 
civil society within the newly emergent democracies. I expect that the expressions of 
optimism, efficacy, and trust that I saw among church attenders in the data from 1991 
will recede with time.
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